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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the politics of two grassroots social 
movements, the Unemployed People’s Movement (UPM), based 
in Grahamstown, and the Rural People’s Movement (RPM), 
based in the rural areas near Peddie, forty miles east.  Observing 
that urban and rural are political designations, the primary 
question of this thesis is: Do the politics of these social 
movements challenge the conception of urban and rural as 
discrete political spaces?  To some extent, it responds to and 
complicates Mamdani’s theory of a bifurcated state in post-
apartheid South Africa in which urban zones are the site of civil 
society and rural zones the site of traditional authorities, and only 
the former a democratised space (1996).  Three themes—race, 
space, and citizenship—are employed and interrogated in the 
process of answering the principal question.  Broadly historical 
in nature, and understanding the present political context to be a 
product of historical processes, the thesis begins with an 
historical study of the Grahamstown region from the time of the 
town’s founding in 1812 until the end of apartheid in 1994, 
keeping the three key themes in focus.  Then the politics of UPM 
and RPM are explored through a series of interviews aimed at 
understanding the context and experience of movement 
members and seeking their insight into the question of urban and 
rural space.  Their responses are presented as a dialogue 
employing a theoretical strategy from Aguilar (2014) that 
distinguishes between and provides a framework to measure the 
‘practical scope’ and the ‘interior horizon’ of movements.  The 
thesis concludes with a discussion of important themes arising in 
the interviews: citizenship, NGOs, and political parties, and, of 
course, space.  The backdrop to this concluding discussion is the 
xenophobic violence which occurred in Grahamstown in 
October 2015, helping situate the research and themes within the 
broader context of South African politics. 
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For the people of Grahamstown who lost their community in October 2015, 
and the people of Grahamstown who worked to make community anew. 
 
People bring community into being. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
URBAN & RURAL: ‘THE BURDEN OF PROTEST’ 
 
‘[C]artography is designed not simply to reflect, to represent by ‘capturing’ the geography of 
racialized power.  It is meant rather to re-present, to intervene in these racialized relations so as 
to initiate possibilities of resistance and response.’ – Prof David Theo Goldberg in Racist 
Culture (1993, 13) 
 
‘Where binaries have meaning, they are dangerous.’ – Prof Lungisile Ntsebeza at Thinking 
Africa Colloquium, Rhodes University (September 2014) 
 
 
On the First of December 1818, some 565 miles east from the Cape of Good Hope in southern 
Africa, a commando1 of British soldiers under Colonel Thomas Brereton, with some Boer and 
African auxiliaries, departed the rather newly established fort and town of Grahamstown heading 
east towards the Great Fish River.  Their purpose was to force Xhosa people following a chief 
named Ndlambe, who had already been driven violently across the Fish, further east beyond the 
Keiskamma River so that the ‘border’—the Fish River, which flowed between the Cape Colony 
in the west and land still inhabited by Xhosa in the east—might be ‘tranquil’ (Mostert 1992, 469).  
The pretense for the raid was cattle theft committed by Xhosa people against white farmers in the 
colony, who lived and ran their cattle on land which had been taken from the Xhosa only within 
the last seven years; land the control of which and access to which was still contested.  Serving 
the interests of tranquility, when Brereton found that the Xhosa had fled the approaching 
commando and hidden themselves and their cattle in the bush thickets along the Keiskamma, he 
‘turned his artillery on the bush and kept firing blindly into it’ (Mostert 1992, 470)—as 
indiscriminate as gunfire can be.  The cattle that stampeded out of the trees, some 10,000 head, 
were collected by the commando and driven back to the colony, and another 13,000 cattle were 
taken in the same raid.  Within a few weeks, the Xhosa were raiding the colony for cattle in earnest, 
because they had lost their most important source of food (Mostert 1992, 470).    
     In the December 1818 commando, known as the ‘Brereton Raid’, we can clearly recognise a 
rationale which has flowed via differently nuanced streams, but steadily nonetheless, through 
southern and South African political relationships into the present: The colonised space west of 
the river was governed by laws, and African incursion into it was criminal; it was a civilised space 
where political belonging—citizenship—was determined by race and allegiance to the British 
Crown.  East of the river was a space (in British imperial-colonial eyes) of illegitimate authorities, 
an African, uncivilised space inhabited by African (and therefore uncivilised) people, where both 
space and people were governable or controllable first with violence rather than with liberal 
1 Originally an Afrikaans word for an armed and mounted raiding party. 
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systems of law, and then with laws designed for their exclusion.  On the contrary, it was a space 
of established and enduring systems and traditions of political legitimacy and belonging, and the 
invasion of European soldiers and politicians, violence and politics was resisted for over a century 
before war and starvation ensured hegemony of the colonial system. 
     Nearly one hundred years after the Brereton Raid, in Grahamstown, on the 23rd of April 1917, 
a group of between five hundred and 1,000 African activists marched from the town’s ‘location’—
designated African spaces in South African parlance since the 1830s, referring both to urban and 
rural areas—to the doors of the Municipal Hall on High Street.  Decisions taken by the Municipal 
Council in 1914 that limited legal access by Africans to reside in Grahamstown to those employed 
in the city, set unfavourable conditions for leases for Africans, and which limited the number of 
cattle that could be legally kept by the residents of Grahamstown’s locations had been the subject 
of protest by petition in the city for three years (Southey 1990).  Furthermore, compounding the 
difficulties for Africans in Grahamstown, there had been many evictions from the locations and 
‘indiscriminate shooting’ of Africans.  These were the motivation for the march.  This protest, 
during which some of the demonstrators were armed, was a signal not only of frustration with 
municipal laws but also of a political autonomy extant in the African locations, and therefore it 
was crushed. 
     The marchers were met by municipal officials, ‘protected by a posse of foot police armed with 
rifles and bayonets fixed, drawn up in a cordon across High Street…. The Magistrate informed 
the crowd that he was prepared to listen to their demands only if they approached the authorities’ 
in a reasonable way and ordered them to return to the location.  The marchers would not disarm 
as long as the police were armed, but did retreat to the location (Southey 1990, 7).  In traditional 
commando style, auxiliary paramilitary forces were hastily enlisted and armed and, ‘By nightfall, 
the outskirts of the city [meaning the white section of the city] and especially those areas 
contiguous with the locations were “‘thoroughly picketed”’ (in Southey 1984, 247).  The Mayor 
insisted that the Africans must disarm or he would not address their concerns, but the next day 
almost 1,000 police and paramilitaries invaded the locations, armed and mounted or driving cars, 
where they surrounded the hill called Makana’s Kop and arrested some fifty-five people (Southey 
1990, 9-10).  Headlines in the Graham’s Town Journal read, ‘Grahamstown Army Marches on 
the Location’ and ‘Cavalry Charge on Makana’s Kop’ (26 April 1917).  The spatial-political 
division demonstrated in the Brereton Raid can clearly be seen in this action as well, and its 
purpose remained the same: violent control of Africans in specific space, and maintaining a 
‘tranquil’ border. 
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     Almost a century later—a century that saw the implementation of the violent ultra-
compartmentalisation of apartheid, as well as formal democracy and the election of a hegemonic 
African National Congress (ANC) government—in August 2014, members of the Unemployed 
People’s Movement and other Grahamstown residents were once more protesting outside of the 
(now Makana) City Hall.  Several hundred people mobilised against corruption in the 
municipality, calling for its dissolution; for transparent management of a corrupt Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP) housing program; and against a poor municipal response to 
a long-lasting and recurring water shortage problem.  Also arrayed once again in front of the 
Makana City Hall was a massive display of militarised police power: several heavily armoured 
cars as well as smaller South African Police Service (SAPS) vehicles with blinking lights blocked 
the road and the square on the west side of City Hall, and cordons of police in riot gear stood in 
front of the building, shields raised.  When speakers from the Unemployed People’s Movement 
addressed the activists from a platform immediately in front of City Hall, their backdrop was 
rendered in SAPS shields and helmets.  The meaning was clear: the march and the protest 
constituted, in the eyes of the municipality, an infringement to be controlled by force. 
     While no retributive invasion by the police into the township followed the protest in 2014 as it 
had in 1917, South Africa is nonetheless a country where space and citizenship continue to be 
politicised, racialised, contested, and controlled.  For ten years, Durban-based Abahlali 
baseMjondolo, ‘the largest organisation of the militant poor in post-apartheid South Africa’ 
(Abahlali baseMjondolo 2006), have faced violent (and illegal) eviction and repression from the 
state when they assert their right to urban land for housing: actions of lived necessity that are 
termed ‘land invasions’ by the state.  Similar violence has been meted out to shack-dwellers in 
Cape Town (Knoetze 2014; Sacks 2014) and Johannesburg (Keepile 2010).  The repressive 
narrative imagines the provenance of the repressible poor as ‘elsewhere’, often meaning ‘rural’, 
as in Durban where activists are cast as being from the Eastern Cape Province (Abahlali 
baseMjondolo 2015a).  South Africa is also a country where rural areas, like urban ones, remain 
intensely undemocratic spaces (Gasa 2015).  In 2008 and 2015, major episodes of xenophobic 
violence occurred which targeted mostly poor Africans from elsewhere on the continent, and, 
since mid-May of 2015, this violence, it has been argued, has been taken up by the state via 
Operation Fiela (Nicolson 2015), which has mobilised South African National Defence Force and 
police units to harass and coral ‘foreigners’—many families suspected of foreignness are South 
African.  Operation Fiela includes ‘land invasions’ among the crimes it will target (Abahlali 
baseMjondolo 2015b).  Behind all of this looms the massacre of thirty-four mineworkers by police 
at a Lonmin mine near Marikana in the Northwest Province in August of 2012—another 
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indiscriminate shooting of Africans—which police stubbornly lied about during the subsequent 
Farlam Commission of inquiry (Tolsi 2015).  Marikana is an affirmation that the lives of the 
(mainly rural) black poor are subordinate to control of the expression of popular and autonomous 
political will by poor black people and rendered as insignificant next to the necessity and sanctity 
of mining industry profits.  Contemporary South Africa is a context, on the whole, of modes of 
politics in which the confluence of space, race, and citizenship is of crucial conceptual and 
practical significance. 
     The focus of this thesis is this confluence.  The theoretical and methodological approach is to 
problematise the perception of discrete urban and rural political spaces by historicising the 
production of those perceived spaces alongside narratives of race and racism; and, in particular, 
to interrogate the political cogency of urban and rural in terms of popular politics, via the 
experiences and politics of two social movements in and near Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape. 
 
Henri Lefebvre first coined the phrase ‘the production of space’ in his book by that title (1974) in 
which he argued that ‘(Social) space is a social product’ which has ‘taken on, within the present 
mode of production, within society as it actually is, a sort of reality of its own’; furthermore that 
it ‘serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production it is 
also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power’ (26, emphasis original).  However, 
while Lefebvre imagined contemporary forms of power to be practised through the 
homogenisation of space (1974, 23), it was the Martinican psychologist, theorist, and activist, 
Frantz Fanon, who theorized the differentiation of space through power relationships.  This latter 
analysis will be the one more useful here.  Fanon located the racialised production of space—of 
‘a world divided into compartments’ ([1961] 1963, 37) governed through different modes and 
logics—at the center of the system of colonialism.  Significantly, both Lefebvre and Fanon 
theorise a fundamental resistance to oppressive space production.  The former writes, ‘The 
violence of power is answered by the violence of subversion…. State-imposed normality makes 
permanent transgression inevitable’ (1974, 23), echoing Fanon’s more specific formulation of a 
decade earlier: 
 
The violence which has ruled over the ordering of colonial world, which has ceaselessly 
drummed the rhythm for the destruction of native social forms and broken up without 
reserve the systems of reference of the economy, of the customs of dress and external life, 
that same violence will be claimed and taken over by the native when, deciding to embody 
history in his own person, he surges into the forbidden quarters ([1961] 1963, 40). 
 
     Both the production of (controlled) space and the resistance to systems of spatial control figure 
in this research.  After Fanon, a set of questions can be enumerated that enable a critical method, 
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analysis, and understanding in regard to the contemporary political situation in South Africa: 
Fanon writes, ‘if we examine closely this system of compartments, we will at least be able to 
reveal the lines of force it implies.  This approach to the colonial world, its ordering and its 
geographical layout will allow us to mark out the lines on which a decolonized society will be 
reorganized’ ([1961] 1963, 37).  We will be examining this system of compartments, its lines of 
force, its ordering and geographical layout over two broad historical periods: the colonial period 
(including apartheid 1948-1994) and, with reconceiving the organisation and decolonisation of 
society kept optimistically in mind, the post-colonial period since the proclamation of South 
African democracy and the inauguration of the ANC government (1994-present).  The questions 
we can ask include: What has been the role and import of space and spatial politics in the history 
of South Africa? How has space been used as an instrument of conceptual and practical control? 
What have been the forms of resistance to this control?  In contemporary, post-colonial South 
Africa, do aspects of the colonial spatial organisation and relationships persist? (It is argued here 
that they do.)  How are people involved in political resistance in South Africa experiencing space 
and spatial control? Crucially, do the discrete spaces—the ‘compartments’—of the colonial period 
make political sense from the perspective of people involved in popular forms of resistance in the 
postcolony?  As indicated above, this last question will be directed primarily at the concepts of 
urban and rural. 
     Why urban and rural?  I argue in this thesis that the specific spatial-political division between 
urban and rural was one of the first articulations of division introduced to southern Africa through 
colonisation, that it was intimately linked to the development of ideas of race in South Africa, and 
that this lengthy process has ramifications today both for modes of control and for mobilising 
resistance.  Furthermore, the two leading theorists of the production of space in the post-colony, 
Mahmood Mamdani and Partha Chatterjee, deal with the ideas of urban and rural.  Considering 
political space in a post-colonial context requires engaging their work both seriously and 
critically—seriously because they both corrode specific epistemological assumptions inherent in 
colonialism and colonial thinking which have been translated to the present dispensation largely 
through global neoliberalism and its attendant power relations; and especially critically if one’s 
purpose is to contribute to the erosion of such modes of thinking.  Central to Mamdani’s and 
Chatterjee’s work are specific political conceptions of urban and rural which provide a functional 
starting point for interrogation of those spaces in the post-colony.   
 
In Citizen and Subject (1996), Mamdani theorizes that a bifurcated state (referring equally to 
‘situation’ and ‘political entity’) emerged in both colonial and post-colonial African countries in 
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which a fundamental political division falls along the boundary between urban and rural zones.  
Mamdani argues that, through colonialism, the state was ‘organized differently in rural areas from 
urban ones’; while on the one hand ‘urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil 
rights’, the ‘language’ of ‘rural power’ was ‘that of community and culture’.  The urban areas 
were governed through direct rule, which aimed at ‘the exclusion of natives [sic] from civil 
freedoms guaranteed to citizens in civil society,’ while indirect rule in rural areas ‘was about 
incorporating natives into a state enforced customary order’ with chiefs as client authorities 
(Mamdani 1996, 18).  One side of the bifurcation—envision the Fish River, c. 1818— was 
‘governed [through] a racially defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an associated 
regime of rights’, while the other side, which ‘ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-economic 
coercion and administratively driven justice’ (1996, 19). 
     Mamdani posits a theory of differentiated access to citizenship which is demarcated by the 
urban-rural divide: urban institutions of civil society govern citizens, while rural, ‘customary’ 
power structures rule over subjects (1996, 61).  In both cases, the mode of governance experienced 
by most black people is ‘despotism’: ‘direct and indirect rule [civil and customary authority] are 
better understood as variants of despotism: the former centralized, the latter decentralized’ 
(Mamdani 1996, 18).  In South Africa there is another line of argument that does not consider all 
rural space in terms of ‘customary’ or ‘traditional’ authority, but still considers ‘the rural’ as an 
undemocratic space, where citizenship is circumscribed by the ‘rule’ of commercial agriculture, 
especially for ‘the black majority’ (Haupt 2014).  Either of these understandings of rural political 
reality is open to Mamdani’s argument that formerly colonised African societies, including South 
Africa, were deracialised with independence but not democratized inasmuch as the colonially 
engineered bifurcation between urban and rural has persisted into the postcolony.  Mamdani 
argues in this vein: 
 
The reform of decentralized despotism turned out to be a centralized despotism.  So we 
come to the seesaw of African politics that characterizes its present impasse.  On one hand, 
decentralized despotism exacerbates ethnic divisions, and so the solution appears as a 
centralization.  On the other hand, centralized despotism exacerbates the urban-rural 
division, and the solution appears as a decentralization.  But as variants both continue to 
revolve around a shared axis—despotism (1996, 291). 
 
       Centralisation and despotism characterise the political experience of many contemporary 
South Africans.  Since 1994, and accelerating in the first fifteen years of this century, the 
centralisation of political power within the ANC national government coincides with a 
centralisation of wealth through neoliberal structures that increasingly marginalises those locales 
and segments of the population that are already isolated politically.  Responsibility devolves more 
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and more to local government, while short resources and corruption hinder the meeting of those 
responsibilities, and politics by marginalised people are frequently explained and deopolicitised 
with the phrase ‘service delivery’ (Hart 2013).  It has often been argued that, in the urban areas of 
South Africa, the politics of the poor are mediated through ghettoization and access to 
employment, location of and access to housing, and access to water and electricity.  However, 
space remains acutely contested and both land occupations and forced removals still occur, post-
apartheid (Hart 2013, 30).  However instead of addressing the crucial question of how citizenship 
is differentiated in South Africa, responses to protest and political activity by the marginalised are 
framed, from above, in the strictly technocratic terms of ‘service delivery’ (Gibson 2011, 29-30) 
or ‘law and its enforcement’ (Neocosmos 2006a, 4).  Alongside neoliberal depoliticisation, the 
same logic of control of certain segments of the population that we saw mobilised in the colonial 
era responses to African politics is deployed.  Political assassinations and killing of poor activists 
during protests in Durban (Pithouse 2014), the mass violence of Marikana in 2012, and the 
militarised xenophobia of Operation Fiela in 2015 demonstrate that government, including 
national government, resorts increasingly to violent repression—that is, despotism—and this 
certainly problematises any argument that the repressive practices of the current South African 
state are very different from the state(s) of the past, even if they are different in scale.  In these 
expressions of state politics is a blending of ‘the tyranny of The Market’ and the ‘discipline of 
direct colonial rule’ at work (Pithouse 2006, 250).  In this context, politics outside of the formal, 
exclusive structures join day-to-day questions of survival on the chopping block of neoliberalism 
in the practice of politics, to quote Rancière, as ‘the art of suppressing politics’ ([1992] 1995, 10). 
 
Mamdani’s work, like Fanon’s, affords us the opportunity to ask a number of important questions.  
Conclusions to even the most thorough intellectual efforts often leave readers with more 
unresolved questions than answered ones.  Perhaps the writer shares in this dilemma, as well, 
arriving at ‘the end’ only to find himself or herself unsatisfied.  Maybe it is fortunate for the long 
process of intellectual work that no question is ever fully answered, but it can be frustrating and 
difficult to accept in the short term.  However illuminating a line of thought might be, it seems 
that the only end it can achieve is an artificial one.  Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject concludes in 
this way: with much more to say; with questions.  It appears necessary to explore some questions 
that arise from Mamdani’s argument in the hopeful interest of providing some basis for expanding 
on his project, and, in particular, analysing critically the production of urban and rural political 
space. 
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     In the last pages of Citizen and Subject, Mamdani offers this enjoinder: ‘The point is neither to 
set aside dualisms that mark social theory nor to exchange one set for another more adequate to 
describing the contemporary situation.  Rather it is to problematize both sides of every dualism 
by historicizing it, thereby underlining the institutional and political condition for its reproduction 
and for its transformation’ (1996, 299).  This is a view which has guided my intellectual 
endeavours, including this thesis, very broadly approached through the following questions: How 
can we question the logic of divisions? Likewise, how can we challenge divisions, both actual and 
perceived? Most importantly, what is the shape of a politics that questions—and perhaps 
challenges—divisions?  Coupled with the questions drawn from Fanon, outlined above, we can 
take a critical and precise approach to ‘problematising’ the perceived urban and rural political 
dualism in South Africa.  With problematising dualisms and questioning divisions in mind, 
Mamdani ends Citizen and Subject by saying that it is by linking the urban and the rural that 
formerly colonised African societies will advance the processes of democratisation which have 
largely eluded them (1996, 297). 
     More recent literature on South Africa has repeated the necessity of creating this link, both 
intellectually and politically.  Hart and Sitas (2004) call for a more integrated approach to 
questions of the urban and rural in South Africa.  Research, they argue, has itself been largely 
bifurcated (2004, 32).  Similarly, Kepe and Ntsebeza write that there is a ‘marginalization of the 
rural’ in scholarship on South Africa (2012, 4-5).  Moreover, even though there is an extensive 
body of literature that explores the spatial aspect of domination and resistance in major urban 
areas in South Africa (Hart 2013; Selmeczi 2012; Gibson 2011; Neocosmos 2006a) and other 
parts of the world (Chatterjee 2004; Zibechi 2010), little work has been done on small towns in 
South Africa.  One valuable piece is an interpretation, through Fanon, of spatial divisions in 
Grahamstown (Pillay 2012), and another is Gillian Hart’s book Disabling Globalization (2002), 
which focuses on small towns in KwaZulu-Natal.  Significantly, however, integrated discussions 
of the urban and rural are also lacking (Hart and Sitas 2004). 
     How can we expand on Mamdani’s ‘bifurcated state’ formulation, with this literature gap in 
mind?  Another set of questions suggests itself, the first question of which is drawn from the 
important book by Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed (2004).2  As mentioned, Chatterjee’s 
2 Although Chatterjee has been referenced, and will be again, this thesis is not intended to engage in the debates of 
the ‘subaltern school’, even though Chatterjee is a founding member of that intellectual project.  The reader may 
choose to situate this particular research in the field of ‘subaltern studies’, but it has no intention of loyalty to subaltern 
theories or theorists.  Alhough valuable intellectual efforts have emerged from ‘subaltern studies’, the work of 
attending to the various strains and critiques of this body of work can be more distracting than fruitful.  Defining ‘the 
subaltern’ or ‘subalterneity’, arguing whether these are fixed or flexible concepts—or not concepts at all but specific 
types or groups of people—are some of the debates which I seek to avoid here except for one brief note below.  
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work is significant in the study of space in postcolonial societies.  Writing about urban India, but 
with theoretical importance for South Africa and other countries, Chatterjee proposes a distinction 
between ‘real’ and ‘formal’ citizenship (2004, 4), in which only those with access to the former 
are fully rights-bearing citizens.  This same ‘analysis has often been applied to post-apartheid 
South Africa, where the realm of civil society is in fact a small one’ (Gibson 2011, 28).  South 
Africans, it is argued, are extended ‘formal’ citizenship, but the relegation of the majority of the 
population to a second-rate physical and political space belies a ‘real’ citizenship for all citizens.  
This latter group, often considered ‘encroachers’ and ‘polluters’ in the urban sphere, are not a part 
of civil society, but of ‘political society’ (2004, 140; 40). 
     Political society is the space of the ‘governed’ (of Chatterjee’s title), and its people make up 
‘populations’, which are governable. ‘Unlike citizenship’, Chatterjee writes, ‘which carries the 
moral connotation of sharing in the sovereignty of the state and hence of claiming rights in relation 
to the state, populations do not bear any inherent moral claim’ (2004, 136).  It is an easily 
observable fact in any city in the world that some urban people are not afforded the same, or any, 
access as ‘full’ citizens to the civil society institutions that are ostensibly urban.  As populations, 
lacking a moral obligation from the state, they are the recipients of services rather than rights, a 
reality seen and experienced in many South African cities (Chatterjee 2004, 136; Gibson 2011).  
Mamdani reiterates the conceptual distinction between civil and political society in Define and 
Rule (2012) as follows: ‘the modern state ensures equal citizenship in political society while 
acknowledging difference in civil society, but its colonial counterpart institutionalized difference 
in both the polity and society’ (2).  This articulation brings in the process of transition from the 
colonial state to the postcolonial state, which is of special theoretical importance going forward 
in this particular inquiry. 
     Mamdani and Chatterjee complement and complicate each other.  Chatterjee reveals clearly 
the contradictions inherent in the ‘centralized despotism’ of urban civil society, its limited 
definitions of and access to citizenship.  While, then, we can say that urban is not the site of only 
citizens, and having pointed out above that rural does not signify only customary authority and 
subjects, we must also acknowledge that the line of bifurcation, at least in a South African context, 
is not neatly drawn.  Therefore, we could ask the questions: How do we account for those segments 
of society whose access to citizenship is not conterminous with their location in either the urban 
or the rural? Is there a ‘space’—not physical, but political, and, in that way, potentially 
Intellectuals make their best contributions when they are invested not in closed-circuit debates with their colleagues, 
but when their eyes are turned outwards from the academy with theory as a tool, not as an objective.   
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transcending the spatial bifurcation—between civil society and customary authority, between the 
urban and the rural, that has political characteristics of each and potential for linking the two? 
     The fact of ambiguity leads to other questions.  The penultimate chapter of Citizen and Subject 
deals with the concept of ‘The Rural in the Urban’.  What new angles on the issue, if any, are 
available if we propose the reverse situation: the ‘Urban in the Rural’?  Both of these expressions 
are seemingly paradoxical, but the point is not a subversion or conversion of the urban or rural 
spaces into their opposites, so obviously we are not proposing the presence of large buildings in 
the midst of (what would no longer be) farmland, nor the more impractical (but no more extreme) 
reverse, but rather about a conceptual and political re-perception of what those spheres mean and 
how they interact.  For inspiration we can look to the work of Norman Etherington, whose 
misleadingly titled history of South Africa in the first half of the nineteenth century, The Great 
Treks (2001), takes a unique approach.  Rather than writing another history from the point of view 
found in the colonial archive, Etherington attempts a history that has as its vantage point a central 
location in the High Veld, a repositioning from which the colonial incursions of Europeans can be 
viewed from without, rather than nearly exclusively from within themselves, and from which ‘the 
agents of colonialism appear first as specks on a distant horizon’, challenging the ‘pernicious 
tradition of viewing South African history through the eyes of white colonists’ (2001, xiii).  He 
critiques, too, other methods (among them anthropological and linguistic) that, in trying to shift 
the focus away from the colonial report, ‘reproduce by other means the Us/Them binary opposition 
typical of colonial encounters….We have events, They have ways of life. We have history, They 
have culture’ (2001, xiii)—in the idiom of Mamdani’s study, ‘we are citizens; they are subjects’.  
Does a method like Etherington’s, very loosely captured in the inverted idea of the ‘urban in the 
rural’, have value in the attempt to link these two spheres? Mamdani mentions the connection 
between ‘urban activism’ and ‘rural discontent’ (1996, 220).  Can we talk, after Chatterjee and 
Etherington, about urban discontent manifested in rural activism?  Taken further, might the 
divisions and binaries through which we understand politics and political action in fact be 
inappropriate to the circumstances that actually obtain and in which many, if not most, people 
make their lives?  The fact, detailed by Mamdani, that people have ties and residences in both the 
urban and rural spaces makes this a compelling question. 
     Mainly, Mamdani’s argument about the bifurcation of colonial and postcolonial African 
societies deals with institutions of power and the reproduction of power: an ‘institutional 
segregation’ in the words of Jan Smuts, that ‘carries with it territorial segregation’ (quoted in 
Mamdani 1996, 6).  The idea of ‘territorial’ spaces being significantly linked to political spaces 
underlies the argument of this thesis.  However, Mamdani’s focus on institutions has provided for 
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one of the major critiques of Citizen and Subject as a narrow and ‘statist’ account (for a 
sophisticated example see Neocosmos, forthcoming, 2016).  However, the political landscape of 
South Africa has been ordered largely from above in dialectical relation to what have become 
suppressed or mutated political traditions and trajectories that are constituted from below.  (We 
will return to this idea of ‘above’ and ‘below’, further on).  Given this, I would argue that Mamdani 
established the particular political history which he did with the intention of proposing a particular 
political future, which, admittedly, comes through quite vaguely.  Since civil society is a site of 
power, especially if one considers the circumscribed nature of civil society—the ‘centralized 
despotism’—Mamdani asserts that ‘no reform of contemporary civil society institutions can by 
itself’ effect reform of the ‘decentralized despotism’ of customary authority which he argues exists 
in many African societies (1996, 15), and of which we have seen local government increasingly 
taking on the characteristics.  It is the final point made in Citizen and Subject that the route to 
transcending the urban-rural divide cannot be on the same avenues built by power.  ‘It is necessary 
to transcend the dualism of power around which the bifurcated state is organized’, in Mamdani’s 
words (1996, 301).  Pursuing the idea of a different political future, Mamdani asks, ‘What social 
forces can link the urban and the rural?’ (1996, 297), and he identifies two ways in which the 
urban and rural have been linked through structures of the state, what he calls ‘administrative’ and 
‘political’ ways, but goes on to say that the former ‘turned out to be coercive’ and the latter 
resorted to clientelism (1996, 300).  However, and this is vital going forward, Mamdani asks the 
question: ‘If power reproduced itself by exaggerating differences and denying the existence of an 
oppressed majority, is not the burden of protest to transcend these differences without denying 
them?’ (1996, 8).   
     It is striking that the manner of transformation, the different political future, which Mamdani 
envisions is captured by the phrase ‘burden of protest’.  This would suggest, in the same vein that 
our discussion here will take, that it is outside of institutions of power—in the ‘oppressed 
majority’—that the mode of transformation must be sought.  Therefore, we can ask, what role do 
people excluded from or not fully included in civil society have in theorising the urban-rural 
division and potentially challenging it?—and it is my contention that they certainly have one.  
What is more, what is the role of people ‘outside’ of liberal civil society, ‘the governed’, in 
initiating societal transformation?—once again, I claim that they have one.  It is possible that 
present in some forms of protest are concepts and politics which suggest a different way of 
thinking about political space than the way born of and matured through colonialism.  Such protest 
itself, if it does in fact move across spaces, will likely be difficult to categorise.  Mamdani writes 
that ‘to create a democratic majority is to transcend’ the divisions organised by power, including 
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the urban-rural divide (1996, 296).  We will now turn to those people who bear ‘the burden of 
protest’. 
 
Social space, as we have seen it characterised by Fanon and Lefebvre, involved elements of 
resistance.  As Fanon expresses it, in the context of colonialism, ‘the presence of an obstacle 
accentuates the tendency toward motion’ ([1963] 1961, 53).   With motion in mind, let us look to 
social movements as potential sources of resistance to spatial delimitation: that is, ‘other forces 
on the boil, because the rationality of the state, of its techniques, plans and programmes, provokes 
opposition’ (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 23).   
     As noted at the outset, this research is situated geographically in the modern-day Eastern Cape 
Province of South Africa, and specifically around the city of Grahamstown.  Grahamstown played 
an important role, especially during the early colonial period, in the development of British 
colonial systems of control and definitions of space and race.  Though no longer an important 
urban centre in South Africa, research in the Grahamstown region still has the potential to provide 
valuable insight to the questions at hand.  As has been explained, the broad questions posed above 
are considered through the politics and practice of two social movements in the specific area under 
study: the Unemployed People’s Movement, based in and near Grahamstown, and the Rural 
People’s Movement, which operates near Peddie, some forty miles east of Grahamstown.  In its 
most specific construction yet, the primary question of this research is if, in popular politics, at 
least as they are manifested through social movements in Grahamstown, whether the perception 
of urban and rural as discrete political spheres is as cogent as the discourse of and about South 
African (even popular) politics would suggest; or if these social movements practise a politics that 
provides an alternative understanding of political urban and rural space. 
     As we have seen, the trend of South African politics since the end of apartheid has been an 
incongruous mix of liberalisation and repression.  In particular, mobilisations of popular politics 
have either been cast as criminal or about ‘service delivery’, rather than politics.  Sidney Tarrow 
links suppression by liberalisation with social movements and citizenship: ‘movements and their 
potential disruption led national states to […] open new forms of participation to their citizens’; 
and in this way ‘citizenship emerged through a rough dialectic between movements […] and the 
national state’ (1994, 76).  In an era when much of the political activity by marginalised people in 
South African meets with criminalisation and violent repression, it is questionable (at least in 
many cases) whether a dialectic exists in this shape at the moment, but nonetheless we can look 
to social movements for examples of popular politics that express an alternative logic to the 
hegemonic one. 
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     A dialectical theory of social movements that perhaps better explains the politics under 
examination is developed by Laurence Cox and Alf Nilsen, in their book on a Marxist approach 
to the study of social movements, We Make Our Own History (2014).  Through the Marxist 
tradition, they consider social movements, not (as in Tarrow’s explanation) as groups that 
‘obediently play a constructive role within a set of rules established from above’, but as actors 
with potentially quite different ideas about the organisation of society (2014, 26).  In their 
construction, the dialectic through which social relationships, including citizenship, are 
constructed does not occur between social movements and the state, specifically, but between 
‘social movements from below’—that is, movements mobilised and organised around a rationality 
of ‘subaltern groups’ (2014, 72)—and ‘social movements from above’—that is, movements which 
seek to sustain the status quo; to ‘either reproduce or extend’ their power ‘and their hegemonic 
position within a given social formation’ (2014, 59-60).3  ‘Social movements from below have 
shaped the modern world’, they write;  
 
[t]hey have not done so alone, but in conflict with massively powerful movements from 
above: successive forms of capitalist accumulation, new types of state and hegemony, 
racist mobilisations and patriarchal movements, new forms of “common sense” and brute 
force which have all attempted, often effectively, to reinforce existing structures of power, 
exploitation and sociocultural hierarchies (2014, vi).  
 
This yields the theoretical outcome that specific political and social norms are dialectically 
produced social hegemonies (in the Gramscian sense); that there is not a social or political order 
that exists outside of human activity.  In other words, to allude once more to Fanon, ‘Man [sic] is 
what brings society into being’ ([1952] 1967, 4).  Therefore, ‘from the abstract consideration of 
how societies are constituted through praxis […] we return to the immediate and concrete terrain 
of struggle, mobilisation and alliance-building – but now on our own terms, not taking the given 
order for granted but seeing it as contingent and capable of being displaced’ (Cox and Nilsen, 48).  
This assumption underlies the following arguments about the historical production of existing 
politics of space in South Africa and the possibility of alternative politics of space, as well as to 
the political identities of ‘race’ and ‘citizen’, which have been so intimately knitted to space in the 
South African context.  The argument in the following chapters that the spatial politics and 
relationships in South Africa—specifically the Grahamstown region—were a project of 
colonialists represents a ‘social movement (or series of movements) from above’, while the 
3 Compellingly simply, Cox and Nilsen define ‘subaltern groups’ as ‘social movements from below’ (2014, 2).  This 
will be the implicit definition of subaltern employed in this work, if one chooses to see ‘the subaltern’ in it.   
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principle purpose of this research, of looking to social movements for a critique of the urban and 
rural binary, is informed by the contingency of the ‘given order’. 
     Hart, reflecting on Gramsci via Peter Thomas, links this to our earlier discussion: ‘far from 
being “located” in civil society, hegemony traverses civil and political society’, such that a certain 
mode and conception of politics are ‘true’ until questioned through different (‘subaltern’) modes 
and conceptions (2013, 192).  Hart demonstrates the practicality for the South African context of 
understanding ‘social movements from above’ as all of those things which Cox and Nilsen outline 
(see above), and the resistance and dialectic through social movements from below in the move 
by the ANC government from consent to coercion and the proliferation of social movements 
‘representing concerted expressions of popular antagonism directed at the ANC’ (2013, 197-198). 
     These movements have particular theoretical significance.  Cox and Nilsen write, ‘Theory…is 
knowledge that is consciously developed out of experience,’ from ‘situated praxis’ (2014, 8; 56).  
Furthermore, they identify ‘a fundamental confusion in the sort of “critical” analysis which simply 
dissects the existing structures of society in isolation from the agency which created and maintains 
them, and which divorces calls for change from any sense of conversation with popular agency’ 
(2014, 206).  This research understands this to be true.  Therefore, the appropriate source for 
critical political theory, which is situated in praxis, and which does not necessarily share in 
hegemonic assumptions about the world, is in fact ‘social movements from below’ that mobilise 
around and because of their lived experience.  How, we can ask, do members of the Unemployed 
People’s Movement and of the Rural People’s Movement articulate the (their) ‘burden of protest’? 
 
This thesis is organised into two parts.  Each part is introduced with a short theoretical excursus 
that reflects on methodology and the approach to the research.  The first part, comprising three 
chapters that focus on the early colonial period, the late colonial period, and apartheid respectively, 
provides an historical context centred on Grahamstown and the surrounding region.  Special 
attention is paid to the three interlinked conceptual themes presented at the outset: space, race, and 
citizenship.  
     The second part proceeds from conclusions drawn out during the historical study: namely, that 
the conceptualisation of urban and rural political spaces or spheres is a product of colonial 
politics, impositions, and culture in which race is profoundly implicated.  It is against this divided 
landscape that the politics of the Unemployed People’s Movement and the Rural People’s 
Movement are considered.   
     In Chapter 4, the content of the interviews with social movement members is presented.  The 
words and ideas of the activist respondents are considered through an ‘annotated dialogue’ 
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between the two movements, framed by the discussion of urban and rural political division.  A 
‘theoretical strategy’ distinguishing between the ‘practical scope’ and ‘interior horizon’ of social 
movement politics as set out by Aguilar (2014) will structure this dialogue. 
     Chapter 5 relates events of October 2015 in Grahamstown in which the Unemployed People’s 
Movement, and, to a small extent, the Rural People’s Movement, were involved.  These are 
student protests and an outbreak of xenophobic looting.  The Unemployed People’s Movement 
supported the former and contested the latter. 
     The conclusion elaborates on critical themes that emerged in the interviews—namely, non-
governmental organisations, political parties, social movement autonomy, and citizenship—and 
makes an historical argument for how these entities and ideas as articulated by activists intersect 
or overlay the overarching themes of the thesis.  In the process, some specific complexity is 
brought to the question of urban and rural political space. 
 
PART I: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
 
First Excursus 
Historiography: Methodology and Theoretical Approach 
 
 
In his Prison Notebooks, the Italian Marxist and activist Antonio Gramsci writes, ‘One cannot 
be a philosopher, by which I mean have a critical and coherent conception of the world, without 
having a consciousness of its historicity’ (1971, 324).  To think about the world, at least the 
world of people, is to think historically.  Acknowledging the worth of Gramsci’s statement, we 
will approach the concepts of urban and rural in terms of their historicity; that is, as historically 
produced concepts with particular material and ontological trappings rooted in specific 
contexts.  Gramsci himself observes in ‘Notes on Italian History’ that urban and rural are 
political spaces roughly corresponding, at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the ‘North’ 
and ‘South’ of Italy.  The two spaces were involved in a ‘complex city-countryside 
relationship’ of collaboration and antagonism that ‘can be studied in’ specific ‘political 
programmes’ mobilised in Italy in the days of its industrialisation (Gramsci 1971, 90-102).   In 
this case, the context is the period since the colonisation of southern Africa by Europeans, and 
especially the 19th and 20th Centuries.  Crucially, the latter part of the colonial period is chosen 
not because the event marks the beginning of history in the region (which it does not), but 
because it initiated a specific historical process through which urban and rural came to define 
political space in southern Africa.   
     Gramsci continues by asking, ‘How is it possible to consider the present, and quite specific 
present, with a mode of thought elaborated for a past which is often remote and superseded?’ 
(1971, 324).  Answering this question entails a critical engagement with history and 
historiography, the details of the former and the worldviews of the latter.  The question of 
urban and rural that runs through this research is posed in and to the present—indeed, a 
‘specific present’—but it is historical in its scope and approach.  The question and its potential 
answers are situated within historical time.  The purpose in the three chapters that follow is to 
historicise ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ as concepts, to argue against their metaphysical permanence, to 
argue for their political and politicised place in history and the historical present.  To that end, 
the three themes introduced above—space, race, and citizenship—provide a useful scaffolding.  
In fact, these are concepts the practical manifestations of which, like urban and rural, were 
fashioned for South/ern Africa in the historical period under review. By historicising these 
concepts, a critically historical and political methodology can be applied in the part of this 
research dealing with social movements of the present. 
16 
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     However, we are not only dealing with a history of concepts but also a history of people, 
and specifically of people who have been and are coerced to the material and political ‘bottom’ 
of a hierarchical society.  In a different essay, Gramsci writes, ‘The history of subaltern groups 
is necessarily fragmented and episodic’, precisely because ‘[s]ubaltern groups are always 
subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up’ (1971, 54-55).1  
Because of this ‘activity of the ruling groups’, Gramsci declares, ‘Every trace of independent 
initiative on the part of subaltern groups should therefore be of incalculable value for the 
integral historian’ (1971, 55).  In the critical history of the Grahamstown region that follows, 
‘every trace’ of politics from below can be neither identified nor depicted, but in keeping with 
Gramsci’s compelling demand for an ‘integral’ history, careful attention has been paid to 
political currents which might flow ‘uphill’.  The ‘activity of the ruling groups’ is treated much 
like Michelle Alexander’s tracing of practises of subjugation of black people in the United 
States from slavery to the Jim Crow laws to mass incarceration with the assumption that 
‘preservation through transformation’ of institutions ‘is the process through which white 
privilege [political privilege of the ruling class] is maintained, though the rules and rhetoric 
change’ (2010, 21). 
     Just as political movements from below must accomplish this defiant ‘uphill’ move, so must 
the historian who encounters the historiography of the oppressor, in the words of Walter 
Benjamin ‘[regard] it as his [sic] task to brush history against the grain’ ([1940] 2005, np).  We 
might look to Etherington, already introduced, for a neatly worked example of this kind of 
history: By shifting the historical vantage point away from the colonial centre, he quite literally 
works against the figurative grain of earlier historiography of South/ern Africa.  Another 
notable example is Ifi Amadiume’s critical ethnography of gender in pre-colonial and colonial 
Nigeria (1987), which, like this thesis, attempts to complicate an established binary.  In order 
to work out an ‘integral’ history, it is precisely the ‘established’, that which has undergone 
establishment, with which we must take issue.  In this case, it is the established historiography 
and the historiographical establishment.   
     The objective is not merely revisionist.  Rather it is the tracing of political ideas through a 
specific history, to situate them within that history rather than above, outside, or beside it.  An 
historian would necessarily begin with primary sources, although, as Etherington puts it, ‘A 
major problem for those who want to create indigenous rivals for embryonic white settlements 
1 Cox and Nilsen’s theory of social movements ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ outlined in the introduction and 
of great use in this research is ultimately Gramscian, in this regard. 
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such as Plymouth Rock, Botany Bay and Cape Town is that there are no written records to 
work from’ (2001, xiii).  However, this thesis is not the work of an historian, and therefore it 
relies largely on secondary sources, though occasionally primary sources were available.  
While historical in its outlook, the research is not meant to provide a thorough history but rather 
to make a point about politics and give context to the politics and actions of the Unemployed 
People’s Movement and the Rural People’s Movement, which are discussed in the second part 
of the thesis.  In keeping with the argument about historiography here, I have been critical of 
the sources when necessary.  In particular, I have reproached the elision of politics where it 
occurs, the argument for or assumption of a natural or apolitical state of society.  ‘Historians’, 
writes Etherington, ‘who think in terms of organic development of pre-destined nation-states 
include everyone inside the borders as part of “our history”.  People on the other side of the 
fence tend to get left out’ (2001, 5-6).  The argument can be extended to speak of fenced 
concepts other than simply the nation-state.  To follow Fanon, ‘[S]ociety, unlike biochemical 
processes, cannot escape human influences.  Man [sic] is what brings society into being.  The 
prognosis is in the hands of those who are willing to get rid of the worm-eaten roots of the 
structure’ ([1952] 1967, 4).  We—people, not a metaphysical History—generate and maintain 
‘fences’, even when the activity of people abounds to contradict their maintenance.  The urban 
and rural divide is potentially another of these fences which can only be conceived of in terms 
of histories that define by division.  Suspecting worms in the structure, I have sought to dispel 
the ‘organic-ness’ and emphasise the political aspect of that boundary.   
 
The Haitian intellectual Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes in Silencing the Past (1995), in a chapter 
entitled ‘An Unthinkable History’, ‘When reality does not coincide with deeply held beliefs, 
human beings tend to phrase interpretations that force reality within the scope of these beliefs’ 
(72).  He pursues this argument through the history and historiography of the Haitian 
Revolution.  As Trouillot relates, Europeans living on the eve of that revolution could not 
conceive of a massive and coordinated revolt by the enslaved people of Haiti.  This was based 
on the ontologically perceived inability of black Africans to conceive of freedom.  Up until the 
revolution, slave owners and European intellectuals alike spoke of its impossibility.  Indeed, 
they continued to deny it during the revolution, as well, and even after the revolution, so that 
‘in most places outside Haiti, more than a century after it happened, the revolution was still 
largely unthinkable history’ (1995, 95).  During those intervening years, Trouillot argues, 
expanding colonialism had justified its own logic (1995, 95), not least (and maybe most) in the 
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continent Africa, a small of region of which is our focus here.  Trouillot explains the process 
through which this happened: 
 
The treatment of the Haitian Revolution in written history outside of Haiti reveals two 
familiar tropes that are identical, in form (rhetorical) terms, to figures of discourse of 
the late eighteenth century.  The first kind of tropes are formulas that tend to erase 
directly the fact of a revolution.  I call them, for short, formulas of erasure. The second 
kind tends to empty a number of singular events of their revolutionary content so that 
the entire string of facts, gnawed from all sides, becomes trivialized.  I call them 
formulas of banalization (1995, 96). 
 
Here, we are not dealing specifically with revolution, but with the possibility of politics and 
political action—although perhaps of politics that, if magnified in scale and scope, could in 
some ways be called revolutionary.  Two erasures and two banalizations after the fashion of 
Trouillot are pertinent to the present argument: Through colonialism, politics other than 
colonial politics are erased, and, even in the process of the formation of urban and rural, the 
political contingency of urban and rural is erased.  Likewise, the actions of people offering 
different political options are not recognised as such, and the distinction between ‘urban’ and 
‘rural’ is dehistoricised and thus banalised.  In a history without historicity, ‘worldview wins 
over the facts’ (Trouillot 1995, 93). 
    We can also consider Kristin Ross’s discussion (2002) of the student and worker uprising in 
France in May 1968 in which she interrogates the frequent assessment of that major political 
event—that ‘Nothing happened’.  Ross writes of ‘the police conception of history’, which she 
derives from Rancière’s understanding of the police, as ‘less concerned with repression than 
with a more basic function: that of constituting what is or is not perceivable, determining what 
can or cannot be seen, dividing what can be heard from what cannot’ (2002, 23).  The ‘police’, 
in this view, act on the moment itself as well as on the memory of the moment until a moment 
and movement of enormous political mobilisation and significance, like May ’68, can be 
banalised—to make the link to Trouillot—as historically inconsequential, and therefore 
invisible (or at least not worth seeing).  In colonial histories as in colonies, the police are a 
permanent presence.  Indeed, they are a nearly permanent presence throughout these chapters.  
With the police in view, Trouillot writes, ‘The forces [of the production of history] are less 
visible than gunfire, class property, or political crusades.  I want to argue that they are no less 
powerful […].  The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility; the ultimate challenge, the 
exposition of its roots’ (1995, xix). 
     The subaltern school, which takes at least its name and some of its terminology from 
Gramsci, has sought to bring those coerced into invisibility back into the historiography of 
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India.  In Dominance without Hegemony (1997), Ranajit Guha differentiates between two elitist 
modes of historiography, colonial and nationalist, both of which, in the context of India, 
‘proceeded from the standpoint of liberalism to regard the colonial state as an organic extension 
of the metropolitan bourgeois state and colonialism as an adaptation’ of such (x; 3-4).  The 
similarities with Etherington are clear.  Guha’s argument that ‘[t]o change the world and to 
maintain it in its current state have indeed been the dual functions of liberal historiography 
performed on behalf of the class [the elite] for which it speaks’ leads him to ask, ‘Where then 
does criticism come from?’ (1997, 6; 11).  He offers the answer, which obliges an allusion to 
the ‘burden of protest’, that criticism comes ‘[f]rom outside the universe of dominance which 
provides the critique with its object, indeed, from another and historically antagonistic 
universe’ (1997, 11).  Therefore, the historical critique which forms the first part of this 
research and enables undertaking the second part looks to that ‘outside’ and ‘antagonistic 
universe’ in constructing its historiography of urban and rural political space. 
     The word ‘outside’ is of special importance in this research, which deals with the spatial 
organisation of political life linked to distribution of power in South/ern Africa which has 
organised and distributed many people into and to the ‘outside’.  Given our discussion here, 
the relationship between space and politics in South Africa must be situated historically.  There 
are two processes to be explored in the coming chapters: the first deals with the history of 
politics in southern African societies; and the second with the hardening and ultimate 
perceptual reification of a boundary between a politically urban space and a politically rural 
space.  Race and citizenship are constant landmarks through these processes.  While the 
following chapters are not intended to provide either a thorough history of politics in South/ern 
Africa, or of the political and archaeological transitions that produced the present spatial 
dispensation, the theoretical aspect of the research requires a grounding in history.  The work 
of thinking critically about political division cannot be accomplished without a departure from 
the normative historical narratives that, more often than not, are dialectically allied with 
divisive political agendas. To take one relevant example, Mamdani writes, ‘Colonial privilege 
took two forms: racial and tribal.  Both were based on legally sanctioned difference, and both 
were taken as proof of that difference’ (2012, 3).  The blending of a priori and a posteriori 
justification for political designations (race, class; urban, rural, etc.) yielded an incontestable 
logic of division.  Nevertheless, the object in the following chapters is to contest. 
 
The first historical chapter, which takes the broadest perspective, deals largely with the period 
around and following the founding of Grahamstown in 1812, and presents an argument for the 
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definition and racialisation of political spaces in nineteenth century colonial southern Africa 
that can be conceived of as ‘urban’ and ‘rural’.  As a preliminary outline of this argument, we 
can look to Wilmsen’s intersectional theorisation of ‘remoteness’ in Botswana, in which 
remoteness is not simply a function of geographical distance from the centre (or centres), but 
rather ‘has three dimensions: geography, economics, and ethnicity’.  ‘Geographic distance’, 
continues Wilmsen, ‘is not even necessary, let alone a sufficient, criterion of remote status. 
[…]   
 
As the intersection of any two of these dimensions decreases from the (Tswana) norm, 
a designation of remoteness becomes more likely; in the intersection of all three stand 
San-speakers, who are generally conceived to be the most remote from Setswana 
society even if not from settled villages (1989, 274). 
 
Transposed to the eastern, ‘frontier’ region of the Cape Colony in the early and mid-nineteenth 
century, with (generally) European/African in place of Tswana/San this provides a broad 
argument for the political processes of spatial definition that were tightly bound to politics of 
race that were and are so fundamental to (but not essential to) southern and South African 
politics since colonisation. 
     The second historical chapter limits the focus to Grahamstown more narrowly and covers 
roughly a century from the mid-nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century, from the 
institutionalisation of Grahamstown’s ‘locations’ to the beginning of apartheid.  This chapter 
covers the development of Grahamstown’s urban spatial politics with the colonial (and later, 
national) politics of rural control, also intimately concerned with space, as a reference.  The 
project of urban-rural distancing argued in the preceding chapter is carried through this period, 
as well.  Importantly, forms of resistance that will be strikingly familiar to a South African of 
the twenty-first century appear as war ceased to be a political option in the Eastern Cape after 
the 1870s. 
     Then the angle is widened once more.  The third historical chapter encompasses the 
apartheid era (1948-1994) by taking account of the consolidation of a particular politics of 
space, race, and citizenship in South Africa during that time.  Special attention is devoted to 
locating apartheid in the longue durée of ‘social movements from above’ in the South/ern 
African context and under the three guiding themes of the moment, space, race, and citizenship.  
As resistance in and nearby Grahamstown shows, alternative politics were likewise reflective 
of continuity.  The historical section of the thesis concludes with two reflections on 
Grahamstown, one from 1986, just before the end of apartheid, and one from 2012, eighteen 
years after democracy. 
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As a postscript, we might revisit Gramsci’s question, ‘How is it possible to consider the present, 
and quite specific present, with a mode of thought elaborated for a past which is often remote 
and superseded?’  We might reconsider the intended reading.  In South Africa today, the 
colonial mode of thought (or of rule) is neither remote in temporal distance nor is it superseded 
by dramatically new lived experience.  We might assign to ‘remote’ the complex definition 
proposed by Wilmsen—in essence, colonial rurality.  We might rethink which past has been 
superseded, which political trajectories and which narratives have been repressed, suppressed, 
or erased.  If the remote and superseded past is the coerced past of African politics, then the 
question changes its meaning: ‘How is it possible to consider the present […] with a mode of 
thought [produced in colonialism] elaborated for [in the negative; for control of] a past [a 
history] which is often [rendered] remote and [therefore] superseded?’  We need to approach 
the social movements of the present at the least with uncertainty about the stability of the 
historical categories, because they are also political categories, in which they work. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
POLITICS & COLONIALISM IN THE FISH RIVER COUNTRY 
 
‘There stood a British fort named Grahamstown in honour of the region’s destroyer.’ – 
Norman Etherington in The Great Treks (2001, 64) 
 
 
The founding of Grahamstown in 1812 on the western frontier of the land inhabited by Xhosa 
people was a significant moment in the development of the politics of space and citizenship in 
South Africa.  The British town, in a hollow in the hills some twenty miles west of the Great 
Fish River, was the symbol in wood and stone and European life of what Noël Mostert has 
called the ‘first great “removal” in South African history’ (1992, 389).  The town site was the 
military headquarters of Colonel John Graham in the war of 1811-1812, during which the 
British finally ‘cleared’ the fertile region between the Sundays and the Fish Rivers—the 
Zuurveld—of its Xhosa inhabitants.1  It was a campaign and ‘clearance’ which Graham 
undertook, in the words of Governor of the Cape Colony, John Cradock, with ‘a proper degree 
of terror’ (Maclennan 1986, 128).  The extent of the violence which drove thousands of people 
eastward over the Fish River is captured in Cradock’s admiring phrase.  As Mostert writes, ‘By 
finally succeeding in drawing this line between Xhosa and colony, the Cape government had 
rolled its power right up to the west bank of the Fish’, and this ‘military achievement created a 
new reality by emphasizing separation of the races as a divide between natural enemies and 
irreconcilable cultures, the only solution for which was complete severance’ (1992, 389-390). 
     While the political situation spanning the Great Fish River in 1812 may have been more 
complex than Mostert’s characterization, two things are certainly clear: the long-unsuccessful 
colonial project of creating a border with the Xhosa was finally achieved. In delimiting the 
eastward frontier of the Cape Colony, the river traced an (official) line west of which were 
colonial subjects of the British crown, east of which lived people who were not.  The Fish River 
border was a demarcation attempted more than thirty years earlier in 1777 by the Dutch 
government at the Cape, when Governor van Plettenberg ‘claimed to have made a treaty’ which 
established the Fish as the colonial boundary (Wells 2012, 78). 
     This process of demarcating racial categories with specific boundaries had begun in the 
first years that Europeans settled at the Cape.  While it is smartingly racist in its own right, and 
contentedly so, I. D. MacCrone’s Race Attitudes in South Africa (1937) provides some of this 
history.  In the mid-1650s, Dutch settlers at the Cape expressed that they wished Africans 
1 It may also have been the Great Place of Ndlambe, one of the most important Xhosa chiefs during the first stage 
of British invasion, until the people with Ndlambe were ‘cleared’ (Holleman 1997, 20). 
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(‘Hottentots’) would ‘erect their huts…a little further off’, or that they would ‘keep a little 
further off’, and the record shows that they clearly saw the land they occupied as a European 
sphere in which Africans enjoyed European ‘protection’ in spite of ‘bold allegations that the 
land belong[ed] to them, and not to the [Dutch East India] Company’ (in MacCrone 1937, 25; 
27).  A canal was proposed to separate the two societies, and even though MacCrone 
characterises it as ‘a clear-cut boundary, segregating the Europeans in an area reserved for 
them’, its purpose was more likely to keep out what he calls the ‘unfriendly natives’ in areas 
reserved for them (1937, 26).  In 1657, recommendations were made that the best ways to deal 
with Africans were to build a line of forts to keep them out or ‘to make a clean sweep of all the 
local Hottentots [sic] by seizing them and banishing them from the country’, and only lastly to 
come to terms with them, although this was considered the cheapest option (MacCrone 1937, 
33).  Between the 1650s and the turn of the century, a (dubious) policy of ‘conciliation’ was 
‘replaced by a more masterful policy of supervision and control by which they [relegated the 
Africans of the Cape] to a very minor and subordinate position in relation to the European 
community’, and in fact Africans were not considered a part of the community at all (1937, 
81).  They were, essentially, ‘non-citizens’, not employed by and bearing no rights under the 
jurisdiction of the Dutch East India Company. 
     MacCrone argues throughout his book that religion constituted the main divide between 
races, initially between free and slave, but that the categories of ‘Christian’ and ‘non-Christian’ 
‘played a fundamental part in determining […] race attitudes and in making [peope] race 
conscious’, such that, by the end of the eighteenth century, skin colour was the most wide 
spread group distinction employed (by Europeans, at least) (1937, 41; 126-131).  Significantly 
for the argument here, MacCrone places religion at the centre of civilisation, which was 
perceived to diminish, along with access to religious institutions, as one moved away from the 
‘centre’ (the Cape) (1937, 108; 111-112; 116).  ‘Remoteness’ was conflated with criminality 
and lack of control of white members of the population (1937, 90).  MacCrone is at least as 
blunt as observers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when he describes such whites 
as, ‘Europeans who, in their contacts with the native inhabitants on the frontier, simply reverted 
to the level of those with whom they came into contact’ (1937, 115).  Being far away was to 
be a part of—or, at least, too close for comfort with—the world and the society of Africans, 
who were conceived of in racial and derogatory terms. 
 
The official boundary at the Fish River was of little avail.  People continued to transgress the 
artificial border.  Perhaps more useful as a reflection of white South African perceptions of 
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space and race in the years before apartheid and as a demonstration of the durability of such 
spatial-racial ideas than as an analyses of the late eighteenth century, MacCrone writes about 
the ‘chaos prevailing [on the Fish River frontier] towards the end of the century…as the result 
of the Kaffir [sic] incursions across the Fish River’ (1937, 117), which description envisions 
the border—as well as the ‘chaos’—as racially defined, the ‘incursions’ firstly as incursions 
and secondly as precipitated by Africans, and conceives of race in the terms of colonial racism.  
The ‘chaos’ was not general, however, for ‘between periods of fighting’, writes Julia Wells, ‘a 
variety of peaceful co-existence flourished’ in the region, in which ‘Gonaqua Khoi, San, 
amaXhosa, Dutch farming settlers, missionaries of several European nationalities, slaves from 
far and wide, English speaking administrators and military officials all jostled together in a 
fluid and complex society.’  The various political and economic systems of the many groups 
existed simultaneously (2012, 84). 
     Although the British border of 1812 was contested and permeable, and though political 
relationships to the colonial government within the colony were not uniform (at the time, the 
British administered to mostly Dutch and African people), the border at the Fish River still 
represented a decision by the colonial government to demarcate citizenship spatially.  Most of 
the people living in the Fish River frontier region did not frame their politics in this way, for 
theirs—both Boer and African—were lifestyles based on free movement, free association, and 
political fluidity.  This is not to suggest that until the coming of Colonel Graham the various 
people of the Fish River Country lived in idyllic harmony.  Indeed, the Dutch settlers did not 
respect Xhosa land use, and in turn the Xhosa resisted incursion and had driven out Dutch 
settlers from the Zuurveld five times before 1812 (Wells 2012, 75; 79-81; 84).  However, 
division of the colony from ‘Xhosa territory’, a division both spatial and political, had not 
previously attained the same degree of reification as it did after Graham’s campaign. 
 
For considering the politics that existed in the Fish River Country before the arrival of Colonel 
Graham, there are two critical histories of South/ern Africa which are especially useful here, 
The Great Treks, by Etherington (2001), and Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 
1400-1948, by Paul S. Landau Landau (2010). While both focus their analysis on the highveld 
region rather than the Fish River Country, what is now the Eastern Cape, the challenges they 
present to the assumptions of standard historiography are applicable in the Eastern Cape, 
nonetheless.  The shared crux to their challenges is methodological.  Etherington attempts to 
escape the enticing historical thicket of the colonial archive and the ‘pernicious tradition’ of 
historiography this produces (2001, xiii).  Landau looks to archaeology and language to 
 
 26 
 
‘recover the political praxis’ of ‘the black and brown complected people who constitute the 
greatest part of [South African] citizenry today’ (2010, 2).  In ‘[assuming] everyone’s 
rationality’, and indeed in acknowledging the existence of an historical political praxis (praxes) 
among Africans, Landau avoids the ‘unfortunate result’ that Etherington sees in linguistic and 
archaeological reconstructions, which is ‘to reproduce by other means the Us/Them binary 
opposition typical of colonial encounters’ (Etherington 2001, xiii).  The critiques supplied by 
Landau and Etherington are employed here to complicate (and also to clarify) the relationship 
between citizenship and space.  The political formation of the concepts of urban and rural are 
the focus.  The argument here is that these spatial-political concepts as they occur in modern 
South Africa derive much of their logic from the country’s colonial history. 
     In many historical analyses, the arrival of Europeans in Southern Africa marked the 
beginning of the political history of that part of the world.  This is a well-known colonialist 
understanding that evokes the inevitability of ‘manifest destiny’, to employ the American 
phrase: the (righteous) bestowal of history by Europeans upon the non-European wastelands.  
That narrative has been successfully repudiated by many writers and will be dismissed here 
except as a peculiarly potent racist ontology; that is to say, it has been (and continues to be) 
historically a significant narrative, though it is historically untrue. 
     In addition to history, the newly disembarked Europeans brought their own interpretations 
of local politics.  As Landau writes, ‘Europeans had always thought in terms of tribes, from the 
very start of their familiarity with the agrarian chiefdoms of South Africa’; differences were, 
in this view, ‘writ forever, in people’s bloodlines, with in-migrations and in-marriages 
peripheral to their continuities’ (2010, 124). 
     In Popular Politics, Landau makes several challenges to the common narrative of South 
African history.  Primary among these is that ‘the political’ was ‘born deep in South Africa’s 
past’, and that politics was not introduced by or dependent upon various actors acceptable to 
Eurocentric (at best) or racist political and historiographical projects (Landau 2010, xiv).  In 
many ways, Landau’s book adds nuance and an enormous amount of detail to a proposition 
made by Etherington in The Great Treks (2001), already mentioned, that historians must 
‘reposition’ themselves in order not to rely on the vantage point of colonial archive alone (xiii; 
5).  Landau looks within South Africa for its politics.  In particular, he challenges—and 
meticulously deflates—the durable idea of ‘tribe’ and ‘tribalism’ as essential to South African 
societies; the idea that tribes were in fact the exact form of these societies.  He asks, ‘How did 
tribal identities emerge in South Africa – did they emerge?’ (2010, 124).  The verb ‘emerge’ is 
already a departure from most narratives, since it suggests process rather than stasis.  Indeed, 
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stasis is basic to the idea of the tribe.  ‘By tribes’ writes Landau, ‘one means affiliations that 
are taken as primary, inalienable birthrights, uniting culture and blood, and providing a total 
blueprint for behavior, necessarily diminished by “civilization”’ (2010, 124). Viewing Africans 
as members of tribes led Europeans, according to Etherington, ‘to misunderstand profoundly 
the nature of the relationship between chiefs and their followers.  Ordinary people did not give 
themselves ethnic labels [….] Most people called their group by the names of the chiefs they 
followed’ (2001, 345).  As ‘tribe’ evolved as a concept, it came to include racial assumptions 
that used biology to determine who was a member of a tribe (Landau 2010, 123; 129; 161).   
     In contrast to a biological understanding of African societies, of African societies without 
politics, Landau argues that we should ‘speak about [people] in terms of what they were doing, 
rather than how Europeans came to know them’ (2010, 249).  To this end, he re-examines the 
words and names people used to describe and identify themselves, drawing distinction between 
how they used the words and how Europeans—particularly missionaries—(mis)understood the 
words.  Especially illuminating is the discussion of the word ‘bechuana’, meaning ‘blended 
together’, or ‘all mixed’, or ‘similar’.  The word was, he argues, ‘most likely the mundane 
phrase, “yes we are similar” or “the same” (tshwana) said to African travelers and Europeans, 
about themselves and nearby others’ (2010, 9-10).  Eventually, as the discourse of tribes 
became widespread in South Africa through colonial expansion, a word denoting similarity 
came to delimit people specifically.  Other words that stood for political rankings or the names 
of ancestors politically mobilised in ‘the present’ were likewise subjected to reduction in scope 
and dynamism and came to signify group specificities that were unchanging.  Landau shows 
how language as the prerogative of ‘the people’ can be the medium through which political 
tradition is conveyed and evolves, and yet it can also be a mode for capturing politics, as in the 
case of missionaries’ encounters with and denial of a political tradition: ‘Aspects of public life 
looked religious only in hindsight, when key translations had already been set into discourse 
and text’ (2010, 76).    
     Methodologically, this is interesting.  Language, unlike the written archive, cannot be 
completely commandeered since it has been shaped by those who use it.  Therefore, even 
though missionaries provided religious readings of African political terms and actions, these 
things did not immediately—nor ever altogether—change in meaning for Africans.  Their 
persistence in African articulation of politics permitted popular action by Africans up to the 
apartheid era (the end of Popular Politics’ historical scope).  Landau demonstrates this well in 
his discussion of the long-lived Samuelite movement, and the related ‘Youngmen’ movement 
of the 1920s and Barolong Progressive Association of the 1930s, all movements which carried 
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on political traditions of African peoples during and well into the colonial period (2010, 169; 
174; 196; 220). 
     The colonial project of remodelling active, popular African politics (or politics of any sort) 
as timeless, ‘tribal’ life tended to emphasise the relationship between (or even equate) tribe not 
only with biological indicators but also with location.  Present but not directly explored 
throughout the arguments of Popular Politics is the interplay between space and citizenship.  
The ways in which these two concepts were deployed throughout the long historical period on 
which Landau focuses are important in considering the political transformation that South/ern 
African polities have undergone since 1400.  While space and citizenship have been conceived 
of differently at different times (and often differently even in the same period), there is 
continuity at least in that they have been used and understood in relation to each other. Two 
important qualifications must be made to this assertion: First, the ideas that I am referring to as 
‘space’ and ‘citizenship’ were not defined, necessarily, in those terms through much of the 
period in question; and second, that, following Landau, I do not consider those ideas as 
structural or divorced from the basic claims of Landau’s book that ‘everyone’s basic rationality 
is assumed’ and that South Africans acted a living ‘political praxis’ (2010, xii; 2).  It would be 
easy to collapse space and citizenship into a rigid framework along the lines of ‘tribe’ (and it 
has been done), whether that word is used or not, but then only if actual, living people are not 
allowed to contaminate a vacuous history.  Space and citizenship are relational because of 
politics: the politics which Landau shows to have been always present in South/ern Africa, and 
not imported by Europeans.  At the same time, much of how the space-citizenship relationship 
has been articulated and accomplished in the past and into the present has been influenced or 
forced by Europeans or people of European descent.  The relation is a complicated one, and 
the discussion here is necessarily brief and limited in historical scope, with focus on the Eastern 
Cape and the area nearby Grahamstown, now known both accurately and problematically as 
‘Frontier Country’. 
     Landau looks to archaeology to supply much of the information regarding the early period 
of his study.  One important type of archaeological site in South Africa is what has been called 
the ‘Central Cattle Plan’, which takes the form of ‘trampled manure centers and satellites, and 
satellites of satellites similarly marked, the main kraal or livestock pen imagined as lying at the 
heart of the polity’ (2010, 46).  Such sites, claims Landau, have been too often interpreted as 
‘individuated [and thus tribal] entities’; this type of site ‘registers cattle manure in the middle, 
nothing more.  It says little about politics or history, and should not be understood otherwise’ 
(2010, 46-47).   
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     However, like language, archaeological remains cannot be totally disassociated from the 
people who produced them, even when decades of interpretation have been based on this 
separation.  Landau links the seemingly static sites with a political tradition based on the 
‘House’, what he describes as an ‘ancient tradition of association, inheritance, and unity, at the 
root of all farmers’ politics, embracing all their elements’ (2010, 49).  Vital to this form of 
association was that ‘[i]t involved reciprocal rights in people, rather than in land.  It opened the 
possibility of settlement to immigrants willing to subordinate themselves to a ruling chief of 
an alliance of farmers and to alter their communal identities’ (Landau 2010, 49).  Thinking of 
the Central Cattle Plan sites as ‘agrarian towns’, Landau proposes that their archaeology was a 
direct product of the House tradition (2010, 50).  This is important because inherent to such a 
political system was the ability literally to move, to change location, to occupy new space and 
new political relationships within that space. The ‘town’, therefore, was a direct result of 
political action. To risk an anachronism and change of context, we can recall Fanon’s 
formulation, writing of Algerian guerrillas: ‘the struggle [which we can read as ‘politics’ in 
this case] no longer concerns the place where you are, but the place where you are going’ 
([1961] 1963, 135).  Groups of people could move, and in doing so, redefine themselves 
politically.  Landau is careful to show that this did not mean a state of constant warfare, but 
rather a situation of political opportunity in which there was also continuity.  As Landau writes, 
‘masculine political space, based on cattle transhumance, ancestry, alliances, and chiefs, could 
remove itself from towns, farmlands, and the woman and children bound to them.  But […] on 
the other side of the spectrum of political behavior, successful chiefs built in stone or defended 
towns for several generations at a stretch’ (2010, 91).  The more permanent settlements and 
polities were legitimated through the notions of House and hierarchy.  Nor did the system 
simply mean that people were leaving their homes and leaders and occupying empty space as 
a new political entity; moving groups entered into relationships with other groups, often 
through the ‘twin court’ structure, in which both traditional house rankings as well as practical 
power of groups sharing the same space were respected.  Junior houses could be the more 
militarily powerful or cattle wealthy, for instance; in other cases, newcomers took a junior role: 
‘the elephant that crosse[d] the river [became] a little elephant’ (Landau 2010, 66; 34).  
     Very similar processes of active citizenship obtained in what is now the Eastern Cape at the 
time that Africans and Europeans began to meet in large numbers there.  Chiefly authority 
among the Xhosa was also legitimated by a chief’s followers, and chiefs also entered into 
complex relationships among themselves that recognised lineage hierarchies as well as 
practical power.  The relationship of the two most important Xhosa chiefs on the Zuurveld in 
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the years leading up to and following the 1811-12 war, Ndlambe (the ‘regent’) and Ngqika (his 
nephew), demonstrates this well.  Indeed, their shared (and contested) leadership of the ‘house 
of Rharhabe’ Xhosa suggests the twin-court structure that Landau describes, as do the 
relationships of several other pairs of Xhosa leaders: Gcaleka and Rharhabe, Phato and 
Chungwa, Hintsa and Bhurhu, Maqoma and Sandile (Wells 2012, 102).  Though Ndlambe and 
Ngqika were sometimes at war with each other2, Julia Wells argues that there was 
‘simultaneously another dynamic operating, which was far more co-operative and supportive’ 
and that ‘[it] should be viewed as a particularly African dynamic of maintaining cohesion 
among leaders’ (Wells 2012, 102).  Though Wells argues that this represents a ‘particularly 
Xhosa-style of traditional leadership’ (2012, 101), the evidence presented by Landau suggests 
a more expansive political tradition that was similar among groups both above and below the 
Great Escarpment, and stretched even further north in the continent of Africa (Landau 2010, 
51-53). 
     As we have already seen, the Eastern Cape region was also a place of mixing of peoples.  
Martin Legassick writes, ‘When the Boers were encountered [in the second half of the 18th 
Century], the Xhosa assumed they would come to absorb them as they already had the San, 
Khoi and Thembu’ (2010, 13)—not a dissimilar situation from what Landau describes on the 
highveld: a ‘political tradition [that] emphasized in-mixtures of people in several modes […] 
and deemphasized origins (and skin colour and accent), in pursuit of common, hierarchized, 
intermarried, growth-oriented settlement’ (2010, 124). 
 
Before successive colonial administrations at the Cape curtailed free movement and delimited 
the meaning and scope of politics, people actively participated in forming their citizenship.  
Citizenship was linked to the political space that people occupied, rather than the physical 
space.  In the African political traditions of both the highveld and Xhosa areas, political power 
over physical space expanded by the inclusion of more people in citizenship relationships with 
leaders rather than in exclusion of people from land in that ‘[c]hiefship itself was an 
incorporative institution, and its success lay in bridging differences among varied 
constituencies.  The word for the landed polity…meant everyone in the big meeting, everyone 
living together, not all blood relations’ (Landau 2010, 11).   
    The arrival of Europeans with new ideas about land ownership and the aforementioned 
misinterpretations of Africans as ‘tribal’ also signified new correlations between space and 
2 And British interference in their conflicts was ceaseless. 
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citizenship.  In very broad terms, the dispossession of Africans of rights to land usage created 
a situation in which citizenship as well as livelihoods became increasingly linked to specific 
pieces of land.  While space could still be defined by ‘who was there’, that ‘who’ was less and 
less a product of political action than of rigidly defined identity.  The 1777 border (see above) 
is one early example of how space was delimited in this new way.  In that year the Dutch 
governor of the Cape ‘set boundary markers on the ground’ between Boers and Xhosa, but 
‘people from both sides ignored the line.  Its only effect was to delay legal recognition of any 
Boer farms established on the further side’ (Etherington 2001, 56).  At stake was political 
belonging or alienation—citizenship, and with it the control of the colonial government.  One 
thing was true of all the advancing borders constructed by the colony: Africans could not own 
land within the colony, but neither could Africans within the colony live without the land 
(which they worked as slaves or under various euphemisms for slavery).  The borders created 
by the colonial governments separated people politically while employing distinctions which, 
like race, could be claimed to have natural rather than political definitions. 
     Yet, mixing of people in what would have been perceived by southern Africans of the day 
as ‘the normal way’ persisted even while the political landscape became more fixed.  Writing 
about the highveld of the 1810s, Landau argues: 
 
[T]he critical distinction between people on the ground was spatial, not corporeal.  
Difference was expressed in the shape of their settlements, not the ethnic composition 
of their inhabitants.  [Several African towns] were laid out in the highveld manner, 
surrounded by arable lands and pastures. They contrasted with Griquatown [and other 
missionary towns] with their rectangular gardens and plots.  Both kinds of town 
inducted streams of Khoe- and San-speaking and métis people into their lineages and 
neighborhoods.  In them Bantu-speaking farmers and herders and foreigners mixed 
with one another, just as they had in the past (2010, 14). 
 
At the same time, however, missionaries were coming to make tribal and racial distinctions 
between people living in the ‘highveld manner’ and those in the square-housed towns.  Later 
in this process emerged the racial category of ‘Coloured’: an ‘adjunct and alternative to 
whiteness’ that Landau argues was developed in Cape Town and Grahamstown and ‘then 
projected into a different situation involving Bantu-speaking people’ (2010, 123).  The result 
was that the mixed populations of South Africa (at least ‘mixed’ in terms of European 
understandings, linked with language, Christianity, and incorporation into colonial settlement 
types and economies) were excluded from the framework of tribalism while the ‘black’ 
populations, no less mixed in many cases, were forced into it.  Those living in towns in the 
European mould did not become tribal while those in towns of the African form did.  
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Citizenship, such as it was, on the one hand was derived from the colony and on the other from 
the tribe. 
     Linked to this, I argue, is the emergence of an urban and rural political divide.  While people 
were increasingly identified racially and politically by the form of their settlement, the 
settlements and the spaces between and around them accrued political significance.  This was 
a process which would have been familiar to Europeans, and familiar in a number of ways.  
English, Irish, and Scottish people of the seventeenth century had witnessed the great struggle 
over enclosure—the mass migration, emigration, urbanisation, and exploitation which it 
produced (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000).  Indeed, the English ‘plantations’ in Ireland were not 
dissimilar to the British project of settlement in the Fish River Country two hundred years later.  
These were actions undertaken by armed and mounted soldiers against the resistance of 
agrarian communities and with destruction of life and livelihood that were mimicked by 
Graham in 1812, and by nearly all of the British colonial administrators and military officers 
to see service on the frontier of the Cape Colony.  The ‘commando’ of South Africa resembled 
precisely the violence of 1640s England, during which one Fairfax, fearing the uniting of urban 
and rural poor, ‘personally led a troop of horse to the most important of the communes, 
George’s Hill, and drove the commoners off the land, breaking their spades, trampling the 
crops, and destroying their houses’ (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000, 118).  In Europe and in 
Africa, following on the heels of the troops came settlers.   
     There was also a European tradition that linked violence, architecture, and the urban-rural 
distinction.  In Goldberg’s discussion of the politics of ‘walling’, we see that the political 
classification of a settlement could depend on its physical structures:  
 
Cities were “razed” not by their complete destruction but by pulling down their fortified 
walls.  Settlements without walls were no longer considered urban, reduced to rural 
villages by nothing more than the removal of their fortifications.  The lack of boundary 
walls erased the demarcation between town and countryside, lived space and commerce 
shading into field.  Razing the wall emasculated the city, sapping its power and making 
it as vulnerable to scorching as the rural (2015, np).3 
 
     Although neither European nor African towns in the Fish River Country were fortified in 
the manner of European cities, there still emerged a ‘wall’ logic in what constituted urban space 
3 James Holston (2008) makes a similar argument in the context of Brazil that has significance for Grahamstown 
when it was founded and in the two centuries since then.   ‘The designations “city”, “urban”, and “rural” are 
politically defined’, Holsten writes, and they are ‘subject to political manipulation and consequence’. The city is 
the ‘juro-political’ and architectural ‘command center of its surrounding region’, and ‘a municipal seat in a 
remote region could be urban politically but unurbanized infrastructurally’ (150). 
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and rural space and this was closely linked to citizenship.  On the easterly side were the Xhosa 
settlements organised in much the same way as Landau describes the ‘agrarian towns’ (2010, 
50) of the highveld.  Mimicking the course of the Fish River on its western bank stood a double 
line of British forts built in the decade after the founding of Grahamstown, which guarded—
and often were important in extending—the colonial boundary (Makana Tourism 2015, np). 
     Behind the forts were the quickly growing towns of Grahamstown in the Zuurveld and Port 
Elizabeth at the mouth of the Sundays River.  The arrival of some 4,000 settlers in 1820 into 
the ‘cleared’ land between the Bushmans and Fish Rivers changed the landscape quite 
drastically.  Most of them had been urban dwellers in England, without any agricultural 
experience.  Not surprisingly, many of the farms which they had been allotted in the Zuurveld 
failed and the erstwhile farmers moved to Grahamstown.  ‘It was their capital,’ writes Mostert, 
‘the most populous place in the east [with more than 3,000 people and 700 houses in 1834], 
second only to Cape Town in size and scope of its activities.  In many respects, it was the focal 
point of the colony’ (1992, 656).  The Zuurveld, renamed Albany after the 1812 war4, was 
increasingly exploited agriculturally in the European manner: ‘In a wide circumference around 
Grahamstown it had been tamed and dressed with tilled lands, corn and fruit, and irrigation’ 
(Mostert 1992, 658).  Wool was becoming a valuable commodity in South Africa, and herding 
sheep, as opposed to cattle, separated the British settlers from both boers and Xhosa (Mostert 
1992, 658).   
     The emerging situation was one in which the form of the colonial settlement and its 
economy divided it politically as well as ontologically from the territories further east and north 
that were still under African control.  Peoples’ roles and political identities were more and more 
determined by their relationship and orientation to the colonial border.   
     And the colonial border advanced. 
 
In 1819, Grahamstown was nearly destroyed in an attack by a Xhosa army led by a man named 
Nxele (also known as Makana or Makhanda).  Nxele’s leadership was consistent with forms of 
leadership of southern Africa as Landau has outlined them.  His message blended invocation 
of ancestors (and aspects of Christianity) with a military project of driving the Europeans ‘into 
the sea’.  Though not from a chiefly family, he derived his power, authority, and legitimacy 
from his followers.  Bad luck or too great a concern for chivalry—Nxele announced his plan 
4 The name is a colonial and imperial curiosity, named after John Graham’s second-in-command, Jacob Cuyler, 
who was born in Albany, New York to a Tory family who fled the American colonies when they ceased to be 
British. 
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to attack to Lord Henry Somerset, the military commander at Grahamstown—led to defeat for 
the Xhosa army at Grahamstown, and a war in which British troops crossed the Fish and drove 
the Xhosa living there over the Keiskamma River, which flows some thirty miles east of the 
Fish at the coast, the distance dwindling to fifteen miles and less inland near Grahamstown. 
The territory between the Fish and the Keiskamma, and north to the Amatola Mountains, was 
‘ceded’ to the colony and was to be preserved as a neutral zone between the colony and the 
Xhosa (Mostert 1992, 857).  Xhosa wishing to cross to the western bank of the Fish River were 
required, after Ordnance 50 of 1828, to have written permission from a colonial official stating 
they were entering the colony to work or to trade (Holleman 1997, 27). 
     ‘By 1830’, writes Mostert, ‘the so-called Ceded Territory had become mainly the narrow 
band of country between the Fish and the Keiskamma rivers and harassment of Xhosa intrusion 
into it was constant and usually cruel’ and, by the middle of the decade, the ‘territory was, more 
than at any time in the sixteen years of its controversial existence, the symbol of the 
fundamental overriding issue: land’ (1992, 857).  Mostert carries on, ‘Although the land had 
always, since the earliest days of the frontier, been the underlying issue of conflict, it had never 
been so entirely central to the confrontation of Xhosa and colonist as it now became’ (1992, 
857).  Land represented not just an economic resource but a political concern as well.  African 
polities, Xhosa in this instance, required land both for sustenance from cattle and cultivation 
as well as for the legitimation of their political leadership.  Maqoma, Ngqika’s son and a chief 
born and most often living in the Amatola region of the Ceded Territory remarked that ‘The 
great reason […] is the land; for our children have increased and our cattle have increased, and 
we must have that land, as it was formerly our country’ (quoted in Mostert 1992, 857), and this 
explanation refers to more than simply a longing for the tribal home, the ‘old hunting grounds’ 
of the colonial myth.  The advancing colonial border represented not only dispossession of land 
but also of political structures based on movement of people and legitimation of leadership 
with access to land. 
 
In May 1828 a troop of soldiers departed Grahamstown for Maqoma’s town near the mission 
station at Balfour below the Katberg.  The people with Maqoma were in transgression of the 
Ceded Territory defined by the colony, and the colonial government saw this as an opportunity 
to make some better use of the Ceded Territory than to simply preserve it as a ‘neutral’ strip of 
land.   
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     One particular concern at the time was over what to do with ‘Khoikhoi’5 and people of 
mixed descent. (It was a purely colonial conviction that something must be done with them.)  
These were the people who would soon come to be identified as ‘Coloured’.  Governor Cole 
at Cape Town, in response to complaints of vagrancy, had proposed that the ‘Khoikhoi’ should 
be permanently settled as agriculturalists ‘adjoining the towns in the colony’ (Mostert 1992, 
617)—quite literally as an ‘adjunct to whiteness’, to recall Landau’s phrase (2010, 123).   In 
response to a humanitarian trend from Britian, there was a push by some missionaries and 
officials to grant Coloureds their own land, and in the end it was determined that a settlement 
would be created in the Ceded Territory with the dual objective of providing (some) Coloured 
people with their own land and of installing a human buffer between the colony and the Xhosa 
(Mostert 1992, 617). 
     Maqoma’s people were sent east, and their town burned, and ‘within a month of the 
expulsion […] the first Khoikhoi and ‘Bastaard’ [mixed race] settlers began occupying the Kat 
river lands’, and the population grew to some 4,000 in the course of the first year (Mostert 
1992, 621).  Thus was born the Kat River Settlement.  Some four hundred square miles of 
territory was divided and subdivided, with land allotted for villages, for private gardens in the 
villages, and for common pasturage.  Churches, schools, irrigations systems, and houses were 
built.  ‘The settlers’, Mostert writes, ‘were required to build European style-cottages and fence 
their properties’ (1992, 621).   
     The Kat River Settlement emerged as something of a foil to Grahamstown in the frontier 
region.  As Mostert notes, ‘Born in controversy, the Kat River Settlement […] was never to be 
free of it’ (1992, 621).  Race was always significant in perceptions of the Kat River Settlement.  
Many Coloured people migrated there to escape a proposed Vagrancy Act of the early 1830s 
which allowed ‘anyone regarded as a vagrant [to] be drafted to forced public labour or 
contracted to a farm’ (Mostert 1992, 638).  Though it was a settlement in the form of the 
European colony—modelled in part after the original plan for the 1820 settlers and undergoing 
a similar ‘urbanisation’ (Mostert 1992, 621)—it was disturbing to whites in Grahamstown, 
‘rising agrarian capitalists of the Eastern Cape, desiring racial subjugation of labor and 
dispossession of the indigenous from their land’ (Legassick 2010, 36).  When land nearby the 
Kat River Settlement was sold by the government, Coloureds living at Kat River were not 
5 ‘Khoikhoi’ is one of many appellations given to and sometimes taken by people living at the Cape when 
Europeans arrived there or by their descendants in South Africa.  Debates surround which, whether ‘Khoi’, 
‘Khoe’, ‘Khoikhoi’, or, blended with another given name, ‘Khoisan’, is the correct term.  These people, as well 
as people of mixed descent, were eventually designated ‘Coloured’.   
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allowed to purchase it, although the land was soon exploited quite profitably by white farmers 
for raising sheep (Legassick 2010, 35).  Because the settlement was not attacked by the Xhosa 
during periods of war, the Coloureds there were suspected by local whites of conspiracy against 
the colony (Mostert 1992, 667)—an attitude reminiscent in its form of the anti-Catholic fears 
of disloyalty common in English history, but inflected more heavily with racial prejudice.   
     The strange position of the Kat River Settlement and its mixed population on the eastward 
edging political frontier allows a further discussion of the ‘square house’ idea, with its complex 
admixture of architectural, political, and racial perceptions.  Colin Bundy stresses two aspects 
of the role of missionaries in South Africa: ‘first, the role of the missionaries as torch-bearers 
of capitalist social norms and the market economy […] and secondly, their contribution to class 
formation in African society’ (1979, 37).  As we have seen, the frontier, with Grahamstown as 
its hub, was increasingly linked to the colonial economy.  Indeed, interpretations of apartheid 
in the twentieth century that see the ‘Bantustan’ system as so many labour reserves for white 
industry, particularly the mines, are convincing to a degree based on the history of a century 
earlier, when African economies were subsumed by the empire at the same time that the process 
of division here discussed was under way.  However, the class formation that Bundy argues 
resulted from missionary activity in what is now the Eastern Cape was not the only outcome 
that has lasted into the present.6  Alongside race and class and capitalism solidified the urban 
and rural as raced, classed, and divided political concepts and identities. 
    Bundy, remarking on the missionaries’ ‘zeal’ for certain settlement forms, asks the key 
question: ‘Why encourage Africans to live in square houses?’ He continues: ‘The frequency of 
references in missionary correspondence and publications to the superiority of square over 
round dwellings is striking – descriptions of square houses in straight streets ring with pride’ 
and notes that transitional houses, neither round nor square, were recommended by one 
missionary (1979, 37).  Square houses and straight streets and rowed gardens, settlement types 
distinct in form from African towns, not only demonstrated inclusion in the imperial economy 
but in the colonial society itself; that is, citizenship.7  Central cattle plan settlements indicated 
a political and economic ‘other’—an ‘other’ in opposition to the enclosing and undemocratic 
6 Economic changes during this period will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3. 
7 MacCrone (1937) unwittingly shows how this applied to white people in Southern Africa as well.  A traveler 
among frontier boers in 1776 remarked that they ‘love to live in the veld by hunting, and it is anticipated that they 
will become completely barbarized.  I have only found two houses that were decently erected…’ (footnote, 
translation, 111-112; emphasis original). 
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tendencies of British/European society.  Such places were, in the racialised mind-set, home to 
‘kaffirs’, ‘reds’—utterly the non-urban and therefore the non-citizen. 
 
The Kat River Settlement was not the only project of the British administration of the Cape 
Colony that blended concerns over race, space, and citizenship.  Indeed, from the time of 
Graham’s destruction of the Zuurveld in 1812 and the founding of Grahamstown, both policy 
and war were increasingly used to micro-manage the interplay of those three political concepts.  
The ‘buffer’ between the colony and the Xhosa as well as the forcing of African people into 
white-style settlements (mainly at mission stations) or into becoming labourers for whites were 
both employed repeatedly.  Indeed, the history from the 1820s on represents largely a struggle 
by whites in South Africa to perfect the implementation of these tools, and of Africans to adapt 
to changing situations in which their political options and spaces shrank drastically.  In the 
Eastern Cape, Grahamstown was the centre of support for the colonial side of this struggle.  
The Kat River Coloured population was castigated by colonial officials and settlers alike, for 
they ‘did not make good use of “the best watered and most fertile district on the frontier”.  For 
Grahamstown, this last point was what mattered’ (Mostert 1992, 920). 
    War broke out once more in 1834: the Sixth Frontier War.  The wide land between the 
Keiskamma and the Kei Rivers was annexed to the colony as Queen Adelaide Province by 
Governor Benjamin D’Urban, and all of the people living there were made British subjects.  
This was significant in the progression of politics of citizenship in South Africa.  
 
As British subjects, all of the Xhosa west of the Kei river […] were to submit to the 
general laws of the Cape Colony, but would retain their own laws and customs for their 
own domestic government.  But their status as British subjects still did not allow them 
to enter freely the settled areas of the colony.  If they crossed the Keiskamma river and 
passed into the white settlements they could be shot.  Nor were they open to the full 
benefits of British Colonial law, as the Khoikhoi were, for the Province of Queen 
Adelaide remained under martial law (Mostert 1992, 750). 
 
The restriction of the movement of black people combined with appropriation of political 
subjectivity prefigured much of the legislation of the next century and a half.   
     D’Urban also relocated 16,000 or 17,000 ‘Mfengu’ from beyond the Kei to the region of 
Fort Peddie (in the Ceded Territory) where they would be another living bulwark for the colony 
and where they could be handily recruited as labourers (Legassick 2010, 45).  White settlers 
were displeased by the location of these particular Africans on good land but were reassured 
by D’Urban that ‘“large tracts are still left vacant for occupation and speculation of 
Europeans”’ (Legassick 2010, 47).  D’Urban’s policies did not last beyond the next war on the 
 
 38 
 
frontier and the Governorship of Harry Smith, but the general project of spatial and political 
control combined with expropriation of land continued.  Harry Smith established ‘British 
Kaffraria’ out of the former Queen Adelaide Province (Mostert 1992, 911), in which the twin 
projects of assimilation and alienation of the people continued: ‘[Smith] would decide their 
locations, where they would live under a new dispensation of his own making (Mostert 1992, 
936).  Punishment of Xhosa entailed confiscation of land, while at the same time British settlers 
arrived and depleted pasturage and hunting reserves (Mostert 1992, 946).   
     Then began a century of legislation to hone the political subjectivity of black people and 
tweak their status and relationship to the land so that white settler interests were best served.  
Location Acts were passed in 1869, 1876, 1884, 1892, 1899, and 1909.  The Glen Grey Act of 
1894 ‘sought more ambitiously to proletarianize large numbers of Africans on “tribal” as well 
as on “white” lands’ (Bundy 1979, 78; 135-137). 
     The twentieth century saw more of the same style of legislation.  The Natives Land Act of 
1913 created African ‘reserves’, which severely curtailed African access to land for the 
remainder of the century (Bundy 1979).  Apartheid, from 1948, solidified this division in 
abstract as well as practical terms.  By the early 1960s, Govan Mbeki could write that ‘some 
11,000,000 Africans have rights to only 9 percent of the land, while 3,000,000 Whites own and 
occupy the rest’ (1964, 66).  Citizenship and space were unambiguously linked by apartheid 
legislation that made Africans the citizens of independent ‘Bantustans’, a status ‘paid for by 
the complete loss of citizenship and occupation rights in the rest of the country’ (Mbeki 1964, 
19).  Access to land within these ‘homelands’—the biggest of which was the Transkei—was 
controlled by local ‘traditional authorities’, a situation that still obtains today in many former 
homeland areas in spite of the end of apartheid (Ntsebeza 2005, 14).  This top-down politics 
stood in marked difference to the incorporative politics of earlier years. 
     With this long sequence legislation and with the formation of tribal reserves/homelands, the 
spatial logic of citizenship was rigidified. Political identity was linked directly to land such that 
each ‘tribe’ had its location.  By the early 1880s ‘free movement was a memory’ on the 
highveld because of growing populations in the region and greater restrictions on African land 
use (Landau 2010, 169).  The option to remake citizenship through physical removal and 
entering into new political relationships was not available anymore.  An important result of the 
whole process of tribalisation was that political mobilisations that for centuries in southern 
Africa had been contestations of citizenship did not fit the framework for citizenship that was 
forged between the colony and the new ‘tribes’.  In turn, imagining space could not be based 
on political action but rather on (politicised) apolitical categories that were nonetheless closely 
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tied to ideas of space and to colonial political projects.  The same was true of the eastern part 
of the Cape Colony through successive programs of colonial direct and indirect rule through 
the institution of chieftaincy and by the systematic and often simultaneous tactics of 
extermination, assimilation, and exploitation.  ‘There seemed’, writes Landau, ‘sometimes to 
be two different conversations proceeding at the same time, imagined as one, but actually made 
to intersect only by the application of force’ (2010, 214).   This applies as neatly to the political 
vocabulary of southern Africa in the period discussed as it does to the actual performance of 
politics.  At the outset of Popular Politics, Landau writes that ‘the case is made that the people 
of South Africa were historically well equipped to absorb strangers.  Hybridity lay at the core 
of their subcontinental political traditions’ (2010, xi).  His careful study of those traditions 
demonstrates a great deal of absorption and hybridity in the terms and forms of political 
mobilization, but also a great deal of continuity.  Colonialism repressed and suppressed this 
hybridity by controlling political space.  Although space and citizenship were both transformed 
during the long period in question, they remained relational to each other.  In general, the long-
unfolding trend in terms of both space and citizenship was that rigidity replaced flexibility and 
the political options available to people were circumscribed.  
     
At the heart of this history of race, space, and citizenship in the Eastern Cape lies Grahamstown.  
The town itself signified the European, civilised, urban and ultimately ‘white’ distinction from 
the African, savage, rural space; and it served as a staging point for incursions into that other 
space for the purpose of exploiting it.  Fort Beaufort and King Williamstown, both further east 
beyond the Fish River, followed its example as colonial necessity dictated, but Grahamstown 
remained the most significant town in the frontier region for a long time.  In early 
Grahamstown, it is notable that politics, mostly concerned with the land, were predominantly 
about the ‘rural’; the urban or semi-urban space of Grahamstown was more a site of military 
and, later on, economic power from which English settlers and administrators attempted to 
control the politics of the surrounding region.  This was often tied to the larger city of Cape 
Town (not to mention the colonial centres overseas) in that ‘“a large proportion of money in 
Cape Town was derived from mortgages on frontier farms and frontier estates”’ (Legassick 
2010, 60).  Put another way, on the colonial frontier the politics of the ‘urban’ comprised 
largely the concerns of white settlers as projected onto the countryside and its people.   
     This was never a purely defined space or politics, however.  Complicating this 
characterization were the settlements for ‘Coloureds’ such as the one at the Kat River, and the 
presence of African residents in colonial towns, often labourers, small farmers, farmworkers, 
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and soldiers.  Their politics changed to reflect new dispensations and a new shape to the world, 
one framed around staunchly defended divisions on the one hand, and upon struggles for spaces 
of autonomy on the other.  ‘It is not possible’, notes Nomboniso Gasa, ‘to understand land 
dispossession without interrogating its links to other forms of disempowerment and 
dislocation’ (2015).  Foremost among these are political disempowerment and dislocation, 
which were projects undertaken with exceptional vigour—often with ‘a proper degree of 
terror’—by Europeans in South Africa.  However, rather than view the colonial period as two 
centuries before which Africans had politics (now recovered in the academy by the likes of 
Landau and Etherington from the grasp of colonial and apartheid historiographers) and after 
which they did not.  ‘The historical trajectory’, writes Landau, ‘of South Africa and its people 
in “precolonial” and “colonial” times was one of growth and change, not stasis and defense”’ 
(2010, 249).  The three political concepts at play in this chapter—race, space, and citizenship—
must be understood in this way.  Landau continues, ‘The division of the past into pre- and post- 
phases has been only too convenient to Western imperialism’s modes of accumulation’ (2010, 
249).  We must be critical of division not only of time but also of space. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
SPACE, RACE, & CITIZENSHIP IN GRAHAMSTOWN, C. 1830 – 1945 
 
‘It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and 
the police force, the place of the native.  As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial 
exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. ’ – Frantz Fanon in 
The Wretched of the Earth ([1963] 1961, 41) 
 
‘Location matters, which have been intrusive enough of late as to make them almost offensive, 
are giving cause for further complaint.’ – in Local Opinion (25 July 1914) 
 
 
We have seen how the process of Cape colonial expansion and circumscription of African politics 
produced political identities linked to space.  These spatial politics were manifested in separate 
and defined zones—defined meaning not only clear but also referring to the act of definition.  The 
division of people was an intentional colonial project to define citizenship.  One of the results of 
this project was the creation of urban and rural political spaces: the former a European space and 
the latter the domain of Africans under indirect rule.  This does not disqualify the actual 
circumstantial differences between urban and rural areas in terms of population density and 
economics; it does mean that there were political conceptions about urban and rural derived from 
colonialism and racism.  Therefore, what had become through conquest European farmland 
represented a continuation of civilization, of European settlement and ideology, while African 
land was, in such a view, the great un-reclaimed wilderness.  We have seen that Grahamstown 
held a central position in the ‘reclamation’ as well as in the production of the spatial-racial 
categories in question.   
     However, it is important to establish an historical narrative of Grahamstown not only as a part 
of the colonial frontier as the previous chapter has done, but also as a town—or, technically, as a 
city—in its own right.  There are two reasons: first, because spatial politics were fundamental to 
Grahamstown’s internal development; and, second, because the contemporary questions under 
examination and the peoples’ politics that are the focus of this research are affected by and have 
developed, in part, out of the politics of the past.  Indeed, spatially and politically, Grahamstown’s 
historical and present circumstances show an astonishing degree of continuity.  Since the mid-
nineteenth century, Grahamstown has been faced with technical problems of water supply, 
housing, road quality, and health which are manifested differently in the ‘locations’ and ‘town’.  
In addition, and more importantly, exclusion from formal political structures has affected black 
Africans living in the locations in shifting but continuous ways during the last century and a half 
and longer, and the same people have been subjected to various systems of control beginning with 
the foundation of the locations, through to segregation and apartheid, and still manifested in 
unequal access to citizenship in the post-apartheid era.  Solutions and non-solutions to 
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Grahamstown’s problems have been (and are still) profoundly dictated by the spatial politics that 
emerged from the European conquest of the region and which produced the current spatial 
arrangement of Grahamstown. 
     Four Master’s theses completed at Rhodes University are particularly useful in composing a 
narrative of Grahamstown from the mid-nineteenth until the mid-twentieth century (Gibbens 
1982; Sellick 1983; Southey 1984; Torlesse 1993).  These theses have accomplished a serious and 
thorough synthesis of the municipal archive and other local sources spanning the years 1860 to 
1945, work which fills a significant gap in literature about Grahamstown.  They would be useful 
to other historical research on this period.  However, it must also be acknowledged that these four 
theses are problematic, and demonstrate repeatedly and obviously the flaws inherent in relying 
solely on the colonial archive (see Etherington 2001).  Though all four sources seem to aspire to 
a form of historiographical impartiality, they frequently take for granted and uncritically 
reproduce the colonial opinions and prejudices appearing in the archive.  Racist terms are used 
without or with only inconsistent qualification, and as a group the authors are staunch apologists 
for Victorian paternalism and humanitarianism.  The type of politics which is fundamental to this 
research is either ignored or not recognised in these sources; they read little differently from the 
municipal records which inform them, and the term ‘politics’ is usually limited to elections and 
municipal council deliberations.  Even Southey, seemingly the most critical of the four, asserts 
that ‘Political activity amongst Grahamstown’s black people seemed to decline as the twentieth 
century advanced’ (1984, 216), and yet goes on to describe several highly political events that 
contradict the statement.  In short, these four theses are not sympathetic to the research and type 
of history which is necessary here.  Nonetheless, a narrative of space and citizenship in the context 
of Grahamstown can be gleaned from them. 
     Chatterjee’s ‘political society’ should remain in mind throughout this history of Grahamstown: 
the notion of a governable segment of society without access to civil society structures of the city.  
Following on the bifurcation of colonial space into the urban and rural, and the evolution of race 
in relation to that distinction, a bifurcated politics materialised in town in which space was in its 
turn defined by race.  The politics of control and repression were organised around governing 
spaces and maintaining their boundaries, while at times there emerged politics from below, from 
‘uncivil society’, in Neocosmos’s nuanced phrase (2011, 374), which transgressed those 
boundaries both practically and conceptually.  In such politics, the question and definition of 
citizenship was contested.  The incidences depicted here elucidate a spatial-racial control of 
politics within the city of Grahamstown that reflected the logic of urban and rural division mapped 
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during the colonial conquest of the Eastern Cape as well as, very significantly, political challenges 
to this order. 
 
In 1829, at the same time that the Kat River settlement was established in the ‘Ceded Territory’ 
to the east of Grahamstown, Governor Cole also officially formed another ‘location’ for Coloured 
people, on the outskirts of Grahamstown.  Originally called the ‘Hottentot Location’ its name has 
only been slightly modified during almost two centuries to the ‘Coloured Area’.  Though these 
names employ the vocabulary of eighteenth and nineteenth century racism and reflect colonial 
racial logic, they will both be used here as context requires; but to avoid careless recycling of 
derogatory language, the latter or also ‘Coloured Location’ has been preferred when possible.  The 
formation of the Coloured Area demonstrates two things: first that a significant number of people 
identified as ‘Coloured’ were living in or very near to Grahamstown; and, second, that the 
definition and hardening of racial categories linked to political spaces that developed around the 
Fish River frontier was enacted in town, as well.   
     The formation of the next oldest location, the ‘Fingo Location’ or ‘Fingo Village’, first 
considered officially in 1841 and enacted in 1848, suggests similar things: that a significant 
number of African people were living in or very near to Grahamstown and that the colonial 
administration was intent to control them by establishing a space of governance in which they 
would live.  The name of the location, derived from the name of people living to the east, the 
‘Fingo’ or Mfengu’1, suggests compellingly a connection to events on the frontier, which was by 
this time shifting away from Grahamstown.  During the frontier war of 1834-36, ‘some 16,000-
17000  “Mfengu” were resettled from Hintsa’s territory [beyond the Kei] to the Fort Peddie area 
and made British subjects, to act as frontier buffers against the entry of the Xhosa to the Fish River 
bush’ in a similar project to the one at the Kat River.  Later in the war, some of these ‘Mfengu’ 
were drafted to fight on the side of the colony, and ‘were also intended to provide a labour supply 
to the colonists, and, indeed, their introduction brought a downturn in wages’ (Legassick 2010, 
45).  Not surprisingly, some of the same displaced people ended up in Grahamstown, only a little 
more than forty miles away from Peddie, and lent their name to the settlement on the town’s 
eastern margin.  Gibbens reports a serious concern on the part of the town councillors regarding 
1 Numerous scholars have complicated Fingo/Mfengu identity, tracing it to the British colonial practise of defining 
of ethnicities (Webster 1995; Stapleton 1995).  One compelling argument (Fry 2010) notes that the ‘earliest and 
clearest means of identifying Fingos was through spatial differentiation’ of the places in which groups of people lived 
and that ‘Fingo-ness sprung from a movement, both literal and symbolic, away from the centres of Xhosa authority’ 
(32).  Fry’s account emphasises complex and fluid politics and identities among Africans (Xhosa), as well as divisive 
eye with which colonial observers gazed upon African people. 
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squatters on the town lands (1982, 256), which substantiates such a set of circumstances in the 
decade between the 1834 war and the establishment of Grahamstown’s second location. 
     Central to the founding of the locations were the issues of control and citizenship.  As Gibbens 
relates, echoing the viewpoints of 1840s Grahamstown, ‘Control remained the very necessary 
motive for the setting up and supervision of the Fingo Location – for, after all, the function of the 
Municipal Commissioners was primarily to order the civic life of the town in all aspects, to the 
benefit of all inhabitants. Yet it was hoped through such control to inculcate the civic duties and 
ensure the rights of municipal householders within the location’ (1982, 256).  Inherent in this is 
the conception of the urban space as the site of ‘civil society’ as opposed to a ‘traditional’ rural 
political space.  The town space was imbued with the colonial civilising mission, and, at the same 
time, the settlers of Grahamstown sought to protect political control through spatial divisions.   
There persisted very strongly in Grahamstown the civilizing ideology of the square houses, 
discussed in the previous chapter; and rights held by residents of the town itself were supposedly 
extended to the location residents, with the hope of ‘civilizing’ them—an attitude emerging from 
colonial periodicals as ‘a common moral code based on the Christian ethic, duty, self-restraint, 
work and charity’ (Gibbens 1982, 256; 21-22).   
     At the time of incorporation of the locations, there was debate about whether Africans living 
in Grahamstown could pay rates and vote, and whether locations should be included into the 
existed municipal wards or form separate ones (Gibbens 1982, 30).  The civilisational project of 
‘town’ is apparent in the remarks of one municipal official at the time: ‘There was a great number 
of natives among us, some civilized, some semi-civilized and some just emerging from barbarism, 
and no provision had been made […] for their representation in municipal matters’ (quoted in 
Gibbens 1982, 30).  Significantly, one condition for becoming civilised was being a qualified 
ratepayer (occupying immovable property with a yearly value of £10) in an (emerging) urban, 
European space.  Citizenship—political belonging—was in the process of codification at this 
stage; some measure of formal political inclusion was extended by the white colony to Africans 
living inside its borders and in its towns, but the social and spatial exclusion of the locations and 
the genuine lack of formal, ‘European-style’, political power experienced by Africans prefigures 
the long trend of the next century of rescinding, abrogation, and exclusion that culminated in the 
institution of apartheid in 1948. 
 
The spatial divisions of Grahamstown were immediately visible.  As a description of the town 
published in The Graham’s Town Journal in 1882 bemoaned, the approach to Grahamstown from 
‘the interior’ first passed through the reek of slaughter houses and the unsightly ‘huts’ of the 
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‘Hottentot Location’, where people ‘in the lowest grade of existence would be a disgrace to the 
most lawless community’.  In the descriptor’s opinion, people lived in this way because they were 
neglected by the municipality (quoted in Gibbens 1982, 238).  These words echo the deprecating 
descriptions of ‘Hottentots’ by Europeans at the Cape in the mid-seventeenth century, as 
reproduced faithfully by the likes of MacCrone.2  They also invoke the prevailing Western 
imagery of the ‘slum’ in racialised terms.  As Goldberg writes: ‘The slum is by definition filthy, 
foul smelling, wretched, rancorous, uncultivated and lacking care.  The racial slum is doubly 
determined, for the metaphorical stigma of a black blotch on the cityscape bears the added 
connotations of moral degeneracy, natural inferiority, and repulsiveness’ (1993, 191-192).  In that 
contemporary portrayal, the senses and the law were violated on the outskirts of town, on the road 
from ‘the interior’, where a concrescence of the wild African sphere had formed on the road to the 
white town, which only needed attention from the whites of that town to be uplifted from its 
disgraceful state. 
     Nonetheless, in spite of the accusation of neglect, the nineteenth century writer emphasises that 
streets were laid out nicely and the Magistrate was in good control of the people (Gibbens 1982, 
238).  Access to the locations was policed: ‘All applicants for being located on the town lands, 
had to go to the Superintendent, who would point out a spot on which they could build a hut’, a 
license was required in order to remain on city lands for more than a week, and grazing of stock 
on town lands required permission of the Municipal Council.  The two locations were administered 
differently, displaying once more the defining of race and space in conjunction.  Fingo Village 
was managed by two headmen while the Coloured Location was managed by an assistant field 
cornet (Sellick 1983, 169). In the ‘Fingo Location’, all occupants of six months could purchase 
their allotments, while in the ‘Hottentot Location’, a person could own more than one allotment, 
which suggests, consistently with racial understandings of the time, that Coloured people were 
more able to participate in ‘civilised’ town life centered around private property than Africans 
were (Gibbens 1982, 258-259; 261).   
     For a theory of urban spatial division, Ealham’s Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona 1898-
1937 (2005) provides a useful framework for understanding urbanisation and bifurcation as 
coincident processes.  Certainly the context of Ealham’s work is different, but the work is 
theoretically valuable.  As appropriate to Grahamstown in the mid-nineteenth century as 
Barcelona fifty years later, Ealham writes, ‘for all the high sounding rhetoric of the urban elites 
and their emphasis on progress and civic equality’—consider the missionary attitude of colonial 
Grahamstown—‘[the city] was not organised for the benefit of all its inhabitants’ (2005, 8).  He 
2 See Chapter 1. 
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continues, ‘in social terms a process of urban bifurcation was at work, according to which class 
divisions became inscribed in space’ (2005, 8).  As we have seen, the process in Grahamstown 
was complicated by increasingly definitive articulations of race as well as class (though only 
partially explored by Ealham, similar racial/ethnic perceptions were mobilised in Barcelona) and 
by the conceptual division of urban and rural, but we will see that the urban bifurcation presented 
by Ealham lends itself to a racialised setting such as Grahamstown.  The bifurcation (and in fact, 
there were divisions imposed within the ‘African’ space, as well) of Grahamstown through the 
institutionalization of the locations was about controlling access to what was conceived as 
properly ‘the city’ and the politics that were acceptable in the city.  The response in 1868 to a 
Coloured man’s being nominated for member on the Municipal Council was to propose an 
increase of property qualifications for membership to £1000 because ‘it [was] not right that the 
council should be exposed to the possibility of such an annoyance’ (Graham’s Town Journal 26 
October 1868, quoted in Gibbens 1982, 249).  As Gibbens concludes from this series of events, 
‘While the right to vote […] was an accepted right of the location communities and acknowledged 
as such by the white community, the possibility of a location resident becoming a Council member 
was regarded as absurd’ (1982, 251).  The contradiction between professed political inclusion and 
access to rights of citizenship is clear. 
     Gibbens is intent to construct an image of the early Grahamstown locations in which racial 
control is tempered with class realities: ‘The lines of division between town and location still owed 
something to occupation and wage-earning capacity in addition to the enormous cultural and racial 
divisions.  There is no doubt that the situation in the locations and among the location population 
was both complex and flexible’ (1982, 267).  Certainly, as Grahamstown was still growing and 
racial exclusion in a town context was in its early stages (in linear comparison with the twentieth 
century), there were complicating facts.  It cannot be ignored, as they are visible in the historical 
record, that some poor white people were living in the locations—characterised as ‘navvies’ 
(Gibbens 1982, 276)—and that there were exclusions and prejudices around class in the attitudes 
of Grahamstown residents, but the administration of the locations and the intention of the 
legislation around locations demonstrates a simple racial strategy.  Most basically, the series of 
Acts affecting locations were called ‘Native Land Act(s)’, and their concerns were consistent with 
their titles.  The Native Land Act (No. 6) of 1876, which was applied to Grahamstown’s locations 
in 1881, was a reaction to ‘squatting’ by Africans in the region to the east that had been temporarily 
the colony of ‘British Kaffraria’ (1847-1866) (Gibbens 1982, 259; 276).3 
3 The land east of the Keiskamma River, which during the colonial conquest was designated by the British as both 
‘Queen Adelaide Province’ and ‘British Kaffraria’, was annexed all of three times to the Cape Colony, with each 
annexation and separation meaning different modes of rule and different definitions of citizenship for the people 
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     In addition to the ongoing enactment of spatial divisions, two episodes in the 1862-1882 period 
accentuate the way in which this division functioned.  The first speaks to the ‘civilising’ attitude 
of the town.  In 1862, the Bishop of Grahamstown had applied to move an Anglican-run school 
for Africans, the ‘Kaffir Institute’,4 from an elite neighbourhood on the west side of town to the 
empty barracks at Fort England, in the southeast.  The move was opposed by white Grahamstown 
in the newspapers on the grounds that ‘no native location should be allowed in the city’ for fear 
that it would lower property values in the Fort England area, and a petition was signed by fifty 
householders against allowing a “‘colony of natives” within the city’ (Gibbens 1982, 241-242).  
Those in favor of the move emphasised the ‘good conduct’ and the Christian education of boys at 
the school (Gibbens 1982, 243).  Gibbens dubiously presents this as a matter of class: rich whites 
on the west side were not affronted by the presence of Africans whereas poor whites nearer to the 
locations were (1982, 244), however, the concern about the value of the land near the proposed 
new site for the Institute suggests a different story based not only on property economics but also 
on politics of space.  The presence of the African learners was acceptable except where it might 
hinder the expansion of white property and the white urban political space; it is clear that there 
was and was to be a ‘white’ city which was not available or accessible to Africans. 
     The second event in the 1862-1882 period that demonstrates spatial division in Grahamstown 
and, more importantly here, the urban and rural logic that we saw develop during the conquest of 
the Zuurveld, was the arrival into town of a group of people referred to as ‘Oba’s Kafirs’.  In April 
1878, with war once more on the eastward-moving frontier, it was decided that a chief of 
questionable loyalties, Oba, should be moved away from the frontier.  The people with Oba were 
split into small groups and sent to Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, and Graaff-Reinet.  
Twenty women and children arrived first in Grahamstown, followed by over five hundred people 
later in the month.  Only some two hundred and fifty remained in Grahamstown, about half of 
them children (apparently because there was concern about Grahamstown’s proximity to the 
frontier and the danger to the town posed by large numbers of possibly hostile adults; and indeed, 
many young men from Oba’s people had crossed the Kei and joined Sandile in the war).  Many 
of those who ended up in Grahamstown at this time stayed there (Gibbens 1982, 273-274).  
Gibbens’s approach to this event reflects the logic of the 1870s:  
 
The presence in the locations of ‘Oba’s Kafirs’, unused to location life and unsettled by 
their separation from their tribe and enforced exile, became a nucleus of nightly 
living there.  It should be noted that in spite of official colony policy, people and leaders east of the Keiskamma did 
not acquiesce to colonial rule.  Sometimes but not only through war, they actively maintained their modes of politics 
and their own conceptions of citizenship while adapting to interference by the British. 
4 The term ‘Kaffir’ or ‘Kafir’ only appears here where it has been used as part of a proper noun (i.e. Kaffir Institute, 
‘Oba’s Kaffirs’), or where primary sources use it. 
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disturbances and riotous living within the Fingo Location.  [There were] complaints about 
the misbehaviour of “Oba’s Kafirs” from worthy Grahamstown citizens […] (1982, 276). 
 
Elsewhere, she observes, along with the Graham’s Town Journal, that by 1879 unrest in Fingo 
Village was worsened by a “great influx” of “utter heathen” into the location, Oba’s people 
included, and that Grahamstown residents lamented that fewer and fewer of the Africans in the 
locations were Christian (quoted in Gibbens 1982, 276-277). 
     Obvious in this is the distinction between Africans from the town and from the country: those 
arriving from the frontier brought undesirable elements into the locations and were characterised 
as fomenting ‘unrest’ and causing ‘disturbances’.  Grahamstown’s white populace were ‘gripped 
by anxieties that the “criminal classes” [were] steadily encroaching on the frontiers of policed 
society’, and outsiders, ‘living in a state of nature or primitive barbarism, the criminal heart of 
darkness in the city’, to use Ealham’s terms in this context, were maligned as damaging to the 
integrity of the Christian city (2005, 9; 12).  White concern for controlling the people coming to 
Grahamstown led in 1860 to a new Municipal Location under city control adjoining Fingo Village 
(Holleman 1997, 38).  After the war ended, there were recommendations that a fence should be 
built around the locations and plot sizes decreased.  A ‘Native Model Village’ was also considered, 
in which respectable men would be located and afforded brick or stone houses with gardens 
(Gibbens 1982, 282; 287).  Citizenship was closely guarded through spatial and racial control, and 
imbued in some cases with perceptions of urban and rural that mirrored the logic of the colonial 
conquest. 
 
Though not always clear on the nature of the ‘unrest’, there are ideas mentioned repeatedly in the 
four theses on Grahamstown history that allow for certain insights.  During the entire century in 
question, paramount in the articulation of the paranoia of Grahamstown’s colonial whites were 
morality and health.  This is consistent with Ealham’s theory and depiction of urban spatial control 
in Barcelona:  
 
[T]he moral panics were a guide to repressive action: they profiled the ‘danger’ 
represented by ‘recalcitrant’ and ‘diseased’ groups (hence the positivist concern with 
classifying, cleansing and civilising), which had to be excluded from the full rights of 
citizenship and isolated from ‘healthy’ and ‘respectable’ individuals. They were also a 
justification for closing off the nascent proletarian public sphere, creating a moral and 
political climate that legitimated the extension of state power on the streets and the 
establishment of a new system of bureaucratic surveillance to regulate civil society (2005, 
14). 
 
That logic was racialised in the African context at the time in question, when unhealthy conditions 
in African residential areas of colonial cities throughout the continent led to outbreaks of plague 
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and other disease, and ‘this “sanitation syndrome” caught hold of the colonial imagination as a 
general social metaphor for the pollution of blacks of urban space’, and public health was 
employed as an excuse to remove Africans to city limits and to implement segregation (Goldberg 
1993, 1990).  When there were instances of plague in Johannesburg and Cape Town, the 
residences of Africans, depicted as ‘slums’ were destroyed and the people ‘expelled to peripheral 
locations on sewage farms’ (Goldberg 1993, 191).  In Grahamstown, Africans were already mostly 
confined to the margins of the city from the very beginning, but the health fears strengthened the 
official white desire for separation and control of Africans, not so much as something new at the 
turn of the century, but as a preservation of the arrangement that had been produced for almost a 
century.   
     Sellick, another apologist for Victorian attitudes, reports that ‘[b]etween 1883 and 1904, the 
locations were little more than disease-ridden ghettos’ (1983, 156). 5  Location residents faced 
dangerous water shortages, water unfit for consumption, malnutrition, waste disposal and 
sanitation problems, all of which contributed to high rates of disease (Sellick 1983, 179-183).   The 
descriptions of these ‘ghettos’ largely follows the opinion that municipal ‘neglect’ was basic to 
the problem.  However unhealthy they were for residents, the locations did function successfully 
as spaces of control, and over the last two decades of the nineteenth century this system of control 
was made more efficient through colonial legislation.  Sellick writes of the ‘growing desire for a 
“cordon sanitaire” between Black and White’ which led to the Native Reserve Locations Act (No. 
40) in 1902 and the South African Native Affairs Commission Report in 1905, which proposed 
complete territorial segregation.  Act 40 was the only one ‘passed during the period of 1883-1904 
which deals comprehensively with the establishment of Black reserve locations near urban areas’: 
in those areas ‘[t]he Governor had extensive powers to prohibit blacks from living outside the 
locations, to regulate the erection of shelters, curfew hours, entry into the location, the carrying of 
identity documents and eviction of residents regarded as “unlawful”’ (Sellick 1983, 159-160). 
    In spite of the colonial efforts, segregation was incomplete in Grahamstown, and its 
incompleteness served to emphasise the division of space.  As Sellick notes, ‘Fairly large numbers 
of Blacks lived in Dell’s row in African Street, and Paradise Row in New Street.  Smaller groups 
could be found scattered throughout the town’ whose ‘presence […] within the city was barely 
tolerated by the White citizens.  Many of their regular complaints [were] about overcrowding, 
noise, drunkenness, and the pollution of the surrounds’ (1983, 170-171).  Indeed in 1886, there 
were complaints that a town Councillor was ‘among the greatest sinners in respect of letting 
5 There were high instances of especially tuberculosis, and also smallpox, and bubonic plague in Grahamstown around 
the turn of the century (Southey 1990, 15). 
 
                                                 
50 
 
houses in the town to Kafirs’ and that the problem of slums would be solved with the introduction 
of ‘legislation to prohibit Blacks from living outside the locations’ (Sellick 1983, 171).  Other 
forms of control included the 1888 law prohibiting Africans from carrying weapons in the street, 
and a curfew imposed in 1912 (Sellick 1983, 173; 187; Southey 1984, 237). 
     In 1870, the Municipal Locations had been expanded, and a section north east of Fingo Village 
had come to be known as ‘Tantye’ or ‘Tantjie’ (Holleman 1997, 38). Under the 1881 Municipal 
Regulations, Fingo Village and the Coloured Location were supervised by the ‘Government 
Inspector of Locations’ for Albany District.  ‘Three headmen were answerable to him for the 
administration of these locations: an Mfengu […] and a Thembu […] in the Fingo Village and a 
Coloured […] in the Hottentot Location’ (Southey 1984, 192), identifications which reflect the 
preservation of official division of Africans not only from whites but from each other as well 
through ethnicity.  The three ‘headmen’ were responsible for the collection of quitrents.  In an 
effort to better control the locations during the first decade of the twentieth century, their control 
was bureaucratised and standardised.6  As Southey relates, ‘All huts and streets were numbered, 
stock branded, and all money derived from the locations [was to be] spent there, and no longer to 
be absorbed into general revenue.  A new register was to be opened, and full information recorded’ 
(1984, 193). 
 
In rural areas, the intensification of spatial control was also under way.  ‘Private locations’ were 
instituted through Act 33 of 1892, which required white farmers to register all the Africans living 
on their farms.  The farmers ‘were liable to a fine if more than the specified number of non-wage 
earning Africans resided’ on their land, which ‘led to evictions in some areas’ and coerced labour 
in some cases.  Subsequent acts in 1899 and 1909 created more specific regulations for African 
residence on farmland and the relationships between white farmers and Africans, largely aimed at 
removing ‘squatters’ from white farmland (Southey 1984, 225).  The private locations 
proliferated.  In 1900, there were sixteen private locations in Albany district, sixty-one two years 
later, over eighty in 1903, and by 1912 almost 6,000 African people lived on 143 private locations 
(Southey 1984, 226-227).   
     Interestingly, many of the white fears—the practises they sought most to control among 
Africans—were the same in town and in the country: farmers’ meetings were concerned with 
6 Even in 1912, Fingo Village and the Coloured Location were still Government Locations, distinct from the 
Municipal Location(s).  All three were administered under different legislation, which largely affected access to 
property and the payment and collection of rates.  There was conflict in the Grahamstown Municipal Council over 
whether the Municipal Locations should take on the regulations of the Government Locations or vice versa (Southey 
1990, 17). 
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labour, theft, squatting, and (always) alcohol production and consumption, in particular of 
sorghum beer—the ‘Kafir beer evil’ (Southey 1984, 226).  On squatting in rural areas, The 
Graham’s Town Journal opined that ‘large portions of the Eastern Province will in a few years be 
nothing better than a native area’ (3 June 1905, quoted in Southey 1984, 226).  The evictions of 
Africans from nearby farms, as well as some voluntary relocation to towns, including 
Grahamstown, created anxiety among whites.  Echoing, in the context of the town, the motivations 
behind the Brereton of 1818, The Graham’s Town Journal reported in 1909 that there were some 
four hundred ‘loose natives’ in the Grahamstown locations who had come in from rural areas, and 
that these people were responsible for increases in stock theft and other crime, leading to stricter 
control of access to the locations in town (3 September 1909, quoted in Southey 1984, 227; 228). 
     A shift of focus to contemporaneous events in Natal allows another exploration of the 
developing spatial control project of British colonialism in Southern Africa.  In 1908, in response 
to an uprising (Maphumalo) in 1906, a ward system was introduced which would ‘redefine chiefly 
powers in “territorial” rather than “personal” terms’ (Ngonyama 2014, 83).  Personal relationships 
between chiefs and people involved the provision of land on which homesteads and farms could 
be founded in return for tributary service, and thus ‘transcend[ed] territories’ (Ngonyama 2014, 
85).  As Crown Lands were sold from the 1880s onwards in Natal, many Africans were forced to 
move back to ‘already overcrowded locations’.  Although chiefs raised funds to purchase any 
available land, in 1903 ‘the Land Department was “instructed” to reject bids by Africans for crown 
lands’, thereby limiting chiefly ability to provide land to their people.  The introduction of wards 
further decreased the authority of chiefs, forcing many people to change their allegiances 
(citizenship) based on where they lived (Ngonyama 2014, 88; 90).  As Ngonyama explains, ‘the 
policy of “merging” and “eating up” polities, which would facilitate redefining boundaries within 
the context of “indirect rule”, was not new’, but the ward system in Natal differed in that ‘for the 
first time, the authority of [chiefs] would be officially bounded territorially so as to eliminate 
“tribal mix up”’ (2014, 93).  Inherent to the logic of the ward system was the same process of 
destruction of African political systems and legitimacy that Landau (2010) theorises and which 
was explored in relation to the Eastern Cape in the preceding chapter: ‘With the Ward System, the 
traditional notion [that … ‘a chief is a chief because of the people’] was replaced by the notion 
that a chief is a chief because of the space/territory in which he resides’—the logic of fixity, once 
again (Ngonyama 2014, 101).  The words of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Arthur J. Shepstone, 
in 1909 illuminate without question the centrality of the idea of space to the colonial project at the 
beginning of the twentieth century: 
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With the area and population so greatly increased, and civilization spreading, slowly 
though it be, in every direction, it is manifest that governing the Natives has come to be a 
task of vast proportions as well as one of peculiar difficulty and complexity (Ngonyama 
2014, 88; emphasis added). 
 
The proliferation and regulation of ‘private locations’ on farms in the Eastern Cape, the increasing 
rigidity of location policy in Grahamstown and the control of locations and Africans through 
‘headmen’ that was going on at the same time displays a consistency of rationalisation and practise 
in dealing with Africans in both urban and rural areas. 
 
In spite of their dismissal in the analyses of colonial Grahamstown periodicals, as well as in the 
four theses informing this chapter, politics existed among Africans living in the locations.  
Unfortunately, they are mostly visible in these sources in relation to specific moments of 
repression, since subaltern politics after the fashion of Chatterjee are not entertained.  Indeed, 
politics by Africans in this period seem to generate quite serious confusion for the researchers:  
‘Evidence’, writes Southey, ‘of political organization in Grahamstown on a local level is non-
existent; but Grahamstown’s blacks nonetheless reacted to threats to their rights, and made their 
voices heard’, in partial contradiction of the assertion a few pages earlier that African Separatist 
churches were active in the locations, where they caused ‘tremendous trouble’, and that ‘political 
activity was intermittent amongst Africans’ (1984, 224; 215-16).  Gibbens and Sellick refrain from 
most analysis beyond ‘unrest’ and mentioning the extent of the Cape franchise.  However, politics 
can be detected which threatened the colonial agenda of spatial control (not ignoring the war in 
the Eastern Cape in 1878-79).  These politics will be important going forward, when the focus of 
this research shifts to contemporary Grahamstown. The framing of the administration of the 
locations as technical concerns of public health and crime are mimicked in the ‘service delivery’ 
and ‘illegal land occupation’ rationalisations of ‘restlessness’, to use the degrading word, among 
poor Africans in South African cities in 2015. 
     In spite of shrinking access to the vote in the 1880s and 90s (and continuing afterwards) and 
the apparent lack of success of formal political organizations such as the local Vigilance 
Association, the South African Native Congress, and Native Education Association (Sellick 1983, 
157-158; 160-164), African people in Grahamstown were frequently politically active.  In one 
instance, in 1887, residents of the Coloured Location refused to pay rents because repeated 
complaints about the state of roads in the location were not answered (Sellick 1983, 177).  At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, repression was preoccupied with squatters and with 
‘unemployed people residing in the locations’, who ‘were regarded as a source of danger’, which 
led to legislation and police forces being mobilised against them (Southey 1984, 231-233).  Police, 
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said The Grahamstown Journal in 1908, were ‘carrying on a regular crusade against squatters and 
vagrants in the city locations’ (quoted in Southey 1984, 232).  An action by thirty-five Cape 
Mounted Police into the locations in 1911, which resulted in fifteen arrests of ‘illegal inhabitants’ 
resulted in a petition and protest, but the City Council ignored the demands (Southey 1984, 233). 
    A newly appointed Location Inspector, unpopular for his strict enforcement of the law, was 
assaulted by one man in 1913.  More importantly, the appointment led to several protest meetings, 
and a petition signed by eighty-eight women living in the location complaining of ‘indifference to 
their interests and the way in which they had been treated by the inspector’ was delivered to the 
City Council in July 1913.  The Council ignored the petition on three grounds: it was brought by 
women, some of these women had been convicted of brewing beer (for which they were supposed 
to have left the location), and all the names had been written by only two of the women (Southey 
1984; 1990, 16). Three years later, women again protested at City Hall, this time regarding the 
water supply to the locations.  They were first accompanied by a spokesman but after inaction on 
the part of the municipality, a larger group of women went to City Hall demanding that the water 
problems should be resolved (Southey 1984, 203).  Southey, in a rather more sophisticated 
analysis of Grahamstown during this period than his thesis, argues that the revolt in 1917 as well 
as the many smaller protest actions during the years 1913-1918 ‘illustrated that the city authorities, 
despite the formidable array of laws that they had built up during the previous two decades [and 
longer] did not enjoy the control that they imagined they exercised in the city’ (1990, 10).  A 
‘deputation of tenants from the location’ in 1916 forced the city council to concede some of the 
provisions of its rigidified lease laws, but political action by Africans continued, leading to the 
armed march in April 1917 (stayaways and boycotts had also been considered).  ‘Despite the show 
of official strength’, as Southey refers to the regiment-sized force that attacked the locations and 
arrested protesters, Africans would not sign new lease agreements, and by September some 350 
of 500 refused to sign.  The Council determined to revise the lease agreements in favour of the 
tenants (Southey 1990, 19), and the cattle quota was raised from three to five, but this was 
accompanied by tightened security and police raids for ‘illegal’ liquor increased (Holleman 1997, 
41).  Still, in the face of increasingly strict control over their lives, residents in Grahamstown’s 
locations managed to resist the terms of the lease agreements.  ‘The city council’, writes Southey, 
‘was constrained by the actions of the location residents themselves’ without outside help from or 
association with formal political organisations, though often with recourse to legal systems that 
demonstrated an exercise by Africans of what citizenship rights were available to them (1990, 20-
23). 
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     The conviction of women for brewing beer was part of an ongoing political conflict in 
Grahamstown.  Alcohol abuse by Africans was decried consistently by white residents from the 
time of the foundation of the locations in Grahamstown, and violence and ‘unrest’ in town was 
largely attributed to alcohol, with clear racial and spatial inflections, as we have seen.  Indeed, the 
‘question of liquor in general and “kaffir-beer” in particular runs threadlike through the history of 
the African working class in South Africa’ (La Hause 1982, 66).  Further east in the port city of 
Durban, the control of the sale and consumption of alcohol in municipal beer halls was devised as 
a means of control of African people and African mobility as well.  The alcohol available in ‘peri-
urban areas’ was illegal, while that for sale near the ‘hostels’7 was managed by the government.  
In addition, the money spent on beer was used to pay the salaries of public officials, and for 
services for Africans.  The monopoly on beer in Durban led to protest, in which ‘the total system 
of coercion and social control; the Durban system, its web of coercive regulations and penal 
sanctions’ were contested.  Boycotts of the beerhalls were staged in Durban during 1929 and 1930 
(La Hause 1982, 67-68; 72) 
     In Grahamstown, a Municipal Beer Hall was constructed in Fingo Village 1938 with the same 
objective of regulating the sale of alcohol in the locations while paying for their maintenance 
(Torlesse 1993, 160). ‘The brewing of sorghum beer’, writes Southey, ‘was widely regarded by 
the white inhabitants of Grahamstown as a practice to be curtailed at all costs’ (1984, 213).  
Brewing was grounds for eviction, but many location residents—mainly women, but also some 
men—relied on brewing for their livelihoods (Southey 1990, 16).  The moral argument that 
Africans were violent or otherwise a problem in town was constantly repeated during the eighty 
year period reviewed by the four theses on Grahamstown, and served, like public health concerns, 
to depoliticise the actions of Africans living in the locations.  Such a ‘localization of crime’, says 
Goldberg, ‘serves a double end: It magnifies the image of racialized criminality, and it confines 
the overwhelming proportion of crimes involving the racially marginalized to racially marginal 
space’ (1993, 197).  We saw the same understanding at play in the earliest days of European 
settlement at the Cape of Good Hope: both the local African population and the Europeans who 
made their way into the ‘barbarous’ countryside were cast as criminal.  In Grahamstown, how 
much of the vague ‘unrest’ or ‘violence’ which was attributed to drunkenness was actually 
motivated by political convictions cannot be known, but it is unlikely, given the instances of 
political action that are recorded, that every time a black African was called unruly, it was simply 
a case of public drunkenness. 
7 Barracks for workers 
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     While political activity by Africans in the surrounding rural areas is obscured in the sources 
utilised here, the information about farmers’ politics can provide insights into what was going on 
there.  Significantly, local farmers—organised as the Albany Farmers’ Association—were highly 
invested in the politics of the town.  Not only were their fears the same as the whites in town, as 
has been seen, but they were intent on absolute control of those Africans who did live in town.  
Farmers wanted extremely strict control of the locations: police stations to be built and manned 
there, the disarming of Africans throughout the entire Eastern Province, prohibition of liquor, and 
pass laws.  They supported curfews for the locations in 1909 and 1912 (Southey 1990, 14).  There 
were rumors of several African scouts being sent from the town locations to surrounding farms 
and to Peddie ‘to try to raise an insurrection’ (Southey 1984, 249)—whether this was an instance 
of fear mongering or based in part on truth is unclear.8  During the major conflict in 1917 described 
at the very beginning of this thesis, which was considered by white authorities and observers of 
the period to be a ‘violation’ by poor Africans into the political space of the white city, the local 
farmers accused the magistrate of being too gentle in his response, and demanded the arrest of the 
deputation that mediated the conflict (Southey 1984, 252).  Repression was organised spatially, 
but in certain ways it transcended the urban and rural division, which suggests that resistance was 
also not confined in terms of this distinction. 
 
Although Grahamstown’s importance on the frontier declined from the mid-nineteenth century—
it was second largest to Cape Town until the 1860s—due to the advance of the frontier towards 
the Kei River in the east, the foundation of King William’s Town and Queenstown and the growth 
of East London as a port (Gibbens 1982, 14; 18-19), the spatial politics that attended 
Grahamstown’s establishment and early projection of colonial politics and military power 
continued to crucially affect the political lives of people living in the town and its surrounds. 
     Leading up to and following the Union of South Africa in 1910, segregation was increasingly 
formalised.  The Natives’ Land Act (27) of 1913, following the recommendations of the South 
African Native Affairs Commission report of 1905, codified territorial segregation and legislated 
the institution of traditional authorities over African areas.  Africans, under the Act, could only 
buy land in ‘Scheduled Native Areas’, which amounted to ‘one-eighteenth’ of the entire Union of 
South Africa (Plaatje [1916] 1982, 24).  Sol Plaatje, an important black intellectual in early 
twentieth-century South Africa, transcribes the Land Act debate in the Union Parliament in Native 
Life in South Africa ([1916] 1982).  What becomes clear reading the transcription is that the debate 
8 In either case, it is reminiscent of accusations by seventeenth century slave-owners at the Cape that Africans outside 
of colonial control were inciting slaves to run away, as seen in MacCrone (1937, 32). 
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was over what form control of Africans (‘Natives’) would take: on the one hand was the repressive 
control ‘[Orange] Free State law’ which came to be the law of the whole country through the Act; 
on the other was the tradition of British liberalism.  We have seen the latter’s civilizing mission 
and its hypocrisy played out in Grahamstown.  The distinction is characterised by one Member of 
the Union Parliament9 as between ‘repression’ and ‘inspiration’, that ‘They had inspired the 
natives to a certain extent, but no sooner had they created an appetite than they had told the natives 
they should go no further’ (quoted in Plaatje [1916] 1982, 75).  In the words of another Member10, 
elucidating the idea of space linked with ‘civilisation’, that is, with citizenship, repression meant 
‘a sort of kraal in which all the natives were to be driven, and they were to be left to develop on 
their own lines.  To allow them to go on their own lines was merely to drive them back into 
barbarism; their own lines meant barbarous lines’ (quoted in Plaatje [1916] 1982, 39).  The ‘result 
of a legislative jumble [that] is “the law”’, writes Plaatje, made it ‘illegal for Natives to live on 
farms except as servants in the employ of Europeans’ and he feared that the same policy would 
soon come to apply in urban areas ([1916] 1982, 69; 71-72). Plaatje emphasises the homelessness 
that the Natives’ Land Act enforced upon Africans, even to the point of burying a child in a ‘stolen 
grave’ because its parents were not allowed to own land ([1916] 1982, 90).  At a political meeting 
at Sheshugu in late 1913, Plaatje learned from local Africans that the Act ‘was raging with 
particular fury in the old Cape districts of Fort Beaufort, Grahamstown, King Williamstown, and 
East London’, which includes the area under study here (Plaatje [1916] 1982, 180).   
     Lamenting the failure of the British ‘civilisation’ and Cape liberalism in which he had had 
faith, Sol Plaatje observes that the ‘worst feature’ of the passage of the Land Act was that it 
demonstrated the lack of citizenship of black African people in South Africa: ‘God in the heavens 
alone knows what will become of the hapless, because voteless, Natives, who are without a 
President, “without a King”, and with a Governor-General without constitutional functions, under 
task-masters whose national traditions are to enslave the dark races’ ([1916] 1982, 76; emphasis 
added).  Deprivation of access to formal political structures went hand in hand with dispossession 
of the land.  South Africa was not for Africans, following the lead of the the Orange Free State, 
which an MP11 said, ‘had told the coloured people plainly that the [Orange Free State] was a white 
man’s country, and that they intended to keep it so’ (quoted in Plaatje [1916] 1982, 45). 
 
At the time of the passage of the Natives’ Land Act, of 4,500,000 ‘black South Africans’, ‘[o]ne 
and three-quarter millions [lived] in Locations and Reserves, over half a million within 
9 C. H. Haggar (Roodepoort) 
10 J. X. Merriman (Victoria West), former Prime Minister of the Cape Colony (1908-1910) 
11 J. G. Keyter (Ficksburg) 
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municipalities or urban areas, and nearly a million as squatters’ on white farms (Plaatje [1916] 
1982, 21).  At the same time, the population of the locations at Grahamstown was some 7,000 in 
total, in three or four locations (whether the Municipality administered areas were considered as 
one or two).  The year 1914, following the Natives’ Land Act, saw increasing restrictions on these 
people’s lives.  In January, it was adopted that ‘any inhabitant of the city could graze up to ten 
head of cattle or twenty-five sheep on the commonage [the locations were on the commons], but 
residents of the location were severely restricted’: in the Municipal Location, only three cattle or 
eight sheep were allowed, and the number was also small in the Government Locations, depending 
on property value (Southey 1984, 242).  Running more livestock on commonage was punishable 
by a £5 fine or prison.  Laws were also passed that controlled leases based on employment in the 
city, that forbade domestic workers from remaining at their employers’ homes overnight, and that 
prevented Africans from owning land and property in white areas.  Resistance continued, and in 
November of that year, a meeting in the location passed a resolution against the lease agreement 
(Southey 1984, 242-243).  In 1926, almost all livestock were required to be registered with the 
municipality; in response, 245 people signed a petition against the regulation, which was an 
‘“interference” against their rights and privileges (Torlesse 1993, 123-124). 
     The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, ‘the adoption of which was optional by municipalities, 
empowered local authorities to set aside locations for African occupancy, stop whites from owning 
land in them, and regulate financial administration’ and also restricted African movement and the 
brewing of sorghum beer (Southey 1984, 255).  The Act did not apply to Fingo Village (still a 
government rather than municipal location), and was only applied to Grahamstown Municipal 
locations in 1938.  
     Coercive control through public health continued as well, including forced delousing, 
quarantine hospitals, and home invasions (during a smallpox outbreak in 1914).  Censuses were 
another form of making control more efficient, and based on censuses taken in the 1920s and 30s, 
the Council determined that there were 2042 ‘redundant’ African inhabitants in Grahamstown 
(Torlesse 1993, 147).  In 1938, black men were required to become employed within six days of 
arrival in town, or face arrest and fines or prison.  The Natives (Urban Areas) Act also ‘made 
provision for the removal of convicted “won’t works” to [farms]’ (Torlesse 1993, 148). 
     An analysis of the first hundred and more years of the locations in Grahamstown shows an 
increasing level of control exercised by white governments against African residents through both 
legislation and coercion (the distinction need hardly be made).  Such was the trend throughout the 
country, in both urban and rural areas, which attained its most intense and systematic form during 
apartheid beginning in 1948.  Formal citizenship for Africans, which in the early days of 
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Grahamstown was somewhat grudgingly permissible under colonial liberalism, was curtailed 
drastically until it was withdrawn entirely under apartheid with the creation of the ‘Bantustans’ as 
‘independent’ nations under ‘traditional authorities’12.  This institutionalised the indirect rule 
policies of the preceding hundred years, and is the basis for Mamdani’s argument for a bifurcated 
state—urban civil society on the one hand, and rural traditional authority on the other: a 
dispensation that did not allow for a successful democratic project at the ending of apartheid, 
1990-1994.  As we have seen here in the context of Grahamstown, access to urban ‘civil society’ 
was not available to everyone—whatever the ‘civilising’ posturing of the mid-nineteenth century 
might suggest—and, specifically and acutely, it was denied to black Africans again and again in 
an increasingly harsh and precise manner.  Crucially, the form of exclusion took similar forms in 
both urban and rural areas, largely through the control of specific spaces defined by race.  There 
is evidence that resistance was also similar—or even linked—in town and country. 
     The historical information in this chapter is partially revisited in Chapter 5 in the context of 
important political events in Grahamstown in 2015, and it provides opportunities for looking at 
contemporary politics in terms of space, race, and citizenship.  
12 See Chapter 3. 
 
                                                 
  CHAPTER 3 
APARTHEID’S SPATIAL ORDER OF RACE & CITIZENSHIP 
 
‘[W]e have to take cognisance of the fact that ours is far from a normal society.’ – Steve Biko 
in I Write What I Like ([1978] 2004, 13) 
 
 
Apartheid merged two political expressions of modernity: race and indirect rule.  The former, 
argues Goldberg, ‘is one of the central conceptual inventions of modernity’ (1993, 3), and the 
latter is, according to Mamdani, a ‘quintessentially modern form of rule in a colonial setting’ 
(2012, 1).  We have seen that race and indirect rule, in their South/ern African manifestations, 
were developed, utilised, combined, and altered through a long process of limiting the political 
autonomy of African people through colonial conquest, and how the Fish River Country, the 
‘eastern frontier’ of the British Cape Colony, centred on Grahamstown, was important to and 
directly illustrates the politics of that process.  So, ‘modernity’—politically contingent and non-
universal, a ‘social movement from above’—modernity, as it came to be expressed through 
hyper-colonialism in South Africa, was swaddled in racialised patterns of rule, direct and 
indirect, that latticed the political landscape.  Fused to these two strands was a third: Since the 
discovery of diamonds in the 1860s and gold in the 1880s, the subsequent ascendance of the 
mining industry, and the hot-burning fuel this provided for colonialism, southern Africa and its 
people were scarred by an extractive and exploitative capitalism.  Race, indirect rule, and 
capital were the tripod upon which the ultra-modern apartheid state was braced. 
     Instituted from 1948 with the election of the National Party representing a white supremacist 
constituency of only one-fifth of the total population, apartheid proceeded as a honing of the 
colonial and repressive modes of control and the politics of race and of citizenship which had 
been ongoing in South/ern Africa for some three centuries.  While deriving its three-legged 
form from these political and economic instruments of oppression—race, indirect rule, and 
capital—apartheid sought to perfect them: to institute a state-systemic answer to minority 
European racist rule of a majority African population. 
     As I have argued in the context of the Grahamstown region, politicised space was significant 
to both the development of and the implementation of racial oppression.  This is not to say that 
race is a purely spatial category, that racism is only a spatial institution, or that space was 
indeed the most important factor in the politics of race; but that space was a facet is historically 
clear, and that, apart perhaps from skin colour, the most blatant manifestation of racial control 
and political circumscription, of repression, and of racialised experience was indeed spatial.  
Therefore, this particular spatial expression and mode of race and racism is especially useful 
in thinking about both historical and contemporary politics in South Africa.  The argument to 
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be distilled from the preceding two historical chapters is that space was racialised (and vice 
versa) between the urban and the rural as well as within those areas; and the argument to carry 
forward through this chapter is that the same concepts of racialisation and spatialisation were 
foundational to apartheid. 
 
‘Race’, Goldberg reminds us, has no ‘single sedimented meaning’, but nonetheless it ‘impart[s] 
specificity’ to people (1993, 80).  While the argument thus far has been to reveal an historical 
production of racialised political space(s), race and racism, during that process, accrued and 
were asserted through numerous other and often contradictory articulations.  Nonetheless, 
Goldberg goes on, race ‘is irreducibly a political category’ (1993, 87).  Racial and racist 
categories are utilised politically to define people, to generate difference and distance, in short, 
to segregate or at least to create the necessary logic for segregation, in order that the exclusion 
of some people is made possible.  Echoing Wilmsen1, Goldberg observes, ‘Distance is not, at 
least not primarily, to be interpreted spatially or geographically but in terms of difference—
and so in terms of the reinvented articulation of racist concepts.  “Generative metaphors” of 
sameness and otherness rule spatial relations’ (1993, 203).  By the time of the institution of 
apartheid, race in the South African colonial context had had its specificities and indicators—
its rules—defined, and those rules, pliable though they were when politically necessary, were 
applied to two things: people and space.  During and through the violent imposition of colonial 
political hegemony, spatial difference was normalised alongside racial difference, and both 
could be used to elide problems other than race—more real, perhaps, than racist problems—
while informing and providing for the control of differences. 
     Apartheid emerged from just such a racist culture (also, the title of Goldberg’s book), and 
its institution relied upon the accepted racial rules as well as the flexible and contradictory, that 
is, political nature of race.  Posel remarks, ‘Apartheid’s principal imaginary was of a society 
in which every “race” knew and observed its proper place – economically, politically and 
socially’, and goes on: ‘Race was to be the critical and overriding faultline: the fundamental 
organising principle for the allocation of resources and opportunities, the basis of all spatial 
demarcation, planning and development, the boundary for all social interaction’ (2001, 52).  
Some aspects of this ‘organising principle’, such as location of residence, had been practised 
widely in South/ern Africa for more than a century, as the history of Grahamstown’s locations 
has shown, and had roots even earlier, while, for other aspects, there was new legislation 
1 See First Excursus. 
 
                                                 
61 
 
codifying racial separation in marriage and sex, in access to public and educational facilities, 
and to cities (Posel 2001, 66).  The classification of race—as African, Coloured, Indian, or 
white—which was the prerogative of white people, was subjective, based upon conventions 
‘which had grown up during the hundreds of years we [Europeans] have been here’ (in Posel 
2001, 55).  Any aspect of one’s appearance, no matter how minute, arbitrary, or violating, 
might determine one’s race.  One’s hair, language, education, associates, politics, preferred 
alcoholic drink, and even one’s furniture could be used to determine race.  A person could be 
deemed to be or choose to be a member of one race in certain situations, and a different race in 
another (Posel 2001, 59-65).  Space continued to be as significant to race as it had been in the 
past: 
 
Classifiers typically fired off a battery of questions to establish a spatial sense of 
people’s race: where they were born, where they had gone to school, where they lived, 
where they had grown up, where their friends lived, where their children were schooled, 
where and with whom their children played.  In a tautological denial of the desirability 
of racial mixing, classifiers tended to read off an individual’s race from the dominant 
racial character of his or her residential area and community of associates (Posel 2001, 
60). 
 
The ordering of space, urban and rural, which we saw elaborated in the locations of 
Grahamstown reached a neurotic crescendo under apartheid.  Indeed, part of the motivation for 
the white political minority that instituted apartheid had been the accelerating urbanisation of 
Africans after the 1913 Land Act and especially after the Second World War, which was 
viewed ‘in South Africa as across the colonial world […]as disorderly and dangerous’ (Hickel 
2014, 140; also Posel 2001, 52).  Perhaps a phrase better capturing white supremacist fears 
would be ‘Africanisation of urban areas’.  ‘The very existence’, Hickel writes, ‘of urban black 
South Africans seems to threaten the basic categories that underpinned both colonialism and 
social science theory, which drew structuralist distinctions between rural/tribal/African and 
urban/modern/European’ (2014, 141).  Grahamstown, though not an industrial city like the 
fastest growing urban areas, underwent its own population growth during these decades of the 
twentieth century (Southey, 1990). 
     The ‘answers’ to this ‘problem’ of African urbanisation that were supplied by the apartheid 
state were the same as they had been in 16572, to create and police a definite line between 
Africans and Europeans, and/or to ‘make a clean sweep’ of Africans from spaces perceived as 
European.  These processes were employed in both urban and rural areas through the 
2 See MacCrone (1937) in Chapter 1. 
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intensification of township management, the modification and solidification of the reserves as 
‘homelands’ (‘Bantustans’), and the forced removal of African people. 
 
It is necessary, in examining how space was controlled, to also provide an explanation for why 
it was controlled, or else how means very little.  Critically interrogating why requires a 
digression back into history.  A classical liberal explanation of apartheid poses racism and a 
white supremacist state as irrational and ideological (in Friedman 2014, 5-7), but this first 
contradicts the potential rationality of racism(s) (Fanon [1964] 1967, 32; Gordon 2015, 85-86; 
Goldberg 1993) and, secondly, influential Marxist explanations and critiques of the apartheid 
state.  As this latter school of analysis has shown, an explanation of apartheid is not possible 
without taking into consideration its third buttress: capitalism. 
     The Marxist critiques are represented, notably and significantly, by Harold Wolpe’s 
‘Capitalism and Cheap Labour-power’ paper (1972), which first repudiates an exclusively 
ideological explanation for segregation apartheid—that is, the liberal account of racist white 
people intent on domination—and implicates the demands of capitalism in the institution of 
apartheid.  Wolpe critiques a view in which ‘the increased racial oppression manifested by 
Apartheid’ were premised on the understanding that ‘the governing National Party’s ideology 
is more racist than that of its predecessors’ (1972, 426).  He goes beyond previous accounts 
(Wolpe cites Legassick 1972) by arguing that apartheid did not simply perpetuate an economic 
system demanding control of cheap migrant labour enabled by the creation of the African 
‘reserves’ in 1913, but that control was ‘crucially a function of the conditions of the production 
and reproduction of that labour-power’ which was sought through specific changes to the 
structure of the South African economy, namely ‘the virtual destruction of the pre-capitalist 
mode of production of the African communities in the Reserves and, therefore, the economic 
basis of cheap migrant labour-power and the consequent changes [to] “tribal” political 
institutions’ that this predicated (1972, 428). 
     Steven Friedman observes that Marxism, by focusing on economic relationships, allowed 
for a critique of the white, English-speaking South African population, which customarily self-
absolved itself from complicity in Afrikaner bigotry, while ‘[a]fter Wolpe and his colleagues, 
history accepted the Marxist assumption that capitalism and apartheid were connected’ (2014, 
10; 14).  It is a necessary connection to make, but requires the qualification that racial 
domination—not for its own sake, not out of some inexplicable meanness—had been a political 
and economic imperative for colonialists seeking to exploit southern Africa/ns since Europeans 
arrived in the region, a period during which economic relationships and the practises of 
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exploitation were not always or only driven by capital and capitalist accumulation.  
Significantly, the modes of racial domination and control of populations had been developed 
over three centuries during which capital had increasingly played a significant role but was not 
ubiquitous or even the most significant aspect of the political economy.  Aimé Césaire, the 
Martinican poet and communist, asks the question ‘[W]hat fundamentally is colonization?’—
his answer, that it is precisely ‘to extend to a world scale the competition of [Europe’s] 
antagonistic economies’ ([1955]1972, 2), is frankly true, but his later point that colonialism is 
a process of ‘proletarianization and mystification’ of societies that were ‘communal’ and ‘not 
only ante-capitalist…but also anti-capitalist’ ([1952] 1972, 7, emphasis original) does not 
properly square with the context of the colonialism practised and experienced in the Cape 
region of Southern Africa. 
    ‘In South Africa [sic]’, writes Wolpe, ‘the development of capitalism has been bound up 
with first, the deterioration of the productive capacity and then, with increasing rapidity, the 
destruction of pre-capitalist societies’ (1972, 432).  It is important to note that these pre-
capitalist societies were themselves at times European and colonial, and not exclusively 
African.3   
     A permanent European settlement at the Cape of Good Hope did arise precisely out of a 
process of extending Europe’s economies ‘to a world scale’.  Ships of the English and Dutch 
East India Companies rested, watered, and provisioned at the Cape on their voyages to and 
from ‘the East’ from the end of the sixteenth century, and a Dutch outpost followed on the 
heels of a Dutch claim to the Cape in 1652 (Mostert 1992, 88-94).  There did not immediately 
ensue any effort to expand colonialism in southern Africa or to exploit its resources beyond a 
trade in cattle with African people living near the Dutch fort, whom even the racist MacCrone 
acknowledges, ‘had the advantage, since they possessed the monopoly of the only commodity 
that was of any value to the Europeans’ (1937, 21).  It is a capitalist’s assessment of the 
situation, but the local economy of the Cape, though linked to an expanding global capitalist 
imperialism, was far from capitalist.  The Dutch East India Company did not seriously consider 
the possibility of exploiting the Cape agriculturally for the benefit of their economic empire, 
and the first agricultural ‘free burghers’ were only nine in number (Mostert 1992, 129).  The 
expansion of the colony inland was not carried out through capitalist exploitation, as was 
already happening in the Americas at the time.  MacCrone and Mostert both portray the 
3 ‘Pre-capitalist’ here denotes a society or economy that historically became or was subsumed by capitalist modes 
of production and not a society or economy ‘intending’ to become or inevitably to become capitalist.  It is possible, 
despite some views to the contrary, to use ‘pre-capitalist’ without assuming a capitalist teleology. 
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decidedly ‘pre-capitalist’ nature of the ‘settlers’ in the Cape region of southern Africa, who are 
perhaps better referred to simply as Europeans, or boers, given their predominantly rather 
unsettled existence.  As Mostert writes, ‘the farms of those who held land were huge and 
sometimes far apart’ and the boers’ ‘way of life’, moving with ‘their herds and their flocks’, 
‘had come to resemble that of the indigenous populace in many more ways than the obvious 
ones of cattle and transhumance’: 
 
[T]hey had no restless material ambitions, no dreams of sudden riches.  They hunted 
ivory, but had no gold fever, did not seek diamonds and other treasure.  They did not 
possess the drive, as pioneers did in other new worlds, to conquer the wilderness, with 
visions of cities and expansion and prosperity.  Their manner of living bore the 
appearance of poverty, for they had no material possessions to speak of […] (Mostert 
1992, 526). 
 
Although Legassick argues that the idea of ‘commerce’ was introduced with the arrival of the 
1820s settlers to the Grahamstown region and effected an economic ‘revolution’ (2010, 22), 
even these latter arrivals, who were quite literally ‘imported’ to be farmers in the fertile, 
recently ‘cleared’ Zuurveld/Albany District, quickly abandoned cultivation for stock farming 
in the manner of boers and Xhosa (Mostert 1992, 546).   
     Certainly, European colonialism in southern Africa was marked, as it was everywhere, by 
dispossession, violence, enclosure (of  different sorts), notions of private property, and the 
arrival of a finance economy, but true capitalist exploitation, it could be argued, did not really 
begin to take hold until the 1840s.  In those years, merino sheep were introduced to the eastern 
part of the Cape at the same time that British wool production declined and manufacturing 
increased.  Imports to Britain then became necessary, and Southern African wool was cheaper 
than Australian wool.  In the late 1820s, wool export was worth £1,300 and in 1846, £200,000.  
The growth of this wool industry motivated appropriation of more Xhosa land, which in turn 
precipitated yet another war in the region, its seventh in seven decades (Mostert 1992, 859-
860).  From then on, and accelerating drastically with the discovery of gold and diamonds in 
the last quarter of the century, Africans in colonial southern Africa were subjected to the violent 
‘transition’ captured in the title of Colin Bundy’s important work The Rise and Fall of the 
South African Peasantry (1979), from ‘their precolonial existence as pastoralist-cultivators to 
their contemporary status: that of sub-subsistence rural dwellers’ (1). 
    Still, even in what can be characterised as a pre-capitalist colonial Southern Africa, there 
had always been a demand for labour.  In the first year of Dutch settlement, the colony’s 
commander, Jan van Riebeeck, had requested that agricultural labour be imported from China, 
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and within four years the first slaves had been delivered to the new colony (MacCrone 1937, 
27; 31).  Slavery was not abolished in the Cape Colony (which had ‘become British’) until 
1834, and the effects of abolition on the lives of former slaves, who were immediately 
apprenticed to their former masters for as long as six years, and on the economic practises of 
colonists, was minimal (Mostert 1992, 633).  After the rise of export trade, the demand by 
white farmers was always for more labour.  Leasing poor, low-value land to Africans created 
‘quasi-feudal relationships’ that ‘provided a short-term answer to white labour needs’ and 
produced rent incomes (Bundy 1979, 45).  Later in the nineteenth century, with the change in 
the South/ern African economies brought about my mining in the northern interior, ‘a growing 
number of Africans sought work in the towns, as skilled and unskilled labour’, something 
which had been going on progressively alongside land appropriation, and these newly 
urbanised people ‘worked in the diamond mines, upon road, rail, and harbour projects, evincing 
a keen awareness of wage levels and employment conditions’ (Bundy 1979, 66).  Therein are 
found the ever-searched for proletariat of the Marxists.  Frederick Cooper warns against the 
gaps inherent in a Marxist analysis of urbanisation, suggesting that the ‘very term…suggests a 
self-propelled process’ through which people ‘enter the mainstream of history’, but that this 
entails the fallacy of ‘adaption’, of ‘inevitable…movement into urban life’ (1983, 12).  Indeed, 
in the context of our argument, certain strains of Marxism would affirm the spatial logic of 
colonialism, of racialised, backward rurality.  Cooper argues, ‘the bounds of an approach to 
space that stressed the linkage of production combined with minimal daily reproduction in rural 
areas have been transcended….  As soon as one admits that the actions of noncapitalist classes 
matter, the determinant logic of capital comes into question’ (1983, 29). 
     It is also crucial to note that the first few decades of the twentieth century saw urbanisation 
and impoverishment not only of Africans but of white people as well.  An increase of ‘capitalist 
farming, especially including fencing’ did not take real hold in South Africa until after the First 
World War, but when it did, accompanied by recurrent and coinciding droughts and recessions, 
it created a population of ‘poor whites’ large enough to draw attention as the ‘poor white 
problem’ (Bonner 2011, 259-260).  Poor people of any race could have been the ‘proletariat’ 
which both capitalists and Marxists require, but the political objective of maintaining racialised 
control of the economy, of perpetuating a colonial system along with capitalism, required 
differentiating the potential proletariat racially.  This is rationally consistent with a racist 
project, and does not disqualify capitalism as foundational to apartheid’s implementation, mid-
twentieth century.  In addition to the control of labour and the economy which white South 
Africans intended, there was a necessity for political domination, since the people to be 
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controlled made up the enormous majority of the total population.  Apartheid not only 
preserved the products of the economy for the white minority, but political institutions as well, 
including citizenship.  The outcome of this is that pre-apartheid and apartheid South Africa did 
not represent only a racialised economy (capitalist or otherwise) but a thoroughgoing racialised 
society moved by a racist culture as discussed above. 
     Let us return to Césaire momentarily, hopefully to reconcile the tensions in the preceding 
paragraphs.  Marx tells that at the heart of capitalism is alienation (1844).  As Césaire shows 
in his Discourse on Colonialism, the concept of alienation takes on different meanings in the 
colony and effects different alienations than are encapsulated in the relationship between labour 
and production.  Colonialism involves alienation of labour, alienation from the land and its 
resources, but also from pre-colonial—or, better put, non-colonial—political institutions and 
cultures and individual and collective identities4, and, above all, from humanity—both locally, 
in the treatment of the colonised as less than human, and globally in that the colonised are 
barred from joining the ‘civilised’, ‘human’ world which prospers through their alienation.  
Césaire’s Discourse shows the profound pervasiveness of colonialism’s alienating tendencies: 
it bereaves the colonised not only of practical considerations like land, but also of their politics 
and even their metaphysics. 
     The consequence of colonial alienation is that the colonised become racialised ‘things’, 
‘objects’.  In his essay on alienation, Marx wrote, ‘the human being (the laborer) does not feel 
himself to be free except in his animal functions’, to the extent that ‘[t]he animal becomes 
human and the human becomes animal’ (1844, np).  It is in this, the alienation of people from 
their humanity, that anti-colonialism finds itself in communism: ‘the labourer’ in Marx is easily 
replaced by ‘the colonised’ in Césaire.  Apartheid, Posel observes, preserved ‘white 
civilisation’ alongside ‘white economic prosperity’ (2011, 321).  More broadly articulating the 
needs of colonialism, the project in South Africa leading up to and following on 1948 was to 
reserve inhumanity for people considered ‘non-white’. 
     This reconsideration of some of the historical period already presented in this thesis is meant 
to complicate a narrowly Marxist or economic explanation of apartheid, though, as Friedman 
points out, Wolpe’s Marxism was ‘an important antidote’ to ‘crude[r]’ forms (2014, 16).  
Wolpe demonstrates that the need for tightening control on African labour was on the minds 
of white South Africans through the 1940s, when political action among African people was 
also frequent; ‘the policy of Apartheid developed as a response to this urban and rural challenge 
4 See Chapter 1 and Landau (2010). 
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to the system which emerged inexorably from the changed basis of cheap-labour power’ (1972, 
445-446; Posel 2001, 52).    Still, apartheid’s systems of differentiation, control, repression, 
and exploitation were normalised over a very long history and were not always associated 
directly with capitalism.  That is not to say that capitalism had no role in apartheid, and indeed 
the correlation is a necessary one, but rather to historicise a somewhat limited view of the 
origins of apartheid and to stress that the reason for spatial and racial control, which is still the 
subject of this discussion, should be considered as the outcome of diverse political processes.  
Posel warns against ‘the risk of caricature’, writing that apartheid ‘was more internally 
fractious and fractured, historically fluid and complex, than the formulaic reductions can 
possible render’ (2011, 319).  Apartheid represents one instantiation in a series of related and 
overlapping ‘social movements from above’ that at some stages included, and finally came to 
be fully invested in, capitalism.  We can now look more closely at how apartheid altered and 
maintained the methods of control regarding race, space, and citizenship, and how the concepts 
of urban and rural were manipulated during the apartheid years. 
 
Apartheid’s spatial and racial landscape of control was delimited in the Group Areas Act of 
1950.  Goldberg summarises the main points of the Act: specific residential zones for each 
racial group with clear physical—natural or artificial—boundaries between them; access to 
‘industrial sites or the central business district’ and ‘common amenities’ that did not require 
people of one race crossing the areas of others; where such crossing was unavoidable there 
should be buffer zones; industry should be arranged around urban areas to give more direct 
access; and the ‘central business district [was] to remain under white control’ (1993, 193).  A 
sort of intimate planning and manipulation that will be familiar from the discussion of the 
development Grahamstown’s locations—the race-specific residential areas, the ‘Native Model 
Village’, the Municipal Beer Hall—characterised the definition and administration of space 
after the Group Areas Act.  The ‘square house’ trope of the missionary days had not 
disappeared, and was developed pseudo-socio-scientifically, imbued with the racialised spatial 
logic we have seen.  In 1951, an urban planner envisioned ‘a township comprised of free-
standing nuclear-family houses’, but where the apartheid state could ‘reproduce aspects of 
“native society” for the purposes of enhancing social control’, and so the township was 
organised around a central point to facilitate surveillance and to ‘replicate the concentric 
structure of domestic space in rural areas’ (Hickel 2014, 145).  In contrast to shack settlements 
in the Cato Manor area of Durban, a ‘“well-planned” township […] gives new hope and joy to 
thousands.  The Bantu [sic] becomes intensely house-proud’ (in Hickel 2014, 147-148).  
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European orderliness was still opposed to African disorder, and the ‘transposition’, as it were, 
of ‘rural’ settlement patterns—‘African’ patterns akin to the tribalised ‘Central Cattle Plan’5—
reinforced the African-ness of rurality.  This gives question to the argument (Posel 2011, 337) 
of ‘detribalisation’ in the early 1950s, as does the ‘ethnic’ character of urban townships in the 
same period (also Posel 2011, 350).  Control of settlement patterns and types of housing, 
including another iteration of ‘square house’ ideology, also persisted in the administration of 
the rural reserves (Soni and Maharaj 1991, 55)6. 
     Such subtle attention to a tribalised configuration as innately African proceeded from the 
system of indirect rule which obtained in the rural areas, the legitimacy of which was carefully 
reinforced in the urban setting while it was strengthened in rural areas through legislation.  In 
rural areas, the reserves ‘scheduled’ by the 1913 Land Act were tailored and gerrymandered 
into ethnic ‘homelands’—the alternative name, ‘Bantustan’, captures more perfectly the 
colonial, contrived, and imposed character of these political spaces.  This had profound 
implications for spatial differentiation of citizenship.  In the late 1950s, faced with frequent 
political protest after a decade in power, the apartheid government 
 
Rejected the earlier notion of detribalisation on the grounds of an allegedly irrevocable 
and primordial ‘tribalism’ that characterised the African psyche.  In consequence, all 
Africans were believed to be culturally and spiritually anchored in an ethnic 
‘homeland’, whether or not they had ever set foot in the place.  Apartheid’s planners 
then inaugurated another shift, in advocating the allocation of ‘self-government’ to 
these homelands (a renaming and political configuration of the erstwhile African 
Reserves).  One of the early renditions of apartheid had been as a means of racial 
‘separate development’ – but conceptualised largely in spatial terms [in the Promotion 
of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959] (Posel 2011, 341).  
 
The reserves were created in 19137  amidst the rhetoric of safeguarding ‘traditional’ forms of 
governing, but these traditions were simply structures of indirect rule.  They differed in 
different parts of the country depending on ‘the nature of each initial encounter between’ 
Africans and white colonialism (Bonner 2011, 275).  For instance, the Tranksei—the reserve 
formed out of the region into which most Xhosa had been confined once their military 
5 See Chapter 1 and Landau (2010).  Furthermore, all instances of ‘tribe’, ‘tribal’, ‘tribalised’, ‘de-’ or ‘re-
tribalised’ must be considered with a critical skepticism after Landau.  The terms are used here in reference to 
other literature where they appear. 
6 Soni and Maharaj (1991) use geography to argue that the apartheid state’s manipulation of space produced 
‘tensions’, ‘manifested in the creation of several new settlement forms which […] challenge our traditional 
understanding of urban and rural’ because of the ‘urban function’ of some rural settlement forms.  Therefore, ‘the 
dichotomy between rural and urban patterns of development […should] be challenged in the South African 
context’ (47).     
7 See Chapter 2. 
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resistance to colonial expansion was finally broken in the 1870s—was administered by colonial 
magistrates through headmen in order to undermine chiefly authority, as opposed to the 
puppeteering of chiefs in Natal (Bonner 2011, 275).  This no doubt arose from the manner in 
which the African people of the Transkei had been wrapped into colonial rule—through nine 
wars over one hundred years, during which chiefs had been responsible for organising massive 
military resistance to colonial violence.  It was, nonetheless, a system of indirect rule.  
Apartheid government relationships to African chiefs were not markedly different, except in 
terms of the balance of power, from some of the early ‘frontier’ relationships: The political 
manoeuvrings involving Ngqika, Ndlambe, and the British8 more than a century earlier were 
as much a matter of colonial ‘assaults on the authority of oppositional chiefs and the invention 
of claims to chiefly authority on the part of those more pliable, if popularly illegitimate’ as 
were the apartheid politics of the Bantustans (Posel 2011, 350). 
    As women and young people came to frighten administrators of the reserves more than a 
chiefly challenge did, the powers of chiefs and ‘tribal institutions’ were strengthened.  The 
Natives Administration Act of 1927 ‘decisively separated white and African administration’ 
and granted ‘sweeping and arbitrary new power’ to the Department of Native Affairs and to 
chiefs, which ‘[brought] all Africans in the reserves under tight state control by retribalising 
them’ (Bonner 2011, 1976).  The Natives Land and Trust Act of 1936 added more land to the 
reserves while curbing access to land outside of them (Mabin 1991, 35).  Wolpe is once again 
of use in showing that the reserves blended pre-capitalist and capitalist economies in the favour 
of the white minority by spatially managing the two (1972, 433-439).  Where Wolpe requires 
criticism is in his assertion that ‘[w]hereas Segregation provided the political structure 
appropriate to an earlier period, Apartheid represents the attempt to maintain the rate of surplus 
value and accumulation in the face of the disintegration of the pre-capitalist economy’ (1972, 
432-433).  The ‘political structure’ was not appropriate only to an earlier period, but, through 
a number of adjustments to the basic structure, deeply appropriate to the white supremacy of 
the mid-twentieth century. 
     The apartheid government ‘strengthen[ed]’ and ‘bureaucratiz[ed]’ chieftaincy in the 1951 
Bantu Authorities Act (Posel 2011, 349).  A decade later, self-government for the ethnic 
homelands9 was enacted and administered territorially much like we saw with the ward system 
8 See Mostert (1992) for an exhaustive account of this political triangle. 
9 The ethnic groups with corresponding homelands were: Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana, Southern Sotho, Northern Sotho, 
Venda, Ndebele, Swati, and Tsonga. 
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in Natal10.  As Posel writes, ‘This variant of indirect rule promised self-government to those 
who identified with chiefly norms’, by ‘reinventing, bureaucratising and disciplining tradition 
as part of the wider project of creating “political order”’ (2011, 350).  Self-government, in 
reality, limited African rights both inside and outside the homelands, but especially for African 
people living in cities and on white farms, where their residences were viewed as ‘outposts’ of 
the homelands (Beinart [1994] 2001, 218; 162).  This withdrawal of rights intensified in the 
1970s, when self-government became nominal ‘independence’.  Between 1976 and 1981, the 
Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda homelands accepted independence (Beinart 
[1994] 2001, 223).  Africans from these homelands lost South African citizenship, and were 
therefore ‘foreigners’ in South Africa, without political rights.  In 1980, the South African state, 
intent to dispense with its obligations to as many Africans as possible, redrew the borders of 
Bantustans to include locations near major cities (Beinart [1994] 2001, 212).  Alan Mabin 
(1991) examines how, during the course of apartheid, the majority of rural Africans went from 
living—were coerced from living—on white-owned farmland to living in the reserves, 
sometimes in urban-dense settings, and how in conjunction with this massive, enforced 
movement of people came a steady deterioration of political rights.  Between 1960 and 1990, 
some 3.5 million African people were subjected to forced removals, during which the 
Bantustans were intentional repositories for the ‘surplus’ people, providing also ‘the repressive 
apparatus to control’ them (Soni and Maharaj 1991, 53-54). 
     None of these shifting, contradictory extensions of and limitations to citizenship of Africans 
during the apartheid era are much surprising in consideration of the shifting, prevaricating, 
sometimes blundering official relationships enforced on African people by the colonial 
administrators of the past.  For example, the Ciskei, the reserve-homeland-Bantustan nearest 
to Grahamstown, was none other than the ‘Ceded Territory’-‘Queen Adelaide Province’-
‘British Kaffraria’ of the previous century, and each of its new official designations brought, 
like those of old, new official ‘citizenships’, all of them ‘formal’ in the sense that Chatterjee 
and Mamdani use the word, and representing more about forms of governance/rule than about 
rights.  The Transkei, a little further east, was declared independent in 1976.  But, ‘What are 
the rights of this Transkeian citizen, the man [sic] who is no alien and yet is treated as an alien, 
without the privileges granted to the immigrant settling from abroad in the Republic?’ asks 
Govan Mbeki:  ‘The Transkeian citizen’ has ‘no say whatsoever in the government that rules 
10 See Chapter 2 
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him’ whether in South Africa or in the Transkei, where the chiefs are ‘responsible to [the South 
African] government and not to the Transkeian citizen (1964, 20). 
 
Many people, faced with the many new attacks that apartheid laws and police made against 
their livelihoods and political lives, did not acquiesce to the new terms of their governance.  A 
number of famous instances of resistance to apartheid—women’s resistance to pass laws in the 
1950s, Sharpeville 1960, 16 June 1976, and the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement in 
the ’70s and of the United Democratic Front in the ’80s—are beyond the scope of this chapter, 
though their historical significance cannot be questioned.  One important series of events, 
however, are the ‘Mpondo Revolts’ of the late 1950s and early 1960s, which contested the 
Bantu Authorities and the Betterment schemes.  Sarah Bruchhausen (2015), arguing for more 
careful attention to the question of rural resistance, shows how these revolts were linked to 
urban forms of protest and in some cases informed them.  Significantly, the activists of the 
Mpondo revolts created autonomous political spaces for themselves—on hills or mountains, 
most famously at Ngquza Hill—and were subjected to massive violence and massacre.  The 
same logic enacted in violence since 1811 is clear: African political space must be controlled, 
with violence if necessary.  The region where the revolts had taken place, ‘Pondoland’, was 
bundled into the Tranksei homeland under repressive indirect rule. 
     Closer to Grahamstown, in the first half of the 1980s, eight communities in the ‘Border 
Corridor’—white South Africa between the Ciskei and Transkei—resisted their removal to or 
incorporation into the homelands through popularly elected committees called Residents’ 
Associations (Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 137).  This was ‘an explicitly political 
struggle’ directed against the South African state as well as the homeland authorities in the 
Ciskei who ruled what Mbeki calls ‘its exhausted earth and sunken peasantry’ (1964, 69).  The 
Residents’ Associations managed to force the South African Supreme Court to grant ‘a 
permanent reprieve from the threat of removal to all eight communities’.  The threats persisted 
from other angles, however.  Despite what could be described as ‘service delivery’ bribery 
from the state’s Department of Development Aid in exchange for ‘participation in government 
structures’, intended to weaken the popular political movements, the Residents’ Associations 
maintained their democratic mandate and did not break down under the Department’s pressure 
(Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 138-139).  Some communities had already been 
removed, however, when the Ciskei assumed its sham independence in 1981.  In what has been 
described as ‘voting with their feet’, a form of politics highly reminiscent of the politics 
described by Landau (2010) up to the beginning of apartheid as well as of the many moments 
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of resistance to eviction in South African cities today, some people resisted simply by choosing 
where they would live. 
 
The people of Blue Rock (in the Border Region of South Africa) had been forcibly 
removed into the Ciskei during its initial establishment and settled at Potsdam.  
Increasing dissatisfaction with their new circumstances in the bantustan culminated in 
a decision by the community in 1987 to risk the wrath of the South African and 
Ciskeian authorities and march back to South Africa.  The South African government 
transported them back to Potsdam, where they faced assault, harassment and murder.  
Despite the disastrous consequences of the march, their resolve to leave the bantustan 
was undiminished, and they marched again, this time back to their original home at 
Blue Rock (Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 140). 
 
In a second case, the Ciskei-South Africa border divided the town of Peelton in 1981, but the 
complete incorporation of Peelton into the Bantustan was enacted in 1988.  Protest and 
resistance to the incorporation provoked violent repression from the Ciskei government police 
and military, who attacked the residents in 1989, destroying houses, arresting almost a hundred 
people, and driving more than a thousand people across the border into South Africa 
(Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 140).  It was an action that demonstrated the ‘despotic’ 
nature of indirect ‘customary’ rule in the homelands.  The South African government 
eventually granted these ‘refugees’ land in South Africa (Grahamstown Rural Committee 1991, 
141), which, considering the situation, constituted a politically significant if practically limited 
victory for popular politics under apartheid.  
 
Apartheid forms of control both practically and culturally—and seemingly intentionally, by all 
accounts—reproduced the basic notion that ‘African’ was innately ‘rural’ while ‘urban’ was 
‘white’.  This resonates most powerfully, perhaps, in the intensification of ‘influx control’ 
through ‘pass laws’ during apartheid, which explicitly limited African access to cities.11  ‘It is 
accepted Government policy’, wrote one official, ‘that the Bantu [sic] are only temporarily 
resident in the European areas of the Republic for as long as they offer their labour here’ (in 
Soni and Maharaj 1991, 49).  Such policy led to the criminalisation of millions of Africans 
living in cities and the denial of obligations to these residents by the apartheid government.  
Even after reform of the pass laws in 1986, ‘only 1.7 million blacks in the independent 
11 Pass laws had a long history in South/ern Africa. The first instance of their use was in 1797.  The ‘Hottentot 
Proclamation of 1809 required ‘Khoisan’ people to have a permanent, registered dwelling place and a pass to 
travel between districts. Passes were also used on the frontier, for instance Ordnance 50 of 1828 (see Chapter 1).  
Pass laws were used most repressively in the twentieth century beginning with the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 
1923 and then in subsequent legislation.  The history of implementation of and, more importantly, of resistance 
to pass laws is significant, but there is not space for it here.  The important point to draw from ‘influx control’ is 
that the legal rights of Africans to the city were limited or none. 
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homelands [became] eligible for South African citizenship’ and some 5 million ‘[were] subject 
to more rigid control, including work permits, fines and deportation’ (Soni and Maharaj 1991, 
59). 
    Nevertheless, Africans resided in and fought for access to urban areas as well as for their 
rights within the cities and towns.  As Soni and Maharaj note, alongside the growing ‘rural 
slums’ and ‘displaced urban settlements’ created by apartheid coercive policy, ‘an attempt to 
ward off state control and repression, as well as a struggle for survival in urban areas’ resulted 
in the equally fast-growing ‘squatter settlements abutting major urban areas’ and the ‘greying’ 
of urban areas (that is, their becoming racially mixed) (1991, 61). 
     This was a fraught process, in Grahamstown as much as any other place. Grahamstown, at 
the onset of apartheid, was faced with an enormous crisis of housing, which has not been solved 
as of 2015.  In 1952, it was estimated that 1,000 houses were required to solve overcrowding 
and poor housing for Africans, and 200 each for Coloured and white people, respectively 
(Lancaster 2013, 71).  What is now the ‘Joza Location’, administered by the municipality, was 
built on the flats above the crest of Makana’s Kop between 1957 and 1962, but the rents there 
were sometimes prohibitively high for people in need of the housing.  The Group Areas Act 
was strongly contested in Grahamstown, and its implementation was much delayed and never 
complete. Fingo Village was proclaimed a ‘Coloured’ area in 1957, 1965, and 1970, which 
would have entailed the removal of 5,500 legal residents to the Ciskei.  However, free-hold 
arrangements had been granted in Fingo Village in 1855, and legal action by the residents won 
the maintenance of the free-hold rights.  In 1980, Fingo Village was ‘deproclaimed’ (Holleman 
1997, 29; 32). 
     The Municipal Beer Hall, as has been noted, was the object of resistance from the time of 
its opening in 1939.  In 1946, a memorandum from the Grahamstown Branch of the National 
Council for African Women announced that the Hall was ‘the worst public building in this 
town’ and that they had ‘no evidence that the profits that accrue from the sale of beer are used 
specifically for the benefit or the improvement of the location’ (in Lancaster 2013, 85).  
Grahamstown residents participated in the country-wide Defiance Campaign beginning in 
August 1952, and some were arrested and jailed for disregarding pass laws and attending 
meetings.  The Beer Hall was boycotted at the same time (the only boycott of its kind in the 
country during the Defiance Campaign), and hundreds of people protested outside of the 
building, demanding a ‘milk bar’ and preventing people from entering.  The Hall was stoned 
and partially burned (Holleman 1997, 44-46).  The boycott, which lasted into May 1953, shows 
effective community political organising and resistance in spite of Lancaster’s bafflement at 
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its coincidence with but (somehow) disconnection from the Defiance Campaign and his 
repeated assertion that it demonstrated ‘no political motives’ (2013, 91-94) 12. 
     In the 1980s, with the institution of Black Local Authorities—the ‘Rini [sic] Council’, in 
Grahamstown—an urban application of indirect rule, Grahamstown was once again the site of 
resistance.  The ‘street committee’ popular structures of the United Democratic Front emerged 
in the town, and members of the Black Local Authority were threatened and some resigned.  A 
boycott of white shops was organised, and residents demanded the building of 3,000 houses, 
removal of the South African Defence Force from townships, a minimum wage, unbanning of 
public meetings, lifting the state of emergency, resignation of the Rini Council, an end to 
evictions, opening of facilities to all, business sites for hawkers, an end to unfair dismissals, 
and improved facilities in the townships (Holleman 1997, 48).  The response, as ever, was 
militarised.  Police were stationed at the 1830s fort on Gunfire Hill overlooking the town with 
floodlights aimed at Joza, and then patrolled Raglan Road, the main road through the locations 
in order to ‘keep a watchful eye on the township’ (Holleman 1997, 12; 48). 
 
We have reached the ‘end’, at least for the moment’s purpose, of a long political period during 
which the ‘bifurcation’ of urban and rural South Africa had been effected, both through 
accident and engineering.  This occurred in the state, as Mamdani argues, in the division of 
‘civil society’ from ‘traditional authorities’.  By the end of apartheid in 1994, the two 
‘despotisms’ under which urban and rural people are governed had been emplaced, laced with 
a history of coercive, intentionally divisive politics.  Ashley Westaway has argued that, for the 
rural areas of the former homelands in the Eastern Cape (a province after 1994), the years since 
the advent of democracy in South Africa have been more about ‘re-imagining and re-enforcing 
practices of segregationism, in a modern guise’ than about dismantling such practises (2012, 
121).  Similarly, Nomboniso Gasa notes that post-1994 legislation ‘directly echoes some of the 
most troubling aspects of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, especially in its creation of “traditional 
authorities” and its reinforcement of the old Bantustan boundaries’ (2015, np).  Rural space is 
complicated by the existence of areas not under ‘traditional authorities’. The more or less 
‘formerly’ white rural areas remain undemocratised areas where the ‘values of South Africa’s 
Constitution are not a reality for its rural citizens’ (Haupt 2015, np).  The farmworkers strikes 
in the Western Cape at the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013, and the extreme repression 
12 A fifth installment in the uncritical ‘Grahamstown Series’ of Rhodes University history theses, this one 
announces in the title that it attends specifically to ‘white English-speaking’ perspectives. 
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with which they were met (Fogel 2013), is demonstrative of the truth in this statement as well 
as the persistence of violence as the preferred arbiter of politics from below.  The discussion 
of the Rural People’s Movement that follows relates the experience of some people who live 
in rural areas but are not governed under ‘traditional authority’. 
     Ben Maclennan concludes his history of the terror campaign that produced the city of 
Grahamstown with a sketch of the city in 1986 that moves with the region’s history: 
 
Grahamstown today has barely twelve and a half thousand white residents, who live in 
relative affluence on the western side of the basin.  On the eastern slopes – the slopes 
down which Nxele’s men charged in 1819 – live some forty-five thousand blacks, 
descendants of the Xhosa and other tribes [sic], and the ‘coloureds’, crowded together 
in ghettos which periodically erupt into violence.  The police, however, ensure that the 
unrest is never allowed to spread across the stream which ran red at the battle of 
Grahamstown and which is now known by the Xhosas as Egazini [sic], the place of 
blood (232). 
 
The same words could have been written of Grahamstown, with modification of a few numbers, 
at any stage in its history, so consistent with each other were the many articulations of white 
control of African lives and politics.  Indeed, Sarita Pillay makes the same distinction between 
Grahamstown’s east and west in 2012.  Her focus is on the people residing in eThembeni, a 
‘shack settlement’ built in Grahamstown’s east in the early 1990s.  Along with official attention 
and promises of services, the residents of eThembeni have become disillusioned with local 
government, despite the new national democracy.  Their citizenship appears worthless in the 
absence of nearly every ‘service’ which the state purports to supply, while envelopment in the 
ward system puts the people at the mercy of the state, which is corrupt and unresponsive—
despotic—impaired by what Gillian Hart identifies as ‘tensions between fierce fiscal austerity 
combined with massive new responsibilities for local government on the one hand, and 
invocations of local participation, social justice on the other – with all this playing out on 
viciously uneven terrains carved by the racial geographies of apartheid, and opening to a global 
economy’ (2013, 97) .  Pillay writes that since eThembeni has been ‘integrated into the official 
state sphere, residents are restricted and constrained in their space.  They are reliant on the state 
for the shaping of their space, or else face possible repression or dispossession.  eThembeni’s 
residents are […] a people coerced in space’ (2012, np).   
     Coercion in space, I have insisted, is a political strategy that in South Africa has included 
among the tools and contrivances of colonial and state control the articulation of the urban and 
the rural as separate spheres of politics.  Indeed, urban and rural appear, in this historical 
review, as politicised spaces rather than essential zones in which politics occurs.  Fanon enjoins 
 
76 
 
us to remember that ‘colonialism has often strengthened or established its domination by 
organizing the petrification of the country districts’, ‘where vital statistics are so many 
insoluble problems’, forcing rural dwellers to ‘rush toward the towns, crowd into tin-shack 
settlements, and try to make their way into the […] cities founded by colonial domination’ 
([1961] 1963, 109; 111).  Between these two spheres manufactured by colonialism, Fanon 
writes, there is a great antagonism, which stains the politics of the struggle for independence 
and the politics of its success ([1961] 1963, 107-123).  Colonialism, Fanon has argued, three 
and a half decades before Mamdani, lays out a great distance between urban and rural, sets 
them at odds with one another, and estranges them politically.  Such is ‘coercion in space’. 
     Still coercion in space has engendered resistance.  There have always been, as we have seen, 
political traditions among those most ‘coerced in space’ which have put the lie to hegemonic 
political ‘truth’ by the recognition of other options, which have rendered boundaries porous, 
and which have pursued politics that are open-ended. 
 
 
PART II: CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
Second Excursus  
Social Movements: Methodology and Theoretical Approach 
 
 
So far, the narrative here has been largely concerned with ‘social movements from above’ that 
have impacted on South Africa’s political landscape of space, race, and citizenship; that have 
greatly affected politics after South African democracy in 1994; and which have implications 
acutely experienced in people’s lives in the present.  It bears reiterating that one of the permeating 
themes and consequences of the history just related has been the political division of urban from 
rural, achieved through a long process of restriction of political autonomy, conceptually 
racialised.  Throughout that narrative, we have seen aspects and moments of an opposing logic 
visible in different forms of political traditions or resistance.  Some of these, specifically the ‘pre-
colonial’ politics theorised by Landau (2010), were the political means by which authority and 
social and political relations were legitimised or delegitimised without necessarily altering or 
requiring the alteration of the structure of society.  However, during the many years of colonial 
and apartheid political hegemony, a specific spatial and racial politics of control was developed 
and implemented, and alternatives, once the norm, were increasingly mobilised as resistance.  
Racial-spatial demarcations of politics dictated the emergence of different politics that were both 
indicative of and opposed to the divisions contrived from ‘above’.  No space, as we have seen, 
whether urban or rural, was monolithic or utterly separate.  Yet, even in accounts that consider 
links between the urban and rural, there is little effort to question the logic of employing those 
categories in political analyses: perhaps better put, those are spaces in and over which politics are 
acted out, but not themselves accountable to any particular political project.  Their accountability, 
after looking at the history, is persuasive.   
     The past, watched for long enough, blends into the present.  Such is the case with this particular 
version of the past.  Arrived at the present, we can finally turn to a discussion of contemporary 
‘social movements from below’ with the motivating question in mind: do they present a challenge 
to the logic of distinct ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ political spaces?  
 
My research with the Unemployed People’s Movement and the Rural People’s Movement (RPM 
and UPM)1 began rather unlike research.  It began with a four hour wait and then, when the wait 
was over, three hours walking in the rain, paying of respect to a family who had lost a daughter, 
and pursuit by a very large dog.  Still, that day’s episodes revealed important things about 
1 These acronyms will be employed throughout Part II in order to avoid tedious use of the movements’ full names. 
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community organising and about the experience and workings of a social movement of people 
marginalised from (or within) their society: For such a social movement, sometimes the office 
rent is in arrears and must be paid now; transport, other than one’s feet, is unreliable, inconvenient, 
and often an indulgence; the importance of personal relationships, of knowing and being 
connected with the community members and what happens in their lives, is vital; and even little 
projects can be difficult, without resources.  Lastly, a meeting with a foreign, anonymous MA 
student is trumped by the exigencies and constraints of living and organising, but that even such 
a meeting finds its time and place, even if it is on rain-soaked streets. 
     A foreigner, a linguistically limited stranger, my initial interactions with members of UPM and 
RPM, as this account illustrates, were also strange and limited.  Nonetheless, my acquaintances 
and local knowledge improved and subsequent meetings were better coordinated and more 
valuable in terms of research.  In the first phase of research, I undertook a broadly-defined program 
of ‘participant observation’ during which I spent fully a year meeting regularly with movement 
members; attending meetings, events, workshops, and protests; and essentially ‘learning’ 
Grahamstown and what it means to be a social movement in South Africa, today.  ‘Participant 
observation,’ according to Laurier, ‘involves spending time being, living or working with people 
or communities in order to understand them […].  The basis of this approach is to become, or stay, 
as close to the spatial phenomenon being studied as possible and it is thereby quite distinct from 
methodologies that emphasize distance and objectivity’ (2010, 116).  My first year of interaction 
with UPM and RPM comprised precisely this.  At the same time, in the university setting, I was 
immersed in historical texts about the Eastern Cape and engaged in learning about contemporary 
South African politics.  Both of these subjects were also learnt ‘in the field’.  The necessity to 
make this spatial distinction—laden with insinuations of the urban and rural—in Grahamstown, 
where the formerly all-white university named after the British Empire’s most ambitious imperial 
capitalist sits at the western (white) end of town, opposite and opposed to the (black and coloured) 
locations in the east, is meaningful in itself, and indicting of methodological practice accepted by 
the academy.  Nonetheless, I did ‘field’ work. 
     There were some limitations, in this phase of research, but the nature of the research permitted 
them.  Not a speaker of isiXhosa, my ‘observation’ was often very strictly that: when I was with 
movement members, I learned by watching, rather than listening.  Important insights came even 
from this limitation.  Not understanding words gave me more time to pay attention to other things, 
for instance, that often when UPM call a meeting in a community, more women attend than men.  
Because of lack of transport on my part and inconsistent transport for the movement members, 
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my observation included more UPM events than RPM, but RPM members were frequently in 
Grahamstown, and this offered opportunities to engage.   
     Eventually, I was sometimes a ‘real’ participant, with an active role; on one occasion I attended 
a workshop as part of RPM.  The inherent and necessary ‘observation’ and ‘participant’ aspects 
of the methodology both featured in my first year and after (Laurier 2015, np). It is important to 
note, especially in light of the limitations mentioned above, that at no point did I intend or attempt 
to obtain or to provide a thorough ethnography.  The participant observation phase of my research 
was more about making the later phase—interviews—firstly possible, and also well-informed and 
fruitful.   
     More necessary, and ultimately far more important, was learning about people.  The year of 
participant observation necessarily involved getting to know people whom I could later involve 
in the interview phase of research.  My attendance and participation at meetings and events also 
allowed people to become familiar with me (as a necessary aspect of participant observation 
[Kawulich 2005, 2]).  However, though rewarding research and interviews became possible, my 
relationships with many people were not always directed towards the eventual end of interviewing 
them, which remained, for much of the time I have known UPM and RPM members, a distant 
prospect.  We interacted—at different times, in different situations, and with different people—as 
guests or hosts, ‘observers’ (on my part), colleagues, and friends.  Sometimes, we were comrades 
in political action.  I had numerous conversations (in English) with movement members, asking 
what a particular event was about, why it was happening, what they thought about the 
circumstances, if they considered something to be a success, and many more general conversations 
about the political situation in Grahamstown and South Africa today.  The diverse styles of 
interaction and observation demonstrate several participant observation roles available to the 
researcher—‘participant as observer’, ‘observer as participant’, and ‘complete observer’ 
(Kawulich 2005, 8)—and while some were more useful than others, I learned while in each role. 
     I also learned a great deal from people about their individual stories.  These conversations did 
not constitute interviews, but, once again, made the eventual interviews as rich as possible.  Still, 
some of the people who provided interviews for this research remained acquaintances, but such 
was the nature of the research.  The advice extended by Laurier (2010) not to learn participant 
observation from a book, but rather simply to do it, informed my approach.  As Laurier writes, the 
methodology ‘acquires the shape and scale of its phenomena’, and the year (and more) which I 
spent shared between university study and participant observation has suited the method of data 
collection that I have employed. 
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    The responses of sixteen people—seven unstructured, one-on-one interviews with members of 
UPM and a nine-person focus group with RPM—have provided the bulk of the information that 
follows in Chapter 4 and the subsequent concluding analysis.  The interviewing method was 
intentionally broad in order to give the respondents the time to develop their thoughts, to say what 
they thought they should say, and also to allow questions to develop organically out of the 
conversation rather than to impose certain ideas—which would effectively have been 
constraints—on the discussion until they seemed appropriate.  In short, I let the respondents lead, 
as much as possible.2  We would normally begin with discussing how the respondent had become 
involved in their social movement.  Then we would move on to why the social movement was 
important, what the respondent thought the movement’s role was in the community, with 
encouragement to elaborate when some idea or subject seemed notable, unclear, or potentially 
useful to my research topic.  More focused questions were along the lines of these: How important 
is it that social movements create links to each other? Are there ways in which your social 
movement has linked up with other social movements? What challenges are there to creating these 
links? As it became clear from some interviews that the role of non-governmental organisations 
was an important topic, I initiated conversation around that topic in the interviews.  At some point 
during each interview, I would introduce the fundamental question I was exploring—the urban 
and rural—and, with both of us sufficiently ‘warmed up’, we could have more pointed discussion 
around that idea.  In this way, a number of important insights and ideas came out of the 
conversations—some which I was hoping to learn, and others which were unlooked for and often 
much more significant.  The reason for the difference between the one-on-one interviews with 
UPM and the focus group with RPM members was simply that this is what the respondents 
preferred.  In structuring and working through the focus group, the same unstructured style and 
the same progression of ideas was employed, and generally the conversation productive and 
interesting.  Going forward, I will use only the words ‘interview’ or ‘interviews’, but this 
encompasses both the interviews and the focus group. 
 
This style of interviewing was motivated, simply, by the position that the answers to the questions 
I am exploring, and the reasons behind the answers, are well-known to the people I am 
interviewing.  Expressing this stance politically, Nigel Gibson writes, ‘The first challenge for 
radical intellectuals is to listen’ (2011, 215); methodologically, it demands intentionally not 
‘imposing an a priori [sic] categorization that may limit the field of inquiry’ (Fontana and Frey 
2 See Bryman ([1989] 1995, 147-151) or Fontana and Frey (1998, 56-66) for thorough discussions of unstructured 
interviews. 
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1998, 56).  At no time did I presume that this research was generating insight into their lives.  
What I am able to do (with resources and time that they do not have) is situate their experience 
and knowledge into a broad historical scaffolding, and potentially offer a new way for intellectuals 
in the academy (not the only place they work) to think about this specific spatial-political 
framework of urban and rural.  Therefore, what the respondents want to tell me—what they think 
is important, what specific experiences and ideas motivate them—is equally if not more important 
than the specific question which motivated me.  Gibson understands an intellectual’s role as ‘a 
fundamentally anti-systemic dialectician, who begins by engaging with a poor people’s movement 
and thereby challenges the research community’s assumptions and practices’, and who 
understands this as ‘a process and a praxis’ (2011, 215).   
     This particular ‘dialectic’ draws on Marx via Raya Dunayevskaya’s Marxist Humanism.  
Affirming the necessity of connecting thought and actions she writes, ‘If you know the exact 
relationship between OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE, between PHILOSOPHY AND 
REVOLUTION, and don't consider any of that as abstract, you then realize it is abstract only if 
you haven't made the connection of objective and subjective’ ([1978] 2006, np; emphases 
original).  Elsewhere, she explained what this means in terms of method, that it is ‘absurdity […] 
if the method were the proof’ of itself; rather ‘[t]he proof can only be in practice, in the actual 
development of society itself’ ([1957] 2000, np).  Theory as a process and a practice, Gibson 
argues, can only be difficult and contradictory (2011).  This research attempts to question an 
epistemic division—urban and rural—through ideas generated from within social movements and 
within the academy, and therefore is inherently contradictory.  
     Two theoretical approaches proved useful in conducting and analysing research with social 
movement members, given the contradictions that exert various influences on this approach.  Cox 
and Nilsen’s Marxist theory of social movements has already been mentioned and proved useful 
in thinking about the history reviewed here.  They argue that theory is not the exclusive prerogative 
of the full-time intellectual.  ‘Theory’, they write, ‘is knowledge that is consciously developed out 
of experience, that has been worked through using experience as a touchstone, that has become 
explicit and articulate, and has been brought to a level where it can be generalised’ (2014, 8).  
They carry on, ‘Theory [. . . means] going beyond the immediacy and situatedness of a particular 
experience.  “Going beyond” means trying to understand the wider ramifications of, and 
underlying processes that give rise to whatever we experience as problematic and frustrating in 
our everyday lives’ (Cox and Nilsen 2014, 10).  The movement members that I interviewed have 
a wealth of experience and reflection upon that experience to offer to the project of theorising, and 
theorising happened actively during the interviews.  Dunayevskaya phrases this succinctly: ‘No 
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theoretician, today more than ever before, can write out of his [sic] own head. Theory requires a 
constant shaping and reshaping of ideas on the basis of what the workers themselves are doing 
and thinking’ ([1957] 2000, np).  While the people involved in this research are not ‘workers’ as 
Dunayevskaya imagined workers, the point remains valid that people must inform theory. 
     ‘Social movements from below’, Cox and Nilsen explain, grow out of people’s ‘experience of 
a concrete lifeworld that is somehow problematic relative to their needs and capacities, and from 
their attempts to combine, organise and mobilise in order to do something about this’ (2014, 72).  
It follows that social movement theory can only be generated in social movements.  Therefore, I 
questioned what members of UPM and RPM find ‘problematic’—an overused and vapid word 
which in this case refers to political, social, and economic confinement to ‘the extensions of 
society’, to use the phrase of one UPM member—and what they ‘do about this’, and, in what they 
do, whether potential exists for ‘going beyond’. 
    To determine an answer to this last question would imply that the social movements 
themselves—or, more precisely, social movement members—have come to a clear answer.  This 
is not the case.  What can be accomplished here is the study of a moment in the dialectic of practice 
and reflection, historically situated, and limited in scope—albeit an intentional, focused study with 
comprehension and explication as an objective. This introduces the second theoretical 
underpinning of the interview phase of this research.  Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar, whose important 
and impressive study of the massive social movements in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, 
Rhythms of the Pachakuti (2014), has proved useful in concretising my methodological approach.  
Bolivia, while it differs in many ways from South Africa, has parallels enough to argue for a 
shared approach to social movements in the South African context.  Indeed, aspects of Mamdani’s 
theory of ‘despotism’ and Gill Hart’s analysis of the crisis of South African local government are 
readily apparent in Aguilar’s description of Boliva: a ‘political framework superimposed on the 
general population, especially in rural and marginal urban areas, which functions basically for 
controlling inhabitants and collecting taxes’ rather than to ‘organize peaceful coexistence between 
legally equal citizens’; a system the ‘shape’ and ‘internal logic’ of which are ‘clearly colonial in 
origin’ and marked by ‘extreme division’ and ‘racist contempt’ (2014, 35).  Aguilar argues that 
indigenous communitarian tradition informed the success of collective action against this 
structure, which is not my argument here, though it may be useful in assessing movements in 
different place and time contexts in South/ern Africa.  Perhaps significantly, struggles in Bolivia 
were able to link movements across and between urban and rural spaces (Aguilar 2014, 13; 35; 
45-46; 105; 122; 174; 176).  It is Aguilar’s approach to studying these movements which is most 
important to this research. 
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     Aguilar writes, ‘The theoretical strategy that I propose does not follow the tradition that 
privileges the production of objective knowledge.  Instead, it follows the tradition that supports 
practical understanding of the social experience of rupture, resistance, and challenge to the social 
order’ (xxi).  This is the approach taken here.  Whether rupture and challenge exist, we shall 
explore in the next chapter.   
     Aguilar provides the most important and specific facet of my interviewing methodology.  As 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, she makes the distinction between a struggle’s 
‘practical scope’ and its ‘interior horizon’.  The former is: 
 
[A movement’s] real material force, its disruptive capacity, its internal vitality to continue 
and advance, its associative networks, its importance in the group of struggles in a country 
and in the world, and so on.  These elements can be ‘observed’ from the outside. 
 
And the latter:  
 
[The] discrepancy between what is done and not said, between what is said and not done, 
and in what implicitly or explicitly appears to be a desire or potential. In other words, it 
relates markedly to the collective type of subjectivity that is produced during times of 
rupture from daily life, rebellion, and uprising (Aguilar 2014, xxiv). 
  
Both of these facets, directions, or definitions contain more than will be explored here, but the 
concept of ‘observed’, ‘real material force, and ‘the discrepancy’ between words and actions are 
useful, if not necessary, to approaching an analysis of the politics of social movements with a 
specific question in mind.  On the one hand, the actual ‘shape’ of the social movement(s) can be 
mapped and explained, while, on the other hand, there is potential for identifying in the social 
movement(s) an alternative articulation of politics, produced in the movement itself, to the 
hegemonic politics of the day.  Crucially, the two ‘hands’ just alluded to belong to the same entity.  
They represent different aspects and reveal important tensions and opportunities, but are not, at 
least for what actually can be called a social movement, divorceable.  They communicate the 
dialectic inherent in praxis and generative of theory. In terms of research, this translates to what 
Gibson calls a ‘willing[ness]’ on the part of intellectuals ‘to engage awkward facts and articulate 
a consciousness full of contradictions’ (2011, 219).  So, in analysing our open-ended interviews, 
I looked for these two strands of the movements in question, taking my cues from the people 
actually involved. 
     Like Cox and Nilsen, Aguilar argues that the hegemonic political and social norm—elite 
normality, ‘a heavy anchor that fixes social relationships in the past and inhibits and traps the 
collective production of political horizons’ (2014, xliii)—is an ‘illusory social synthesis’.  Aguilar 
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identifies the modern state in this synthesis (2014, xxii-xxiii).  ‘Order’, if it exists, is political, 
produced, and maintained. 
     The contingent nature of political hegemony allows that ‘[t]here are times in history when 
social conflicts, confrontations, and upheavals transcend the constrictive framework designed for 
their administration and control’ (Aguilar 2014, xxiii).  In indigenous Bolivian traditions, this time 
is called ‘Pachakuti’, interpreted as a ‘“turning or inverting” of time and space’ (Aguilar 2014, 
50).  The ‘practical scope’ and ‘interior horizon’ strategy is useful in relation to the idea of 
‘Pachakuti’, because we are able to conceive of struggles as partially successful or partially failed 
while still accepting that they produce a different understanding of ‘time and space’; that is, they 
articulate an alternative politics to state-oriented or state-produced politics.  Praxis may reflect an 
‘interior horizon’ which does not achieve implementation, but which is no less real as a conceptual 
mode with potential for expression.  ‘Inversion’ or ‘turning’ may exist on the interior horizon. 
     However, after Aguilar’s formulation, it must be asked: Do we need only to look to specific 
‘times’ of explicit ‘upheaval’, when in fact certain modes of ‘inversion’ are frequent and do not 
constitute a (concrete) upheaval?  Better expressed, is the political reality complicated enough 
most of the time that generally a different approach than the top-down articulation of spaces and 
of politics becomes necessary to explain them?  The specific struggles of UPM and RPM are not 
of a scale that can change South Africa in the way the struggles between 2000 and 2005 did in 
Bolivia, but they are aimed at changing people’s daily lives, and in that way reflect a different 
logic that ‘gradually lessens the preference for material value over real people’ (Aguilar 2014, 
xxv) and may not be limited to antagonistic divisions (i.e. urban-rural) inherent to a specific 
politics, that is, the politics produced through the colonial organisation of power through race and 
space.  Michael Neocosmos writes about ‘thinking in excess’: 
 
[People] are in other words capable of reason, of thinking beyond their social location and 
conditions, of thinking an excess beyond the simply given extent of the social division of 
labour and its corresponding social identities […].  Without this ‘excessive’ character, 
politics is simply conflated with ‘the political’, with party, the state and political 
community […]. [E]xcess is always excess over something, namely the extant, with the 
result that there is always a relationship between the thought of what is and the thought of 
what could be […]. The excessive-expressive dialectic is thus what structures the thought 
of emancipation (forthcoming, 2016, 25). 
 
Political excess, we can argue, is possible without practical success.       
     Cox and Nilsen speak of ‘going beyond’, Aguilar of a ‘praxis of disruption and escape’ (2014, 
xxxvi), and Neocosmos of ‘excessive’ politics.  All three of these theoretical formulations are 
about what Aguilar calls ‘explaining [conflict] in a way that breaks the conceptual fetish of 
categorization as the basis for knowledge’ (2014, xxviii).  All three also demand an actional 
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approach.  Perhaps the most important theorist of decolonisation, Fanon follows his exposition on 
the ‘Manichean’ colonial world with the ‘aggressive’ response of colonised people to their being 
‘hemmed in’ by the ‘compartments’ of colonialism.  In the midst of the aggressive outburst, when 
it happens, it is ‘an urgent matter to decide […] how to conduct and organize the movement’, and, 
‘[i]f this coherence is not present, there is only a blind will toward freedom’ ([1961] 1963, 52; 
59).  In terms of this conversation, what follows explosion is politics.  Once more we see the 
centrality of a dialectic in praxis, concretised in Aguilar’s twin concepts: ‘practical scope’ and 
‘interior horizons’. 
 
Three crucial theoretical points must be taken forward.  The first is that people involved in social 
movements are more concretely described as being involved in the politics of thinking, doing, and 
living.  The second is that ‘going beyond’ the particularities of experience, which Neocosmos 
understands in emancipatory terms, is political and actional.  This is compelling, given the 
importance of movement in the moments of resistance that appeared in the history of spatial 
coercion just reviewed, and the ‘transcending’ quality implied in Mamdani’s ‘burden of protest’.  
Third is that the dialectic between practice and reflection is where theory develops, and that this 
dialectic exists in social movements.  Therefore, the people involved—who are political and also 
actional—are authors of theory. 
     We will now look to the words of members of UPM and RPM for a critical approach to 
understanding urban and rural political spaces. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
URBAN & RURAL MOVEMENTS: AN ANNOTATED DIALOGUE 
 
‘The movement expresses both force and reason.’ – Nigel C. Gibson in Fanonian Practices in 
South Africa (2011, 215) 
 
‘We learn from them.  They learn from us.’ – Activist, Rural People’s Movement 
 
  
The UPM and RPM are both organisations working to improve the lives of the people living 
in their communities, to educate and mobilise people politically, and to remain, to differing 
degrees at different times, organisations that challenge the political status quo.  Although they 
are political, they are not political parties and they are intentionally not affiliated with any 
political parties.  Sometimes, their projects bring them into open confrontation with established 
political authority.  They might be called ‘community political organisations’; they might also 
be classified within Chatterjee’s ‘political society’ as discussed above; but we will retain the 
designation used so far—‘social movements’—with the understanding that the term ‘social’ 
does not preclude people’s thinking and acting ‘politically’.  UPM’s and RPM’s political bases 
in their communities and work for those communities are evocative of Raúl Zibechi’s assertion, 
in a study of Andean social movements, that ‘[c]ommunity […] deserves new attention, not as 
an eccentricity of the past that resists dying, but as a dynamic of both common production and 
common association with overwhelming political relevance’ (2010, 136).  Community in his 
formulation does not refer to the assumed ‘communal’—read ‘traditional’, even ‘pre-
colonial’—society, but rather to the shared existence of people, eminently and fundamentally 
modern, that does not immediately denote a ‘state’.  Both UPM and RPM assert the political 
relevance of their community—that is, of the people who, through the processes of formal 
democracy linked to neo-liberal capital and to a recent past of exclusionary, racialised 
colonialism, are not considered relevant to politics or to the making of decisions that affect 
their daily lives.  We have seen how space, race, and citizenship were manipulated and 
institutionalised towards the conceptual and material enforcement of this ‘irrelevance’. 
     The insistence on relevance as well as of an alternative way of doing politics is explicit for 
both UPM and RPM.  As one member of UPM explained the founding of the movement: 
 
We started it in 2009 in August, after the discussion amongst former activists [that] 
something has to be done.  Something has to be done. […]  In August 2009, indeed this 
was materialised, and then the Unemployed People’s Movement was formed.  The hall 
was full to its capacity.  People heeded the call. 
       
What ‘had to be done’ was the galvanisation of a political mobilisation to contest what he 
described as a corrupt local government that was simply going about its own business without 
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accounting to or for the people it governed—in short, the absence of actual democracy.  Why 
did ‘something have to be done’? 
 
It was about giving up. Nothing [was] being done.  These [local government] people 
are just doing it; they are corrupt.  There [was] no counter power.  They [were] not 
being challenged. There [was] no dissenting voice coming [from] outside.  And I think 
we have been able to play that role. 
      
     Similarly, a man involved with RPM explained that post-apartheid democracy was not what 
people had hoped for: 
 
We thought actually that democracy would be a bottom-up approach, but it appears 
that it is a top down approach. In fact, people are not given a chance to participate in 
most of decisions and the laws that affect them. [Interpreter’s translation] 
 
     In response to this political marginalisation, RPM seeks to open an avenue to political 
participation for its members beyond the limited democracy of electoral politics. The same man 
later expanded on this point: 
 
When the democratic government took over […], some people of course went to take 
their post in the government […]. We had huge expectations, but after we saw that in 
fact this government is in fact similar to the other one.  They keep promising, but 
nothing happens. We decided to revive again, and bring about struggles for the 
community. [Interpreter’s translation]1 
 
UPM is based in Grahamstown itself, and RPM in the rural areas around Peddie, a little over 
forty miles further east.  One will recognise this area as the ‘Fish River Country’, the region of 
intense political contestation in the nineteenth century where we saw racial-spatial political 
practises and structures develop, as well as resistance.  Given the insights arising from the 
historical review, a consideration of the two movements simultaneously is both intellectually 
and politically significant.  The discussion in this chapter observes the intentions delineated in 
the first excursus on historiography and considers UPM’s and RPM’s contexts and politics as 
historical (though not in order to provide a complete history of either movement).  
Consequently, we will begin with a short introduction to both movements: in their own words, 
how they came into existence, how they work, and the issues that they face. In this way, a clear 
sense of the roles that the movements play in their communities and of their modes of politics 
can be brought to the argument of this research. 
1 Where a second translation was done, other than the interpreter’s rendering, the original Xhosa is also 
provided. 
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     The more focused purpose in this chapter is to put UPM and RPM, through the words of 
some of their members, into a dialogue around the question of urban and rural.  Now, UPM 
and RPM cooperate on demonstrations and events, some of the members know each other and 
frequently discuss social and political ideas with each other (and day to day things, of course).  
Therefore, the ‘dialogue’ is not unique to this research, but also exists (and to a much fuller 
extent) in real life.  That dialogue—of a longer duration, reinforced with activity, and informed 
by complete understanding of experiences—is richer than the abbreviated account which can 
be provided here.  However, this project aims, as outlined in Second Excursus, to look to 
activists for theoretical knowledge, and, through this specific annotation of the political ideas 
expressed by UPM and RPM members, to incorporate their ideas into the political discourse of 
urban and rural space that is the focus of this research. This chapter comprises mainly the 
content of interviews (empirical information), the analysis and discussion of which will be the 
function of the concluding chapter that follows. 
     After the introduction of the social movements, the dialogue will be organised into two 
sections in which the ‘practical scope’ and ‘interior horizon’ strategy structures how we will 
examine ‘how’ or ‘to what extent’ UPM and RPM cooperate or do not cooperate and which 
opportunities for unity or division exist between them.  We will then turn to what people think 
about these practicalities and about possible alternatives—in short, the politics—since the 
question is less about how the physical spaces of urban and rural are transcended or 
transgressed and much more about the political geography that includes both urban and rural 
areas.  The first dialogical section will address the ‘practical scope’ of the movements’ activism 
and the times when they have connected; and the second will consider the ‘interior horizons’ 
of the movements, again with attention focused on the possibilities for and challenges to 
cooperation.2  For both sections, the question of urban and rural provides a contextual 
backdrop as well as a critical objective.  Because this chapter deals largely with modes of 
politics, space is mentioned less often than in the preceding (or following) chapters.  However, 
three important points regarding space should be kept in mind in reading this chapter: First, the 
modes of politics in question are framed by the specific shape of spatial politics that we saw 
developed historically; second, the ‘top-down’ modes of politics which are mentioned 
frequently by members here are important in replicating those same spatial demarcations, and 
this will be explored more closely later; and, third, remembering Lefebvre, that the ‘production 
2 For discussion of the concepts ‘practical scope’ and ‘interior horizon’, see Aguilar (2014) or Second Exursus. 
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of space[s]’ is inherently conditional upon ‘the modalities of their genesis’ ([1974] 1991, 16)—
that is to say, different modes of politics will produce different politics of space. 
 
The Movements 
 
Cox and Nilsen (2015) write of social movements as encountering and then choosing to contest 
‘a concrete lifeworld that is somehow problematic relative to their needs and capacities’ (72).  
Certainly, the ‘lifeworld’ in which UPM and RPM members live, in which the members of 
their communities live, are concretely problematic in many ways—the symptoms of the 
pathological inequalities in South African society.  In order to impart a clear picture of the two 
movements before turning to more abstract themes, members’ explanations and descriptions of 
this experience are provided here.  One older man, a lifelong resident of Grahamstown who 
lives in eThembeni, talked about his reasons for joining UPM: 
 
The problem is that I’m still suffering, you see.  So that’s why I want[ed] to join the 
movement of the UPM.  I know everything about the people who are suffering, who are 
still suffering again.  [They say] I’m free, but there is no free for me.  Because I am 
living in the squatter’s camp, you see.  There is lack of water, lack of housing, and jobs, 
and the school—our children do not get [an] education.  But in 1994, they said to us 
there are better life, better education.  But still now there is nothing going right.  So 
that is why I’m a member of UPM, because I’m still suffering, I’m not working, and 
I’m still living in the squatter camp [in] the shacks. 
 
The specific issues that this man outlined—water, housing, unemployment, education—were 
reiterated often by members of both UPM and RPM; indeed, by everyone.  The issues of 
housing, water, and roads were raised in regard to both urban and rural areas, issues that are 
resonant with problems that Grahamstown’s residents raised at least as early as the 1860s.  
Combined with these problems, which are characterised by the lack or inadequacy of 
something, are notions of dignity, voice (or voiceless-ness), and people’s will to be involved 
in the organising of their own lives and the politics of their country. 
     UPM was formed when activists convened community members in the ‘informal’ or ‘shack’ 
settlement of Phaphamani in Grahamstown to mobilise for the provision of electricity by the 
municipality.  
 
They were refusing to give people electricity in Phaphamani and Zolani. So we blocked 
the roads. They arrested us, ’cause they were saying there is no money. While they 
were releasing us they were delivering electric poles there [laughs]. So that place has 
electricity now. 
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Another major action in UPM’s history was the 2011 ‘bucket system’ protest, aimed at the lack 
of proper toilets which many people in Grahamstown faced.  In October of that year, 
community members dumped buckets of human waste in Grahamstown’s City Hall.  A member 
of UPM later explained the reasoning:  
             
It takes the suffering that is usually hidden away as a private shame and makes it a 
public embarrassment to the government […] When people experience their suffering 
as a private shame, things don’t change. But when this suffering becomes 
politicised and collective action can be taken, especially in elite spaces, things really 
can change (in Knoetze 2013, np). 
 
     RPM came into being in a less confrontational manner.  As an RPM member narrated, after 
attending a National Land Summit held in Cape Town (2005), at which it became apparent that 
‘there was not an organised voice of the landless people’, a Grahamstown-based NGO, 
Masifunde Education and Development Project Trust (hereafter referred as ‘Masifunde’), along 
with rural community members launched RPM in 2007 ‘to organise a voice for the landless, a 
voice for the women’.  Though the same member stated the RPM ‘did not come up through the 
struggle’—meaning, it did not begin with protest action like UPM—it was intentionally formed 
in order to challenge a ‘problematic’ experience through self-representation.3  For one example, 
in July 2010, RPM submitted a statement to the South African Parliament regarding repeal of 
the Black Authorities Act (1951).  The statement explained: 
 
In the last 2 weeks, we as the RPM went village by village to seek the opinions of our 
members, supporters and the broad community about the repeal of the Black 
Authorities Act (BAA). We went to the villages of Nobumba, Ndlambe, Pikoli, 
Ndwayana, Prudhoe and Mgababa. People were shocked that this law was still existing. 
They thought that we lived in a new South Africa. When we told them that this Act 
introduced tribal authorities they remembered all the pains they suffered under tribal 
authorities. They then asked us whether the repeal of this law will also mean the 
removal of the chiefs who are now coming back to rule them. We said that yes the BAA 
will go but the chiefs will remain. They were unhappy about this. They gave us one 
clear and loud voice: Mayihambe i-Black Authorities Act kwakunye namantshontsho 
ayo4. After the village meetings, we also spoke to community leaders at a separate 
meeting. The message to us was the same: mayimke i-Black Authorities Act, maziphele 
tu ii-tribal authorities, singabemi boMzantsi Afrika omnye5 (RPM, 2010).6 
 
3 The presence of an NGO is acknowledged to have some bearing on the matter of representation, as will be 
discussed in detail below. 
4 ‘The Black Authorities Act and its puppies [legislative offspring] must leave’. 
5 ‘The Black Authorities Act must leave, the tribal authorities must completely end; we are the citizens of one 
South Africa’. 
6 The Black Authorities Act of 1951 was repealed 31 December 2010. 
 
                                                 
91 
 
     While they are only some of the actions that RPM and UPM have taken, these episodes and 
their explanations illustrate the reasons why UPM and RPM were formed and something of the 
role they have played in their communities in the last several years.  
    Another specific issue experienced as materially problematic is the corruption of municipal 
and other government officials, which in some cases leads to poorly built Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) housing and other government projects and to indefinite 
waiting periods for such housing dictated by a corrupt list by which people obtain RDP housing.  
As related in the introduction, one major protest demonstration organised by UPM called for 
the municipality to be dissolved because of corruption, including in regard to housing.  
Corruption is also an issue affecting people’s lives in the rural areas.  A young man in RPM 
related that: 
 
The issues of development and corruption, the housing projects, the sanitation, you 
know, they’ve always been a problem.  Even now you’d find that with the project that 
is going on now for the toilets, you’d find that already if you go around some areas 
they are already collapsing, but millions of money have been put for that project, so 
there’s a lot of corruption. 
                
Or, as a woman in RPM said: 
 
Let’s say you just trying something that will develop or benefit the community, for 
example the crèche. When you go to the municipalities to ask for funds, they will 
promise, and promise, and promise, and promise, and promise, ’til you lose hope. 
[Interpreter’s translation] 
  
Members of UPM and RPM participated, alongside the Black Student Movement from Rhodes 
University, the local NGO Masifunde, and the United Front (a South Africa Leftist 
organisation) in another anti-corruption march in September 2015. 
     RPM intentionally seeks to build women’s power in their communities, and UPM ‘does a 
good job’, according to one member, of addressing ‘women’s experiences’ and ‘women-related 
challenges’.  Members of both movements mentioned rape and abuse of women and children 
as specific problems in their communities.  Rape, said a member of UPM, ‘has become huge 
even in Grahamstown alone, besides South Africa’.  RPM members spoke of rising crime in 
their area, including home break-ins and the sale of alcohol and tobacco to underage people. 
 
These specific issues raise an important point about the politics of the two movements that is 
linked to the discourse around movements in South Africa more generally.  People’s struggles 
in South Africa are often cast from outside (or, perhaps, from ‘above’)—both by the state and 
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from within the academy—as ‘service delivery’ protests (Gibson 2011; Hart 2013), a 
classification that is insufficient in several ways.  By focusing on the moment of protest, it 
obfuscates the ongoing work of community organising; it presents the ‘service’—water, 
housing, roads, security, anti-corruption, etc.—rather than the people involved in protest as the 
protagonist (or antagonist) of the moment; and, proceeding from both of these problems, it 
hides the political nature of the action.  Trouillot offers a lucid analog in his discussion of Haiti 
just before its revolution in 1791, when the defiant, violent, and political actions of enslaved 
people were written off as isolated occurrences—‘the rebellious slave’ was made out to be 
nothing more than ‘a maladjusted Negro’, and his or her action ‘drained of its political content’ 
(1995, 83).  So we see the trivialisation and banalisation of politics by poor, black people.  It 
is not the position here that social movement members are incorrect to speak of service 
delivery, or that services comprise an inferior or illegitimate set of demands.  Rather, the 
purpose, seemingly both logical and necessary, is to centre the words of activists in this 
discourse on service delivery. 
     Members of UPM and RPM mentioned better service delivery as one of the objectives of 
their movement or poor service delivery as one of the problems with government.  For example, 
at an RPM march in Grahamstown in 2014 a reporter was told that ‘the municipality should 
prioritise services’ (Gotywa, 2014).  Another member of RPM said in our interview: 
 
What you can notice is that ever since the post-apartheid era […] the basic services do 
not come to people.  People do not receive the basic services.  As we have seen coming 
along the road, the road is very bad.  Even here, this is supposed to be a preschool [or] 
crèche. It is not in a good standard for people even to sit within it. [Interpreter’s 
translation] 
 
  Similarly, a young woman in UPM explained: 
 
The most things that [UPM] is working on is in terms of service delivery and the 
corruption in the municipality. 
 
Nonetheless, it remains entirely possible to be political about services.  She continued by saying 
that UPM is ‘fighting for what rightly belongs to the community’.  Significantly, she discussed 
membership in UPM as follows: 
 
I would say…it is people who are coming […] to get helped from the UPM, because 
[they are] seeing how the other [sic] political parties have failed the community, I will 
put it that way.  So the UPM doesn’t speak for the community, but the community speaks 
for themselves through UPM. 
              
 
93 
 
This understanding is reminiscent of the reasons given by the other respondents from UPM and 
RPM for the founding of the movements, provided above.  While this woman explained that 
services are some of the specific issues that UPM takes up with the municipality, she also 
asserted the ‘right’ to those services as well as the ‘right’ of the community to demand them 
and to take action to obtain them.   There is a link to the implementation of ‘bottom-up’ 
democracy which speaks to issues of citizenship.  Recall that, for Chatterjee, ‘rights’ signify 
citizenship and ‘services’ governable populations (2004, 136).  Indeed, given the need to ‘fight’ 
for things like electricity, water, and housing, neither of the terms ‘service’ and ‘delivery’ seem 
appropriate to the situation.  In a follow-up conversation, the same woman from UPM said that 
‘the people do not fight only for services, but also for dignity’, because of the fact that the 
government does not account to the people as it is supposed to, including in terms of services.  
She cited UPM’s early struggle against the bucket-system as an example of this intersection 
between services and dignity.  Another young woman involved with UPM explained that:  
 
Looking at UPM, it’s not about protesting for service delivery only, but it’s also about 
helping people […].  Last year UPM buried like three people, because they [UPM] 
were helping people, so there’s a lot in social movements than just protesting for 
service delivery.7 
               
     The two concepts of politics (thinking and acting politically) and helping the community 
are linked for members of both UPM and RPM who understand their movements as having the 
role of enriching the political consciousness and encouraging the political participation of the 
people in their communities.  This was expressed in a number of different ways: 
 
RPM Member, speaking on the first task undertaken by RPM: It was to teach the people 
about their rights, for you find that people think they are done a favour, because they 
don’t know what is in the constitution, so the first thing was to teach people about their 
rights […]. [Interpreter’s translation] 
 
RPM Member: We have been training and also learning about the laws, mainly those 
that affect people, for example the Communal Rights Land Act, the Traditional Bill Act 
[sic], which was delayed because mainly we challenged it. [Interpreter’s translation]8 
 
UPM Member: [UPM has the role of] letting people know what’s going on around 
them, and making sure that they know […] they have right to have a safe house, water, 
and all that stuff; and also to change people’s mindset […].  Since UPM was formed, 
like, many people have guts to stand up to the municipality right now. As you’ve seen 
that there was a protest a few days, a few weeks, ago that was not organised by UPM, 
7 She refers to fundraising for funeral expenses, which frequently present a difficult financial challenge to 
people with small incomes. 
8 Communal Rights Land Act 11 of 2004 and Traditional Courts Bill B1 of 2012. 
 
                                                 
94 
 
but people knew that because of the protests that were made by UPM they knew that 
they could also do protests. It’s in their right to do things like that. 
 
UPM Member: I think the role of the UPM must be to raise the awareness and 
consciousness.  You must get the RDP house, but you must understand why the RDP 
house is being built in the extensions of society.  You must understand why you don’t 
have water […].  We must understand why there’s no electricity […]—the structural 
cause.  We must be able to understand budget. I think these are the things we must 
understand if we want to change the society […].  Fundamentally our role must be to 
change society through the local struggle. 
 
Once again, the issue of rights is prominent, and citizenship, specifically the rights of formal 
citizenship in South Africa, and this will form an important part of the analysis that follows in 
Chapter 5 and the conclusion.  Importantly, the contradictions of engagement with the 
institutions of formal politics while remaining, in different ways, movements outside of them 
will be addressed. 
 
Practical Scope 
 
Not surprisingly, the ‘practical scopes’ of the two movements are directly linked to the 
problems in their communities which they have taken up as issues on which they focus or the 
subjects of protest.  These are markedly similar for each movement and the two movements 
often collaborate on events and demonstrations.  One member of RPM recalled three different 
marches in the year leading up to our interview in which RPM and UPM had both participated 
or which they had planned together.  Of course, they are different movements with people 
living in different places, so not every issue is the same.  RPM helps people with the issue of 
land claims, while UPM has developed a function of working with people who are having 
problems obtaining RDP housing.  Though these particular functions are similar, they are also 
locally specific in terms of rural and urban settings.   
     Two woman involved in RPM gave a somewhat different responses, naming practical 
differences between urban and rural movements as well as giving reasons for how rural 
movements could benefit from linkages to urban movements: 
 
Yes, in fact from the rural country you’d find that the government does not listen to 
people compared to the towns.  So we need to share that experience—what they do.  
Perhaps [their burning] is why they are listened to. [Interpreter’s translation] 
 
The other thing that would help would be to occupy the space of the media [which is] 
easier in townships than in rural areas. [Interpreter’s translation] 
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And a woman from UPM agreed that a difference exists and explained it this way: 
 
You’d find most of the people in the rural areas find it difficult to stand up and fight 
for what they think is right for them.  But here in towns like Grahamstown, you’d find 
people standing up. [Interpreter’s translation] 
 
Her explanation for this discrepancy had to do with the perception that electoral politics was 
the mode of politics in which people most often participated in rural areas, and described this 
as a form of oppression.  We will return to this idea, momentarily. 
     There are other differences, as well.  For instance, RPM has some members who live under 
traditional authority as well as some members who do not, and this entails a different set of 
political agendas and disputes than UPM contend with in Grahamstown.  As one member of 
RPM said: 
 
A certain distinct thing that I think should be mentioned is the issue of the rural 
democracy.  Whereas in the townships they are ruled by democracy, if I can say. 
Whereas here there are imposed chiefs, so that makes it a little different, because you 
have an imposed leader that you have no say in.  So that’s something that makes these 
struggles a bit distinct.  I’m not rebuking the importance of trying to link them together. 
It’s very important. 
 
     Recently, RPM joined a number of other mainly rural organisations picketing the Eastern 
Cape Provincial Government’s appeal of a court ruling that allowed people in the Cala Reserve 
(in the former Tranksei) to elect their own leaders (headmen).  The statement of protest read, 
in part, ‘We collectively condemn the decision of the provincial government to launch this 
appeal. This appeal amounts to a denial of rural people their right to enjoy the full fruits of their 
own democratic customary practise. This appeal shows that the provincial government regards 
rural people as non-citizens’ and went on to distinguish between an urban and rural experience 
of citizenship (rnews, 6 August 2015).  In this specific instance, we can see the bifurcation of 
authority between ‘civil society’ and ‘traditional authority’ that Mamdani wrote about.  Still, 
the urban-based UPM was included among the organisations that signed the statement against 
non-democratic rule of ‘traditional’ authorities.   
     Most of the RPM members interviewed for this research come from the Prudhoe area, some 
eighteen miles south of Peddie centre.  Although we could see an area under traditional 
authority from the room where we were speaking, one man said, ‘We do not have chiefs here, 
so we will not speak much about chiefs’.  Nonetheless, traditional authority and ‘rural 
democracy’ or the lack thereof are issues affecting the lives of some RPM members and not 
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UPM members, though the latter movement shows solidarity with them in that aspect of the 
struggle. 
     The practical scope of the movements’ politics is limited by the fact that, as one UPM 
member phrased it, the two movements have separate ‘jurisdictions’.  ‘We can’t,’ he said, ‘go 
to rural areas because RPM works there, but we work with them.’  There was also the issue of 
local NGOs working in the rural areas, and so, because of them, if UPM extended their work 
into those areas it would cause ‘commotion’.  This is despite the fact that when people have 
problems ‘whether they see “RPM” or “UPM”, they just come’, including people with ‘farm-
related problems’.  Some people have come to UPM with problems that they feel would be 
better addressed through the movement than through the NGOs working in their areas, but 
UPM is reluctant to take up these issues because of the aforementioned ‘jurisdictions’ and the 
‘commotion’ that would result from working outside of the acknowledged boundaries. 
     Still, though it is mainly RPM that deals with land claims, UPM has had some involvement 
in this matter.  The narration of one such case from Committee’s Drift, some twenty-five miles 
east from Grahamstown, makes for a rather dramatic story: 
 
We [were] fighting for this community because they missed a deadline to claim land. 
That was two years back. The land belonged to the state, so there was this white farmer 
who was using the land—terrorising the community, killing their animals.  So we 
organised a protest, about two years back.  We went straight there.  We demanded [the 
farmer’s] livestock and we gave it to [the community].  The police were there, and we 
told the police that the only way you are going to resolve this—because you aware of 
these cases and you haven’t acted—so the only way to stop us is when you incarcerate 
us and shoot us.  So we took the community to the land, we gave them their livestock, 
we told the white farmer that they will be working on this land.   
     The department called us.  We attended meetings.  The former mayor, the outgoing 
mayor, wanted that land as well, that farm.  We fought that. The department called 
[saying] we can resolve this matter.  Why can’t we give UPM about twenty hectares in 
that farm, to work the land, and then we allow the Department to take decisions, we 
don’t fight with the department, we support what the Department [does]?  And we 
refused.  The community continued to enjoy the rights on that land. 
 
This sort of action by UPM is not usual, however, and it was described as ‘going the extra mile’ 
when UPM has worked outside of Grahamstown.   
    Members accept their different ‘jurisdictions’ to some extent, and some people 
acknowledged the function of their movement as specific to a certain place in that, practically, 
they encounter some different problems, and the same people cannot be everywhere at once.  
For instance, one member of RPM stated: 
 
Of course you’d find that sometimes you do align with some other movements to be 
involved in certain struggles.  But the fact that in terms of the geography we’re still in 
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the rural areas that proves that we’re sort of conserved into certain specifics focused 
only on the rural country. 
 
Similarly, a woman who has been involved in UPM since their first action at Phaphamani 
believes that movements should keep their identities as movements but march together on 
issues that affect them in common. 
 
The limiting—the ‘conservation’, to use the term just quoted—of movements to Grahamstown 
or to the rural areas, as it is explained by members of UPM and RPM, does not stem principally 
from the movements or members themselves, but rather from outside.  Two specific influences 
were cited and explained by many members of both movements to be limiting to the efficacy 
and action of social movements as well as of the opportunities for working together by causing 
tensions within and between social movements.  These are NGOs and political parties (or party 
politics).  For the purposes of this chapter, we will look at how members of the two social 
movements in question understand these influences and how exactly they are limiting, and the 
conclusion will include a more thorough discussion of their answers within the context of this 
thesis. 
     The overwhelming response from members of both movements was that, although NGOs 
can be valuable in terms of providing transportation, training, and other functions requiring 
funding, the relationships between NGOs and social movements can be, and often are, unequal.  
One young man in RPM explained the problem succinctly, raising the two most important 
issues: autonomy and funding: 
 
NGOs themselves tend to dominate the movements and they don’t give the autonomy 
to the movements to work freely [….].  Even if there are people who can think critically, 
who can work at ground level, but they don’t have space to do that because if the NGOs 
draft a program for the funders then they get the funds […].  If that struggle […] you 
want to engage on is not on the program then they won’t do it, because they have to be 
accountable to their funders. 
 
Members of both movements talked about NGOs ‘dictating’ to social movements, about how 
they can cause conflicts between social movements who looking for much needed funding and 
resources, and within movements, as well.  When I brought up rural areas with one UPM 
member, he immediately turned the conversation towards NGOs: 
 
The issue even for us here, we are struggling a bit for funding and stuff.  It becomes 
worse to them.  Even their struggle is getting manipulated by NGOs.  Even those 
NGOs that come to fund them, they want them to deal with their [the NGO’s] issues 
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so that they can ask [for] more funding for their operation, different from what [the 
rural people] asked funding for. 
                
This can lead to people ‘forgetting their struggles’ through constant interaction with an NGO 
that focuses on specific local issues that can divert attention from other local problems or from 
problems that are not limited to the local area or people but which are not conceived of or 
treated in broad terms by NGOs.  ‘Dependence’, in this analysis, can make people ‘lose focus 
of the actual struggle’. 
     UPM has a different relationship with NGOs than RPM does, and maintains greater 
autonomy although it is often dependent on NGO funding for paying rent for its offices and 
other practical expenses (for which, currently, it is unfunded).  Still, UPM has dealt with several 
different NGOs and funders during its existence.  A young woman in UPM explained: 
 
It can tend to be not good for social movements to work with NGOs because NGOs 
tend to control social movements.  They want them to do their work.  They have terms 
[….].  You go this certain way […].  If the UPM wants to help someone, then if the 
NGO does not okay that, then the social movement will not be involved with that kind 
of person.  So I think that NGOs should not be working with social movements.  They 
should just let them be. 
 
Although RPM were formed by an NGO, Masifunde (Helliker 2013, 323), they are conscious 
of the situation that this creates, and often spoke of the ways in which NGOs ‘dictate’ to 
movements.  While acknowledging the utility of the relationship, the words of one RPM 
member clarify the issue of autonomy, and exactly how NGO relationships can impinge upon 
movement independence and decision making: 
 
Because the RPM for example has no funds [without NGOs], it’s hard to do something 
that is outside of the programs for example of Masifunde.  So we have to bow there for 
the money.  So they will control what must be done and how it should be.  But then, on 
the other side…well, they do help because the programs we do are similar. 
[Interpreter’s translation] 
             
This sort of imposition has directly affected the relationship between UPM and RPM in 
different and contradictory ways.  As one member of RPM explained:  
              
Initially when we talked about this we were of the idea [that] we should probably meet 
with UPM and build one movement.  Of course that would be in talks and talks and 
suggestions, and see where it goes.  But when the NGO [unspecified] came they 
imposed, ‘No, it’s fine.  This should be RPM and this should be UPM but you should 
find ways to connect in terms of the struggles only’. 
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However, an NGO-led initiative called Inyanda has attempted to bring both UPM and RPM 
under its umbrella along with other Eastern Cape movements in rural areas and in 
Kingwilliamstown.  The understanding by many people was that this is indicative of self-
serving NGOs rather than legitimate attempts to create large-scale movements.9  One RPM 
member said that this sort of ‘enforced’ relationship between urban and rural movements, in 
which NGOs decide that unity is needed and then force ‘these movements to work together and 
also to work in a certain way’ are not viable—‘You can’t enforce it.  It has to run smoothly’. 
     It was a young UPM member who spoke most strongly against the influence of NGOs, 
emphasising their need for funding even to the point that they ‘make money through the 
communities’ problems’, saying that they are ‘like municipalities’, and characterising the 
NGO-social movement relationship as ‘abusive’.  
 
I’m no longer interested in going to workshops or going to those kind of meetings.  I 
believe that [NGOs] only want to get our ideas and then implement them in their own 
ways […].  They only force ideas to the people, and make the people to believe that this 
is the only way that this thing will be able to work.  Even here in Masifunde10[…] they 
ask you for ideas, and then they already know what they are going to do. They ask us 
to be creative and come up with ideas. But when we did come up with ideas, it was only 
after that that [we heard], ‘We already have a plan’. 
 
Her summary was that NGOs ‘use and abuse’ social movements in order to fulfill their need 
for funding.  This was a view shared by many people.  Another woman said, ‘NGOs are like 
capitalists. They survive by sucking the blood of social movements’, and she agreed with others 
that they could be a factor in keeping social movements apart. 
     In a particularly memorable moment during one interview, the UPM member I was 
interviewing called for another man, a UPM member as well, to join us.  He was asked, had he 
eaten today?  No, he had not.  Did he come early to the office?  At eight in the morning.  How 
long had he been there?  ‘Just look now’, he answered, indicating his watch.  It was five in the 
evening.  This brief exchange was meant to illustrate for me the differences between the daily 
workings of social movements and NGOs: how they operate and the circumstances in which 
they operate.  As one activist put this, more analytically: 
              
9 The Inyanda (United) National Land Movement is a project of the Trust for Community Outreach and Education 
(TCOE), which features in the next chapter. 
10 While not affiliated with Masifunde in the official way of RPM, UPM do have an unofficial relationship with 
Masifunde perhaps similar to one between ‘neighbours’.  However, it appears unstable, but movement members 
were not particularly forthcoming about it because of the frequent closeness of people in RPM, UPM, and 
Masifunde.  If anything, this is indicative of NGOs causing tension or division in and between social movements. 
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Socially, everything happens day by day.  You can have your yearly plan, but here you 
must be easy to adapt to changes socially.  If you can’t be easy to adapt, it’s becoming 
a problem.  And NGOs like to make people administrators of the struggle, rather than 
the action doers. They like to take those people who are in the forefront, to take them 
to the administration part of the struggle.  They take them. 
 
 
Now we will turn to the other dynamic which came up as potentially divisive: party politics.  
Kirk Helliker compares the relationship of movements and NGOs with those of movements 
with political parties.  He writes of the ‘[w]ariness on the part of rural movements with regard 
to political parties (and the state broadly) because of the possible ensuing incorporation into – 
and subordination to – the representative politics of the state’ (2013, 319).  The imposing role 
of NGOs mirrors the relationship that community members, including those involved in social 
movements, might have with the state through participation in electoral politics. 
     As mentioned, UPM and RPM are not political parties, nor are they aligned with any 
political parties, although their members are allowed to and sometimes do participate in 
electoral politics or have party affiliations.  An explanation of this was similar in some ways to 
the moment just recounted from the UPM office.  ‘For example’, said a member of UPM, ‘I 
am a member of AZAPO’: 
 
As a political party […] you want to help people who have the membership of your 
party.  Most of the time they are the priority.  But with [a] social movement, […] every 
social issue is a priority, even if you are not a member.  For example, UPM buried 
many people out of fundraising for them, which no political party did before, if you are 
not a member. Even the councillors who get salaries […] they were not doing that. 
 
Members of both movements explained that party affiliations are at least intended not to create 
conflicts within the movement, either for or between individuals, but that this did not always 
happen.  It is perhaps best captured by a woman in RPM who combined the point with some 
of the problems caused by community organising in a space of party politics:    
 
When you enter these houses, going house to house signing people up [for RPM], 
carrying your papers, when you enter there, it is difficult for people to join RPM even 
though it was explained to them that it was an organisation for ‘upliftment’ and it is 
not going to snatch someone’s cap and it is not going to snatch their organisation that 
they [are part of].  But it doesn’t [come across] well, which is why I’m saying that 
there’s a need for other people—maybe people that aren’t us, or maybe we plus other 
people can explain properly that RPM is an organisation for ‘upliftment’ and is not a 
political party and we are not politicking.  If you are part of the ANC you are going to 
stay a part of your ANC.11 
11 Xa ungena kewzizindlu ungena umzi nomzi mos uyajoyinisa uphethe amaphepha wakho xa ufika phayana 
abantu kunzima ukujoyina iRPM nangona babeyicaciselwe iRPM bayiva ukuba ngumbhuto wophuhliso 
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Even within the movement, party politics present a challenge to unity and to political action.  
One man in RPM talked about how this occurs, when a member might see his or her political 
party as the object of criticism: 
 
And they don’t want to toyi-toyi12 against their organisation.  Let’s call it ‘political 
application’, because if a person let’s say maybe he’s [sic] in a high position of the 
ANC [he] won’t want to go forward to the municipality and toyi-toyi against [his] 
organisation.13 
 
They had also experienced councillors claiming that RPM was a political party in order to 
confuse community members and keep the movement small because the councillors ‘did not 
want people to challenge their positions’.  
     Similarly, a woman in UPM explained that more significant than NGOS in creating 
divisions in social movements were political parties, for reasons much like those just cited by 
RPM members.  She also reminded me that political parties, and she singled out the ANC, do 
not like social movements because they change the consciousness of people who then might 
challenge politicians and parties.  It was therefore a priority for politicians and parties to make 
sure that they ‘deal with the movements separately [interpreter’s translation]’.  
     Curiously, although members of both movements spoke strongly about how their 
movements are non-aligned and non-discriminatory of membership in regard to party politics, 
and both talked about how such politics can trouble their attempts at mobilisation, party politics 
came up as a specific problem between the movements, as well.  Indeed, one woman in UPM 
identified party politics as the ‘biggest challenge’ to cooperation between UPM and RPM.  She 
said that the ‘extent of the relationship [between UPM and RPM] is only for joining together 
in marches’.  When asked why, she elaborated on the role of party politics, making a point that 
came up repeatedly in interviews with members of UPM.  The problem, she said, arose 
‘because some of the members of the RPM belong to the ANC, I’ll put it that way, and then 
we as the UPM we have members who are members of some political parties’.  She then 
ayizoxutha ikepusi zakhe ayizoxutha mbutho wakhe anawo. But ayingeni kakuhle la nto le ndithi iyafuneka kukhe 
kuphindwe kukhe kuze mhlawambi abantu abangesithi of nathi plus nabanye abantu abazakubacacisela kakuhle 
hle ukuba iRPM ke ngombutho wozophuhliso ayingombutho wapolitiki awupolitiki.  Ukuba uyi-ANC 
uzakahlahla uyila ANC yakho. 
12 Protest 
13 And abafuni uku-toyitoyela umbutho wabo.  Sithi “political application,” because ukuba umntu let’s say 
mhlawumbi he’s a ukusikhundla esiphezulu se-ANC abazufuna ukuyaphambili kwamasipalati ayo-toyitoyela 
umbutho wakhe. 
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reiterated the point, in almost the same words as the RPM member above, that the social 
movements are not parties and members are allowed to keep their party loyalties: 
 
[A]s the UPM we always say that when we come to the office, leave your party cap 
outside, and when you come to the UPM you are the UPM only, even though you belong 
to the ANC or [another party].  
 
Her understanding was that RPM was different, and that this created division between the two 
movements, going so far as to say that they ‘don’t want to work as a collective’: 
 
The RPM, I think to them because they think that the UPM is fighting with [against] 
the ANC—but the UPM is not fighting with the ANC, the UPM is only fighting for what 
rightfully belongs to the community, that’s all—so to them they believe that UPM is 
fighting with the ANC. 
              
This was a statement peculiar to UPM members speaking about RPM.  Three made the point 
explicitly.  While their understanding of the situation is intimate and should be accepted as 
sincere, it remains that RPM members were also willing to question the ANC or ANC 
affiliations, as we have seen.  This suggests broad internal divisions on the issue of political 
parties as well as contradictions in the way both UPM and RPM are able to address party 
affiliations.  The basic and important point that needs to be taken forward is that political parties 
came up as a dividing force and in complex ways. 
     One man in UPM, whom we heard speak on the issue of suffering above, historicised the 
situation, saying that the problem of disunity began when the ANC became the ruling party in 
1994, before which the ANC had been part of the struggle against apartheid and more united 
with other parties and movements.14  It was the formation of the ANC government which led 
to a situation in which the ‘other political parties made decisions [that] they have to fight’ with 
the ANC.  He understood the role of UPM as ‘to show that there are still other things we’re 
supposed to fight about’ than merely the contestation of elections and state control.  His account 
complements another member’s assertion that ‘People are coming to get help from the UPM 
[because] the political parties have failed’. These form an important statement on politics and 
the politics of UPM (in particular) and social movements more generally: that they have a role 
or responsibility to be political in ways that parties are not.  This is an important point which 
will be taken up in the conclusion. 
14 Although even this is complicated by anecdotes about tensions between the ANC and the Azanian People’s 
Organisation (AZAPO) during the 1980s. 
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     The sense of the various and related themes brought up and statements made by members 
of UPM and RPM seems to be captured in the words of one RPM member who said:  
 
The party politics or the formal politics will always create these cleavages […].  We 
should sometimes forget about party politics because they will always separate the 
movements. 
               
Julian Brown (2015) has looked at the way some other social movements have engaged with 
electoral and party politics with various and difficult to measure results.  While choosing this 
avenue enables the elections to be contested and shifts the politics within elections, it can also 
have consequences of demobilisation, cooptation, and the necessity to formalise a movement’s 
structure and organisation in ways that fundamentally change a movement (117-119).  Brown 
recounts Abahlali baseMjondolo’s shift from a ‘no vote’ stance to support for the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) in KwaZulu-Natal in 2014, observing that this resulted in tensions and conflicts 
within the movement and between Abahlali and other movements (2015, 120-121), which is a 
consequence consistent with what UPM and RPM activists have argued in relation to party 
politics.  UPM and RPM have not taken this route, as we know.  Still, the issue of engagement 
with formal political structures is one to which we will return in the conclusion.  
  
Interior Horizons 
  
The interior horizon of a politics or political movement is more fluid than its practical scope or 
the objective issues for or on which it works; it is both driven by and limited by these practical 
experiences, encompasses their contradictions, and yet contains the possibility of thinking 
beyond them.  Therefore, the shape and scope of the interior horizon is harder to define and 
measure.  As Aguilar, from whom the ‘interior horizon’ strategy is borrowed, writes, the 
measuring of this horizon is ‘primarily’ accomplished through ‘collective acts’, and is worked 
out in the formation of distinct political subjectivities (2014, xx; xxiv).  It is important to 
remember also that this process is historical, and history, which has occupied much time here, 
is also useful in demarcating the span of political horizons.  Like Aguilar, Raúl Zibechi writes 
about Bolivia, but his argument is just as pertinent in a South African context.  ‘A kind of 
epistemological earthquake occurs’, Zibechi writes, ‘when those who have occupied the depths 
of society for centuries—Indians and women, etc.—emerge as subjects, which calls into 
question the subject/object relationship, one of the most pernicious legacies of colonialism’ 
(2010, 83).  Indeed, this ‘epistemological earthquake’, the potential for its happening, sits at 
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the very heart of the questions that motivated this research.  The specific subjectivity 
interrogated here is of those people whom historical processes have rendered excluded, but 
who understand their historical role as working towards an inclusive future through struggle 
against the problems of the present.   
     In this dialogue between UPM and RPM, the simplest responses to questions about 
cooperation, about linking struggles, about the relationship between urban and rural struggles 
and movements will provide a starting point from which the complexity of an interior horizon 
or horizons can be elaborated.  In the words of some of the activists: ‘We are fighting together’ 
[UPM]; ‘Yes, the struggle is one’ [RPM]; and, beginning to entertain an analysis, ‘Struggles 
must connect at the end of the day.  They are all the struggle of exclusion’ [UPM].  In these 
words, on a most basic level, there is a political commitment that does not limit itself to an 
urban or rural context, or to a political context in which urban and rural are necessarily divided.  
As one person said, ‘When the hammer of oppression falls, we will all be counted under that 
hammer’.  This politics is given form in terms of the practical scope, especially the similarity 
of problems and experiences faced by UPM and RPM members.  When asked whether 
movements in town and in rural areas should link up, one RPM member responded: 
 
Yes, it is necessary as the struggles are very related. [We share] a similar struggle for 
water, sanitation, housing, because housing is as bad in the rural areas as it is in the 
town.  That is why you find that when the UPM does marches the RPM goes and support 
and vice versa. [Interpreter’s translation] 
 
     The understanding of some was that the movements could work in their areas and remain 
different movements while also working together when the issues were shared.  The most 
definite expression of this opinion made reference to the NGO-led Inyanda project and the lack 
of autonomy in this ‘unity’.  If unity should emerge, it should be unity brought about by the 
social movements themselves, not under any ‘umbrella’, in this view.  This idea of keeping 
movement identity was also associated sometimes with the idea that, at times, issues that should 
be taken up in common were not, because of too much focus on one problem or another that 
did not create room for cooperation.  Land was among these.  Although the specific issue of 
land had come up in two interviews as a potentially divisive issue because of the way that RPM 
focused on land, it was a member of UPM who pointed out that ‘we all need land, even here in 
town’, and she was later supported by a member of RPM who said, ‘The issue of land is not 
only for the rural areas. People even in the cities they need houses, they need land for their 
houses, for cattle, all those things we ignore’.  He said this while making the point that 
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movements should aspire to constitute ‘a mass struggle for social change’ that could effect the 
‘transformation of society’.  Quite clearly, speaking with members of both movements, 
whatever specific problems they tackled or political contradictions developed in the process, 
they expressed a desire—importantly, a desire couched in political terms—that South African 
society could be changed for everyone, not just for their members, not just in their area, and 
not only on the issues which defined their struggle.  Again, this demonstrates a politics that 
does not limit itself to urban and rural spaces but has an expansive horizon.  Even though this 
politics is usually manifested in marches and solidarity, it is very much present in the thoughts 
of the people involved in the movements, and motivates their involvement in collective actions. 
     An RPM member spoke on the importance of mobilising people to make viable connections 
among different rural struggles, while one UPM activist considered the possibility of expanding 
UPM outside of Grahamstown to nearby villages where it could ‘work closely with RPM’ to 
increase membership.  Pressed on this point, on why it had not happened, the same person said, 
‘It hasn’t happened because we just focused on the problems that are here. We didn’t look 
outside of Grahamstown. That’s why it hasn’t expanded yet’.  How important is it to make 
links to other social movements? I asked one UPM activist.  ‘Very, very, very important’, he 
said, and then corrected me, moving the conversation beyond ‘social movements’: 
 
Actually even communities themselves, even neighbours, community is so much 
important. […] So if you are believing in the kind of struggle we’re in, you need that 
kind of community […].  I so much believe in unity.  I so much believe in unity. 
Working together—you know even as a family, doing things together is better. 
 
     The idea of space and the influences of space often crept into conversations with UPM and 
RPM members when discussing this question of how the movements could go forward in their 
struggles.  The same UPM member who envisioned a closer relationship with RPM also 
observed spatial politics at play in Grahamstown.  She believes that UPM focuses too much of 
its attention on ‘town’, as opposed to the township: 
 
I think that UPM can get more members if they go to the communities and have some 
of the events that they always have at Rhodes in the community so that people can see 
UPM, it can be visible to people.  Because if everything that the UPM does is done in 
town then the people can’t see that, because not everyone is always in town, so if the 
UPM can like move from here in town to the location and be more involved in the 
location than they can get new members. 
 
So far we have discussed UPM as located in a particular space, the township, the excluded 
zone, or the ‘extensions of society’—a pregnant phrase in the view of history.  Further 
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discussion around the ideas raised by this UPM member—how UPM might inscribe, modify, 
or, still, potentially challenge the urban spatial divisions we have seen carved onto 
Grahamstown since its founding—will be taken up in Chapter 5.  What is significant in the 
words of this activist is the fact that strengthening the movement, in her view, requires a shift 
in spatial logic and activity, which in turn signifies a shift in politics. 
     Similar ideas came out from the RPM interviews.  One member spoke about the decline in 
member numbers and what the cause of that might be and how it might be rectified:   
 
As a social movement you should also focus on the social contradictions if you want to 
change society […].  You should not only focus on the parliamentary politics […].  You 
should bring something new to the people.  I guess that’s why you find that the numbers 
have decreased because not all people are interested in that type of politics, but I 
believe everyone can play a crucial role.  But we’ve ignored that space. 
 
His reference to the formal sphere of politics as a separate ‘space’ from that in which ‘everyone’ 
can play a role is an important point in terms of the inquiry here as well as an important political 
point.  It shares with the argument made by the UPM member the spatial aspect of politics, and 
in particular a politics that will change society to become more inclusive.  ‘Social 
contradictions’ this activist says, including the division between urban and rural politics, can 
be worked out in ‘people’s spaces’:  
 
We tend to ignore the spaces used by the people.  We only focused on the politics as in 
the parliamentary politics […]. We ignore a lot these spaces used by the people, the 
cultural spaces, the music spaces […]. Those spaces are […] very important and it 
would be easy to build links […] or find cracks to build links along—across the whole 
world if we [were] able to use those spaces. 
 
Such creative conceptions of how politics and space could reshaped were more often (though 
definitely not exclusively) held by younger members of the two movements, who, far from 
being naïve, were able to at once note and accept the ‘social contradictions’ of their experience 
and to move beyond them.  However, members of all ages conveyed ideas around these 
‘people’s spaces’, even if they did not use the word.  Indeed, if we look back to the reasons for 
which the movements were started, to constitute alternative, ‘dissenting’ political movements 
from ‘outside’ and from the ‘bottom’, ‘up’, then the politics of space has been present 
throughout the discussion, both in thought and in the lived, historical experience of the people 
of UPM and RPM.  It is an experience also laden with historical contradictions that complicate 
the very idea of ‘people’s spaces’ and the ways with and boundaries within which the 
movements are able to work.  If one person’s words provided a concise, political, and forward-
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looking synopsis of what could be a shared interior horizon, it is one woman from UPM who 
spoke of broadening the meaning of community and in doing so, challenging the political forces 
of division which act upon the world of her experience.  She communicated this eloquently: 
 
We would be speaking with one voice, and there would be no dictators within us. It 
would be us facing our experiences.  If we become just a community, and share our 
own experiences, and find a way of dealing with them.  
 
In these words are an aspiration to unity, an assertion of the necessity of autonomy, the 
centering of the knowledge that stems from experience, the importance of community in 
making struggles around those experiences, and the hope of employing these principles and 
strengths towards a project of self-reflective collective action.  This review of UPM and RPM 
members’ words can be situated in the broader discussion of space with a question: How would 
the ‘modalities’ of such politics, to refer to the quotation from Lefebvre above, be significant 
in the production of political spaces while acting through and being acted upon by the spatial 
divisions produced through other modalities? 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONTESTED SPACES & CONTESTED CITIZENSHIPS IN GRAHAMSTOWN 
 
‘Class, gender, and racial distinctions made possible the actual practice, if not the formal 
idea, of “degrees of citizenship”, whereby some come to possess greater claims to being part 
of the nation than others, and others are often close to being foreigners or largely “rightless” 
because politically weak and marginalized.’ – Michael Neocosmos in From ‘Foreign Natives’ 
to ‘Native Foreigners’ (2006, 72). 
 
 
During October 2015, the last month of this research, South Africa and Grahamstown were the 
sites of massive political mobilisations in which race, space, and citizenship were deeply 
implicated and experienced.  Student protests against university fees and other issues such as 
the outsourcing of university support staff were staged across South Africa in what became a 
partially coordinated national struggle with local variation and diverse movements.  In 
Grahamstown, this coincided with the mobilisation of xenophobic violence in the city.  While 
the specific reasons informing and motivating these political actions have not been the focus 
of this thesis, and the ways in which race, space, and citizenship factored are somewhat 
different in their particulars than what has been examined here, still it would be improper 
scholarship to conclude a study of contemporary politics in and around Grahamstown without 
mentioning the most intense weeks of politics experienced there during the course of the 
research.  In the period of some ten days, these two distinct but not unrelated sequences of 
political events changed the shape of Grahamstown’s politics while also exhibiting continuity 
with the long history of politics in Grahamstown.   
     Because the events recounted here are limited, for the most part, to the actual town of 
Grahamstown, UPM were intimately affected and involved, while RPM were involved only 
occasionally.  Therefore, like Chapter 2, this chapter focuses very closely on town with 
reference to rural areas when it is appropriate.  The politics of space around both the student 
protests and the xenophobic violence will be explored with attention to the role that UPM 
played during both events.   
 
On Monday, 19 October, Rhodes University was blockaded and shut down by students joining 
in a countrywide series of protests against the scheduled increase of what are, for some, already 
unaffordable fees for tertiary education.  The students were also motivated by what has been 
called ‘decolonisation’ of higher education and by the disadvantaged access to universities 
faced by especially working-class, black students that had been the subject of more localised 
struggles beginning in March and continuing during the year (Naicker 2015).  From the start 
of political activity by students at Rhodes in March, UPM had been involved and offered 
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support, which usually took the form of UPM’s participation in marches and of informal 
discussions with student activists.  Some members of UPM were also members of the most 
prominent group of political students, the Black Student Movement (BSM), for much of the 
year.  In general, UPM, and, to a lesser degree, BSM, viewed collaboration as a necessary part 
of their programs, explained through a discourse of uniting student and community struggles.  
Rhodes University’s site at the extreme western end of Grahamstown emphasises its elite-ness, 
its inaccessibility, and its distance from the black and poor township in the east.  The one UPM 
member who mentioned Rhodes in the last chapter spoke of it as distant from the community 
but also suggested that a connection between UPM and BSM would be an important link to 
make.  The student movement’s links with UPM differed from other times that people in the 
western end of town had associated with UPM: for instance, the August 2014 protest, when 
some (non-organised) students and suburban Grahamstown residents joined UPM outside City 
Hall.1  Their participation was motivated by a city-wide water shortage, and not by solidarity 
for UPM or the other issues faced by township residents.  There remained a spatial (and largely 
racial and class-based) political distinction between participants from the township and the 
‘town’.  When asked whether this participation should be viewed positively or not, the same 
UPM member explained: 
 
No, it wasn’t a good thing, because they only started getting involved with the 
community when they were affected. Why can’t they always get connected to the 
community [...]?  They only were there because they were affected by the water 
shortage.  When they are not affected they do not want to be part of it. 
 
     A different approach was apparent at times in the relationship between UPM and BSM.  
Rather than inscribed, Grahamstown’s spatial divisions were sometimes challenged through 
this political relationship.  For instance, BSM and UPM planned a joint march from Fingo 
Square (in the old ‘Fingo Location’) to Rhodes on 28 May 2015 under the banner ‘Decolonise 
this Institution’ in order to highlight the colonial character of Grahamstown and the university’s 
position in it.  Although miscommunications resulted in only a small number of UPM members 
participating in this march, the BSM, joined en route by some members of the community, 
undertook the march and its fundamental politics were still performed. 
     When the BSM began protest action in earnest in late August, UPM members continued to 
be involved. Their involvement was possible because of their urban location; some members 
of RPM showed interest in BSM, but did not participate in their protests or meetings.  
1 See Introduction. 
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Demanding a long term solution to the university’s short vacation accommodation problem2, 
BSM began an occupation of the university’s Council Chambers in the Main Administration 
Building on 26 August which lasted for over a month, and, on many days, UPM members 
participated in the occupation.  The occupation was a contestation of space in multiple ways.  
Students occupied the symbolic decision-making chambers of the university (which the 
university was keen to end), and they ‘redecorated’ it with black-and-white pictures of 
important black and African revolutionaries, thinkers, artists, and militants.  However, the 
participation of UPM brought a different dimension to the occupation, in which community 
members accessed the (in this case, literal) ‘ivory tower’, named after a British imperialist 
whose exploitation of South/ern African people had involved their separation from the land 
and an important moment in their ‘coercion in space’.3  The student struggle, which had begun 
with objectives of improving the experience of working-class, black students at Rhodes as well 
as of making the university more accessible to working-class, black students is an important 
one in Grahamstown, where high school matriculation rates (except at the expensive, elite high 
schools) are extremely low (Westaway 2015), and very few local students attend the university 
which is within walking distance of their homes.  The opportunities for solidarity between 
students and UPM, and, in the beginning of September, for unity among the student movement, 
UPM, and National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU) members who 
work at Rhodes and mostly live in Grahamstown’s township were clear, though such solidarity 
has not been fully realised.  Nonetheless, when the national student protests began, UPM 
members once again joined the students at Rhodes.4 
     Let us return to Monday, 19 October.  Members of UPM participated in the student protests 
at Rhodes and EMC that day, because the issues of class, race, and access to education were as 
much theirs as they were the students’.  A few hours after the protest at Rhodes began in the 
early hours of the morning, students from Rhodes marched to nearby Eastcape Midlands 
College (EMC) to show solidarity with EMC students whose protest beginning on Friday had 
2 Beginning in March, BSM had been critical of the university’s policy of requiring students to leave during the 
two short vacations each year or to pay an expensive fee to remain in residences.  The costs of travel or the 
residence fees were a constant source of financial hardship for some students and their families: just one way in 
which the university was exclusionary of poor or working-class students, the majority of whom are black.  The 
occupation ended in an important if negotiated success for the students. 
3 Cecil Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony when the Glen Grey Act (1894) was passed, which was 
one of the many Acts to affect detrimentally African people’s relationship to the land, the economy, and to limit 
their involvement in the colony’s politics.  He was also a capitalist whose mining ventures accelerated the 
exploitation of African labour.  Indeed, changing the name of the university is among BSM’s and other political 
students’ objectives. 
4 Firsthand account  
 
                                                 
111 
 
been met with police violence.  Solidarity was extended because the students at Rhodes, who 
had burned tires and blocked roads just the same as the students from the college, had not been 
met with aggression from the police.  The issues of race and space were certainly at play: 
Rhodes is an elite and formerly all-white university, with a relatively diverse student body, 
while EMC’s student body is mostly black and located in a wealthy neigbourhood of 
Grahamstown.  The assumed criminality of black people in ‘white town’ mimicked the logic 
whetted during colonialism and systematised under apartheid.5 Shortly after the Rhodes 
marchers arrived at EMC, students from both institutions were dispersed with stun grenades.  
The protesters returned to Rhodes to regroup, and in the mid-afternoon marched back to EMC.  
After an hour, SAPS ordered the students to disperse, which they refused to do until five 
o’clock.  SAPS then scattered them by force, deploying more stun grenades and a mobile water 
cannon.  A mass meeting organised at Rhodes in the evening included members of UPM. 
     Rhodes University remained closed for the duration of the week while nationally the scale 
and scope of both the student protests and their repression intensified.  In addition to the 
rebellion against structural oppression through class and race, the question of citizenship 
remained at the core of the protests posed in the forms of who had a right to the higher education 
institutions of South Africa and who had a right to determine the content and future of higher 
education in South Africa.  At Rhodes, the students demanded that the levy for foreign students 
be reconsidered and standardised across the country’s universities.  As part of the national 
demonstrations, on Wednesday, 21 October, Rhodes students and staff marched through town, 
taking a route passed EMC.  Police had issued a permit for this march, and monitored its 
progress.6 
 
However, while the students marched on Wednesday, another protest by the taxi drivers’ 
associations in Grahamstown had initiated violence in town.  When the mayor failed to meet 
with the protesting taxi drivers, who had delivered a petition bringing attention to the terrible 
state of Grahamstown’s roads and the rise of violent crime, they turned their frustration against 
‘foreign’-owned shops or ‘spaza shops’ owned by Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Somali, and 
Ethiopian residents of Grahamstown.  It was a premeditated move.  Some of the taxis taking 
part in the protest had xenophobic slogans painted on them, and a crowd was mobilised by the 
taxi drivers to attack and loot the shops, beginning in Bathurst Street not far from the centre of 
5 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
6 Firsthand account 
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town and then proceeding into the township.  The xenophobic violence was legitimated by the 
looters on the basis of rumours that a ‘foreigner’—an ‘Arab’, a ‘man with a beard’—had killed 
and mutilated several women in recent months; rumours which SAPS in Grahamstown had 
done nothing to dispel in spite of repeated warnings by UPM members and other Grahamstown 
residents that they could result in violence (Unemployed People’s Movement 2015).   
     For almost a week, looting, destruction of property, and threats continued against shops and 
shop owners, and the attacks came to target shop owners from Malawi, Palestine, Senegal, 
Nigeria, China, Sudan, Egypt, Ghana, and Zimbabwe.  Some three hundred shops were looted 
and several hundred people were displaced.  This violence differed from earlier instances of 
xenophobic mobilisation in South Africa, for example in May 2008 April 20157, in that only 
two people were injured and the ‘foreigners’ under attack were mostly defined as Muslim rather 
than as ‘other African’. 
     Xenophobia as a feature of politics is not new in Grahamstown, and the history of space, 
race, and citizenship which has been developed through the first three chapters of this thesis 
shows moments and modes of xenophobic politics in the town itself.  Indeed, the history of 
Grahamstown’s differentiated spatial politics has threads of xenophobia running through it 
from the beginning.  A brief review is useful, here.  As we have seen, the voluntary arrival and 
forced relocation of Africans to the immediate Grahamstown area during the 1830s and 1840s, 
spurred the colonial government’s decision to set up the first official African ‘locations’ in 
Grahamstown.  These were days when Africans were counted as ‘foreigners’ in the Cape 
Colony.  Through the latter half of the nineteenth century, fear and suspicion of Africans 
arriving in Grahamstown from further east on the advancing colonial frontier, inflected the 
particular racism of the town and region. In this xenophobic view, in which to be African was 
to live perpetually on the edge of criminality, to be ‘more African’, from the rural frontier, was 
even worse.8 
     In Chapter 2, we saw that a great fear of both the unemployed and of ‘vagrants’ or ‘illegal 
inhabitants’, which often referred to African people from rural areas, was prevalent at the turn 
of the twentieth century, driven by the town’s white population and working through the police.    
We also saw that the criminalisation of brewing of sorghum beer was strongly linked to racist 
and xenophobic perceptions of ‘African-ness’9.  A properly historicised account of xenophobia 
7 Neocosmos’s study of xenophobia as a political discourse in South Africa shows that it has been a problem since 
the transition to democracy in 1994 (2006a, 1). 
8 See Chapter 1 and O’Halloran (2015c). 
9 See Chapter 2. 
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in South Africa that draws on such local examples would be valuable in analysing the politics 
of today.  Here, we should note the overtones of urban and rural that worked in the early 
movements of xenophobic politics in the example of Grahamstown, the ways in which race 
and ‘foreign-ness’ are intertwined today, and the possibility that this discourse, originally 
levelled against inhabitants of Grahamstown’s locations, could have been internalised by their 
descendents.  As mentioned, Grahamstown’s particular xenophobic politics did not target 
‘African-ness’, but rather was Islamophobic in nature.  The modes of xenophobia are not the 
precisely the same as in the past, but the spatial divisions through which they operated are not 
lost, either.  In South Africa more broadly, xenophobic violence and politics have retained 
much of their racialised character. 
     In April 2015, xenophobic attacks in Durban targeted foreign-born Africans, particularly 
Congolese people, as well as people from the Eastern Cape (imagined as rural) living in 
informal settlements.  To be poor and African—the ‘more African’, the worse—were the 
criteria for victimisation.  When members of Abahlali baseMjondolo organised a (legal) anti-
xenophobia march, it was violently prevented by police.  Abahlali baseMjondolo identified the 
police, the ruling party, and local taxi drivers as supporters and instigators of xenophobic 
violence in Durban (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2015a). 
     Shortly afterwards, beginning in July 2015, Operation Fiela deployed SAPS and army units 
to combat crime by rounding up ‘foreigners’ and other ‘illegal inhabitants’, including people 
who are part of land occupations around the country.  Poor people, Africans from other 
countries, and Africans living in informal settlements are targeted.  The same understanding 
that the authorities employed over a century ago in Grahamstown, which views ‘illegal 
inhabitants’ (foreigners) and ‘unemployed people’ as problems, which led The Grahamstown 
Journal to observer in 1908 the ‘regular crusade’ against ‘squatters and vagrants’, is at work 
today.  It legitimates, as it did in colonial Grahamstown, various forms of prejudicial politics 
and violence. It also emphasises the notion that poverty signals non-belonging, or, alternately, 
that poverty breeds violence, both of which conceptions involve spatial assumptions, being 
largely aimed at township residents. 
     As in Durban, local politicians and businesses are implicated in Grahamstown’s xenophobic 
politics.  At a meeting convened by Makana Municipality at City Hall on Friday, 23 October, 
the Mayor, Acting Municipal Manager, and Speaker asserted that the municipality and SAPS 
would handle the situation but did not then proceed in subsequent days to ameliorate either the 
political situation or the emergency needs of the affected people.  No SAPS representative 
attended the meeting, and a Democratic Alliance (DA) ward councillor expressed her belief, 
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highly enabling of xenophobic action, that when the ‘foreigners’ came back, they should have 
fewer shops.10   The night before, community members had been present when an ANC 
councillor had addressed a crowd, informing the people that the foreigners would go 
(O’Halloran 2015b).  Grahamstown’s taxi associations actively instigated and supported the 
looting by bearing xenophobic slogans and transporting looters for free, according to 
community members. 
     Also like in Durban earlier in the year, and, indeed, in Grahamstown in the past, the police 
have had a central role (Mba 2015).  Inexplicably, SAPS have claimed that their ‘restoration 
of order’ and ‘support’ of the ‘foreigners’ after the week of looting was a success for Operation 
Fiela (IOLnews 2015).  In contrast to this narrative, Grahamstown shop owners affected by the 
looting as well as members of UPM have recounted police behaviours that ranged from 
indifference, to laughing at people whose shops were being looted, to facilitation of and 
participation in the looting.  In addition to their failure to respond to the Grahamstown 
community’s fears and warnings, the immediate aggression exercised against students by 
SAPS at EMC contrasted sharply with instances on Wednesday in which police allowed people 
to loot shops; and, despite many arrests, the contrast between policing in the township (for 
township residents) and in the wealthy quarters (against young black people) shows a stark 
spatial divide (O’Halloran 2015a).  Indeed, the spatial division of Grahamstown was glaring. 
The police line strung across Beaufort street, declaring and dividing with yellow tape and rifle-
bearing officers the zones in which looting would be tolerated and would not be—the township, 
and the ‘town’—was reminiscent of the logic of crime, criminality, and control of earlier 
Grahamstown.11  Southey’s depiction of events in 1917, when the white town was ‘thoroughly 
picketed’ against the ‘unrest’ in the township, is worth recalling (in 1984, 247). 
 
Members of UPM protected shops under attack in the first hours of the xenophobic crisis, and 
worked over the following days to try to end the violence and looting.  In the emergency 
meetings convened by UPM after the onset of the xenophobic looting and destruction, members 
of both UPM and RPM were present and affirmed the right of the shop owners to live and trade 
in South Africa and Grahamstown, not as foreigners who had the appropriate documentation 
but as community members who, in both their countries of origin and in South Africa, had to 
confront the same exclusions as the locally- and South African-born people. 
10 Firsthand account 
11 See Chapter 2. 
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.  In an interview exactly two weeks before the beginning of the xenophobic crisis in 
Grahamstown, a UPM member brought spatial arguments into our discussion of the political 
situation that eventually produced the crisis.  This conversation warrants quoting at length. 
 
For example now in the location people are in fear [...]. There is this fear of the crime 
growing.  There [is] this new thing that it is said to be happening, of taking peoples 
parts, killing, murdering people.  And people came to us with that.  Even during the 
march, [a UPM activist] was called aside by women who were saying, ‘No, no, we 
don’t want you talking with the municipality only, we have this burning issue because 
we are living in fear in our communities’.  We went in a meeting with the [police] at 
the police station but we were sent to the police station in Joza. When [there was] a 
report back to those women, they suggested that there should be a march that goes 
there to the Joza police station.  
 
This matter of being sent to a different police station is significant.  As the man resumed: 
 
The [town] is divided into two.  Most of us after the river12 […], we’re supposed to do 
everything that needs involvement of police in Joza, then this [station] is in town.  So 
that’s why we couldn’t get tangible results here. 
     Apparently the things of the past, even after the 1994 change, core issues didn’t 
change. There is still black and white, because this one police station actually is like 
an extension of security of a white monopoly.  Whereby for example if there’s a break 
in or a robbery at Checker’s [grocery store in the CBD], they can be easy dealing with 
that.  [But] usually in the community, in the township, there are many cases they are 
dealing with—you know, differences between people, where there are fights and all 
those stuff—but in this side it’s more about financial problems, guarding the finance, 
the whole economical sense of it. It’s an individual economical [sic] sense, the break 
ins and such. 
 
The way people are treated at these police stations differs, as well.  In the Joza station, people 
wanting to open a case are usually required to produce a suspect, which is not the case at the 
other police station catering to the mostly white population.  The way the police responded 
before and during the xenophobic attacks is consistent with this this racial-spatial argument.  
As I have argued elsewhere, the police do not serve the township community—‘the’ 
community, in many people’s perceptions—but control it (O’Halloran 2015a). 
     When the affected women, calling themselves Voices of the Foreigners’ Wives, along with 
UPM, RPM, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and support from other local 
organisations, students, academics, and residents, organised a protest against xenophobia, 
crime, violence against women, and poor service delivery at City Hall on 30 October, the 
Mayor refused to accept their memorandum—a patent announcement, made uncountable times 
12 The river which divides the town roughly in half, east of which is the township.  It earned the name eGazini in 
the battle of 1819.  See Maclennan (1986). 
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in the history of Grahamstown, that only some residents enjoyed access to the protection and 
services of the formal authorities.  In the days before the march, as the municipality and police 
manoeuvred to prevent any public protest by the women, the mayor had told these women that 
she had ‘forgotten’ about them.  It requires little effort to proceed from this ‘forgetting’ to an 
invocation of the phrase ‘surplus people’ that was so fundamental to the project of exclusion 
in twentieth century South Africa. 
 
It is important to note that, like the historical exclusionary project, the events of October 
accentuate the importance of citizenship.  Following that, it is also crucial to remember that, 
historically, citizenship had spatial referents (at times determinants) and that particular forms 
of xenophobic and racist politics had spatial overtones, as well.  October’s events in 
Grahamstown evinced spatial politics and demarcated space in specific ways, as we have seen.  
These can be linked to the question of citizenship as it has appeared throughout this thesis. 
     In the words of UPM and RPM members, we saw that citizenship emerged through the 
language of rights—rights belonging to the community and rights claimed by the community 
from the government.  The discussion of service delivery, of service delivery as masking of 
politics but also as political in actuality, as well as the emphasis placed by members of both 
movements on ‘bottom-up’ politics and practises have made the question of citizenship an 
important one here.  We will continue to pursue the concept through the moment of the 
xenophobic attacks, on the first morning of which UPM and RPM convened a meeting in order 
to address the problems both politically and practically.  As one man of fifty years who lives 
in a shack on the outskirts of Grahamstown had said in our interview during calmer times, ‘But 
everybody, this is our country—everybody, no matter you are white, not matter you are black, 
no matter you are green, we are here in South Africa’.  This logic, put into clear practise during 
the crisis, demonstrates an open and egalitarian approach to the issue of citizenship, and a 
different definition practised by the state.13 During the looting, UPM, RPM, Masifunde, and 
other local organisations including the Makana branch of the EFF party mobilised to stop the 
attacks and to talk with community members about the struggle that the shop owners shared 
with them, no matter where they were born. 
13 Neocosmos writes, ‘Xenophobia emanates in society as a direct outcome of the hegemony of a state discourse 
of nation-building and human rights—in other words of citizenship….Xenophobia is a product of the parameters 
of this discourse and of the obscuring, subordination, or defeat of an alternative popular-democratic political 
discourse which had stressed a different understanding of citizenship and the nation’ (2006a, 21). 
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     In contrast to these actions and the politics behind them, the xenophobic Islamophobic 
violence that took place in Grahamstown in late October 2015 offered a different logic of 
citizenship: a closed and exclusionary approach conceived through narrow definitions of 
identity and belonging.  Though most of the ‘foreign’ shop owners who were attacked are South 
African citizens and most are married to South African women, they were considered by some 
to be outsiders who do not belong—who, whatever the official documentation might say, were 
not citizens of South Africa.  People were mobilised around this political logic, through and by 
local business and political interests, to drive ‘foreigners’ out of Grahamstown. 
     Analysing xenophobia in South Africa, Achille Mbembe has argued, with some melodrama: 
 
A mass of structurally disenfranchised people have the feeling of being treated as 
“foreigners” on their own land. Convinced that the doors of opportunity are closing, 
they are asking for firmer demarcations between “citizens” (those who belong) and 
“foreigners” (those who must be excluded).  They are convinced that as the doors of 
opportunity keep closing, those who won’t be able to “get in” right now might be left 
out for generations to come – thus the social stampede, the rush to “get in” before it 
gets too late, the willingness to risk a fight because waiting is no longer a viable option 
(2015, np). 
 
     While Mbembe may begin to explain some of the causes of xenophobia in South African 
society, he neglects the xenophobic politics articulated and enacted not only by the 
‘disenfranchised masses’, but also by ‘social movements from above’, which Neocosmos 
describes (2006a) and which were visible in Durban in April 2015 and in Operation Fiela (see 
above).  In Grahamstown in October, this ‘top-down’ xenophobia was observable in the words 
of some municipal councillors who agreed that the foreigners should go or should at least have 
fewer shops in the township (O’Halloran 2015b).  The politics of citizenship which motivated 
UPM and RPM members during the Grahamstown crisis was of shared political belonging, 
despite the oppression and exclusion—the poverty—which affected them. 
     Neocosmos (2006a) writes that xenophobia is ‘a discourse and practice of exclusion from 
community’; furthermore, ‘this process of exclusion is a political process’ ‘concerned with 
exclusion from citizenship [that] denotes a specific political relationship between state and 
society’ (15-18).  Historically, xenophobic politics have been strongly linked to colonial 
racism and to the manufacture of inequality still experienced in South Africa today.   
Xenophobia has been a politics of oppression and control of poor people and ‘foreigners’—
those who are deemed not to belong, who have most often been identified as Africans.  The 
state, in its many forms from the colonial period through apartheid and into the post-1994 era, 
has actively participated in defining ‘foreignness’ in ways that exclude poor, black people.  
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Monopolies and business interests—beer, taxis, shops—have had a role in deciding who and 
what is ‘foreign’, in producing exclusion and in inciting violence.  In the daily experiences of 
xenophobic mobilisations in Grahamstown, the spatial politics that are central to this thesis, 
which were clear historically, are bluntly manifested.  In recent years, poor people have been 
mobilised against other poor people and Africans against other Africans in this project of 
exclusion, control, and oppression.  It is part of Mamdani’s argument that this sort of conflict 
among members of the oppressed working-classes has, in South Africa just before the end of 
apartheid, made clear urban-rural distinctions, as in violence in mining hostels in the 
Transvaal in 1990.  Importantly, political parties, the apparatuses of indirect rule, and the 
rationalities of both were pivotal during that instance of urban-rural division (1996, Chapter 
7).  Similar modes of top down politics will be discussed in the next chapter. 
     Beginning to turn this discussion of citizenship and the xenophobic crisis of October 
towards the question behind this research, we can look to James Holston’s distinction, 
developed in the study of urban settings in Brazil, between two modes of citizenship, 
‘entrenched’ and ‘insurgent’ (2008, 6).  The difference is another formulation of ‘formal’ 
citizenship and practical experience of differentiated citizenship set out in the introduction 
through Chatterjee’s explanation of ‘political society’, with Holston’s emphasis on the 
capability of those who lack access to formal rights to produce forms of political belonging or 
citizenship.  The ‘entrenched’ form of citizenship considered here lends itself to exclusion.  As 
Neocosmos writes, ‘[Xenophobia] is a consequence of an understanding of politics which 
presupposes boundaries and territories the other side of which is populated by others who do 
not possess the rights which we enjoy.  It is therefore linked to the rise of the territorial state in 
Africa as this develops primarily with colonialism/apartheid and which is then consolidated in 
the post-colonial period’ (2006a, 18).  The spatial exclusion of the past, which entrenched a 
certain form of citizenship, is among the political precursors of contemporary modes of 
exclusion. 
     Forms of insurgent citizenship, Holston argues, are the outcome of ‘democratic 
disjunctions’ or politically enforced inequalities because of which ‘insurgent citizenship 
disrupts established formulas of rule, conceptions of right, and hierarchies of social place and 
privilege’ and ‘erodes entrenched practices of domination and deference that gave the everyday 
its sense of order and security’ (2008, 274).  It is important that ‘insurgency’, in this usage, is 
political: the manufacture of citizenship, whether from above or below, can shift the political 
organisation of space.  Indeed, the political history of the Grahamstown region from the 
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beginning of the colonial conquest through the end of apartheid represents one such process 
through multiple stages. 
     Julian Brown (2015) has applied this theory of insurgent citizenship to contemporary South 
Africa, arguing that in the political actions of many South Africans—acts and people that are 
often considered not political because they are not organised through formal state politics—the 
construction of new forms of citizenship not limited to the state conception is possible.  Brown 
focuses largely on possibilities for political opening—that is, what is often termed 
‘emancipatory politics’—but rightfully acknowledges that closed and exclusionary politics are 
also possible.  The example he provides of the latter are South Africa’s increasingly common 
xenophobic attacks.  The importance of state involvement in these politics, which Brown 
concedes, highlights Holston’s point that ‘entrenched’ and ‘insurgent’ citizenship are 
‘entangled’, and the latter can be implicated in the perpetuation of the former as ‘a mechanism 
to distribute inequality’ (2008, 7).  This entanglement, concludes Holston, ‘both corrodes the 
old regime and perverts the new’ as insurgent citizenship can ‘irrupt on the very foundations 
of the entrenched’ and yet become ‘bogged down by the past it inherits as well as confronts’ 
(2008, 313).  While our focus has been on the possibilities of more open politics, particularly 
in terms of space, it is a crucial observation that ‘social movements from below’ are sometimes 
about limiting politics, as well. 
     The ‘inherited past’ mingles colonialism with liberalism, and liberal modes of citizenship 
inflected with colonial concepts, especially of race, are key to this discussion.  One useful 
conceptual distinction which Brown borrows from Engin Isin for the South African context is 
between ‘activist citizens’ and ‘active citizens’, in which the former contest the politics of the 
state while the latter contest the operation and efficacy of its institutions (2015, 61).  ‘Existing 
practices’, Brown writes, ‘may guide the ways in which these enactments occur, but they do 
not determine them.  Political acts are creative: they enable new forms of identification to 
emerge. In the context provided by practises of citizenship as the basis of political agency, they 
enable new kinds of citizens to emerge’ (2015, 61).  This ‘activist-active’ distinction might be 
made in relation to UPM and RPM, and was even made to some extent by some of the members 
of the movements.  As one RPM member explained,  
 
The struggles in the towns they are noticed and people are listened to.  Maybe it’s 
because of how they demonstrate.  They would even block roads, burn places, whereas 
in the rural areas we just complain but we do not burn things, thinking that we are 
saving ourselves [by] keeping peace, so it would be important to have that linkage [to 
struggles in town]. [Interpreter’s translation]. 
 
 
120 
 
Indeed, though this statement was not specifically about UPM, and many other urban struggles 
and social movements could be inserted as examples, UPM’s approach to politics is often more 
confrontational than RPM’s.  They both participate in marches and petitioning, but UPM, 
especially in its early years, has burned tires and dumped buckets of human waste in 
government buildings, which RPM has not done.  However, that is not meant to suggest that 
UPM are some kind of a renegade group or that RPM are not challenging the state in some 
ways.  They both engage with the institutions of the (liberal) state: the municipality, the police, 
and the courts.  Both movements can be recognised in what Brown depicts as ‘disruptions of 
the political order [that] serve to provoke incremental and instrumental changes that open up 
spaces for new developments, for the potential redistribution of goods, power, and authority, 
and for an increasingly just social distribution’ (2015, 62).  In part because of this similarity, 
UPM and RPM are able to cooperate on many issues and to some extent it demonstrates a way 
in which politics is not immediately defined by the space in which people or a movement live 
and operate or by their location in urban or rural settings.   
     However, while Brown ultimately has faith in the ability of formal liberal institutions, and 
in particular of the law and courts, to effect change or to be changed under pressure from 
‘insurgent citizens’ in order for a more just society to emerge, this does not altogether mesh 
with the ideas of many members of UPM and, to a lesser extent, RPM, despite the fact that 
they engage with those institutions at times.  Many see these institutions, the state, and formal 
politics as sometimes tools and more often as adversaries (although sometimes both, 
simultaneously) in their struggles, but also as inherently broken.  Brown is clear on these 
contradictions inherent in ‘insurgent citizenship’ and notes there are ‘several strategies’ 
available to activists and communities that include confrontation and engagement (2015, 116), 
sees the possible ‘harnessing’ of movements’ disruptive political power by engagement with 
formal structures (2015, 125), but also views the formal avenues as necessary to the success of 
‘insurgent’ forms of citizenship rather than fundamentally politically contingent.  Assertions 
of political equality and agency are, in Brown’s view, about exposing inequality in daily 
experience and in access to the formal arenas of citizenship (2015, 149).  The ‘new forms of 
identification’ and ‘new kinds of citizenship’ of which Brown writes are asserted both in and 
out of liberal structures of citizenship, but the existence of those structures is not challenged.  
The ‘opening of politics’ or a more ‘open’ politics refers to the expanding of current modes of 
(liberal) citizenship applied to different or more people.  The possibility that those structures 
might be altogether dismissed through the constitution of a different form or forms of 
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citizenship not dependent upon or defined through those institutions is not very seriously 
explored.   
     While practically, as the two social movements in question are currently constituted, there 
does not appear to be potential for self-removal out from the current state’s authority and a 
reconstitution of authority in new political space as we have seen possible in Landau’s analysis 
of pre-colonial politics, the ‘interior horizons’ of many UPM and RPM members certainly 
imagine a different dispensation than the current one and they are not invested in maintaining 
the structures they have to deal with in their struggles.  For some examples (not without 
complexity and contradiction), UPM has demanded the dissolution of Makana Municipality, 
and RPM have been involved in challenging the existence of ‘traditional authorities’.  Neither 
movement is invested in the continuation of a particular mode of top-down political authority 
should it become ‘more equal’.  In the words, ‘it will be us facing our experiences’, is found a 
clear renunciation of forms of representation by or through others. 
     In spite of the daily differences of experience, and, indeed, also because of their similarities, 
members of UPM and RPM can assert that ‘the struggles are the same’.  They are ‘bottom-up’ 
and egalitarian.  Far from ‘utopian’, their politics simply do not always rely on liberal 
definitions of citizenship and liberal modes of defining citizenship.  They are assertions, 
perhaps hard to discern amidst the ubiquity of the state and its politics, of the current order’s 
contingency and of a true ‘open-endedness’ that is the basis of Brown’s argument, if made in 
the context of liberalism (2015, 163).  It should be noted that forms of liberalism (linked, as 
ever, to forms of despotism) at work historically were important to defining people through 
race, tribe, and citizenship in ways that were increasingly spatialised. 
 
The national student uprising and the outbreak of looting are undoubtedly a part of the longer 
narrative of political movements recounted through the first three chapters, and their place in 
South Africa’s history deserves close attention.  As Neocosmos has argued, the (now recurring) 
crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is a feature of the country’s crisis of democracy (2006a), 
and the students categorically expressed their position that their struggle was an effort to hold 
the state accountable to its people and to have universities that are accessible to and function 
for the people of South Africa (Naicker 2015).  Perhaps urban and rural space were not at stake 
in these events, but space certainly was, as well as citizenship, and race—in this case, with 
black or ‘Arab’ as referents.  In Grahamstown, UPM members, so important in this research, 
worked hard during the crisis to quash the xenophobic rumours, to end the looting, and to 
provide needed supplies and support to the affected families.  After members of UPM went 
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through the township distributing flyers with an anti-xenophobic message and speaking to 
residents, one UPM member said, ‘We heard two things.  We heard about the rumours [of the 
murderer being a foreigner], and we heard the frustration of unemployment.’  While 
xenophobia is not a natural progression from poverty, we cannot divorce both frustrations from 
the politics of inequality and exclusion that have a long history in South Africa and 
Grahamstown, and which we have seen UPM and RPM working against.  In Grahamstown, 
xenophobic politics affected most the people who live in the township, the space of exclusion. 
     These two mobilisations of October, one which seeks to democratise higher education in 
South Africa and has met with repression from universities14 and the state and one which seeks 
to exclude through violence and is countered with activism driven by shared humanity, shared 
rights, and shared struggle is the backdrop not only for the conclusion of this research but for 
the immediate future of UPM and RPM, and of other social movements across South Africa.  
Although a different focus is necessary for concluding here, this political context now in the 
process of being reshaped and its significance for many of the concepts interrogated in this 
research must be acknowledged.  With this in mind, we will turn once more to the question set 
out at the beginning: do the politics of social movements offer a critique of the notion of 
discrete urban and rural political spaces? 
14 Except when they marched to EMC, Rhodes students did not have police deployed against them in October 
2015 as students did in almost every protest across South Africa.  They had encountered police earlier in the year, 
however, when an attempt was made to prevent BSM members from entering a meeting of the university Senate 
on 28 August. 
 
                                                 
CONCLUSION 
‘STILL MORE THINGS WE’RE SUPPOSED TO FIGHT’ 
 
‘The elite will attach a fundamental importance to organization, so much so that the fetish of 
organization will often take precedence over a reasoned study of colonial society.’ – Frantz 
Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth ([1961] 1963, 108) 
 
 
Closing an argument on space demands a return to its primary theorist, Lefebvre.  Writing in 
the second half of the twentieth century, he observes, ‘The state is consolidating on a world 
scale.  It weighs down on society (on all societies) in full force; it plans and organizes society 
“rationally”, with the help of knowledge and technology, imposing analogous, if not 
homologous, measures irrespective of political ideology, historical background, or the class 
origins of those in power’ ([1974] 1991, 23).  As a ‘social movement from above’, the state in 
Southern/Africa has undergone great shifts in its political organisation of space as indigenous 
political systems were usurped by processual colonial systems that produced apartheid and then 
the emergence of a liberal-democratic state in 1994.  Throughout the period reviewed here, 
urban has been persistently separated ‘from above’ from rural.  As Lefebvre continues, ‘Space 
in its Hegelian form comes back into its own.  This modern state promotes and imposes itself 
as a stable centre – definitively – of (national) societies and spaces’ ([1974] 1991, 23).    
     The state conceived of as operating as a ‘stable centre’ imbued with the Hegelian 
relationship between domination and subservience is crucial to the argument here.  The 
discussion1 on engagement and confrontation with state institutions by social movements and 
the way in which citizenship politics can be ‘entangled’ brings to the fore perhaps the most 
significant point coming out of the interviews with UPM and RPM: the issue of ‘social 
movements from above’.  The specific movements which were repeatedly mentioned and 
explained in the interviews are political parties, which are organisations for the contestation 
and perpetuation of the state’s politics, and NGOs, usually categorised within ‘civil society’, 
which, though not the state itself, is certainly within the ambit of state power and logic 
(Neocosmos 2006b).  Political parties and NGOs emerged in the interviews as potentially (and 
often) divisive within and between social movements.  This deserves close attention because 
of the historical processes of spatial and political division from above that transpired in the 
Grahamstown region. 
     We will begin with NGOs.  The relationship between NGOs and social movements is first 
and foremost an unequal relationship.  As many of the members of UPM and RPM explained, 
1 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
123 
 
                                                 
124 
 
funding for their movements comes (or can come) almost entirely from NGOs, which often 
creates a situation in which social movements are dependent upon and subordinate to NGOs.  
As people also explained, this allows NGO agendas (which are likewise motivated by funding) 
to be pressed upon social movements.  This is corroborated by Helliker, who writes, ‘The 
historical evidence suggests very strongly that this interface [between NGOs and social 
movements] is marked broadly by movement subordination to the dictates of NGO dispositions 
and imperatives’ (2013, 325).  For an anecdotal example, we can look to the narrative outlined 
by one woman employed by an NGO working in the rural Eastern Cape: Her NGO was formed 
in the late 1970s in response to the crisis of education in the Eastern Cape, but after the change 
in government in the mid-1990s, overseas funding was no longer available for education work 
and the issues on which the NGO focused became food sovereignty and small-scale farming.2  
While this was also ostensibly a response to local need, the weight of funding in the shift of 
focus demonstrates the ‘top-down’ political imposition that can occur in NGO-social 
movement relationships in which funding determines how and for what people should or will 
be political.  The difference in approach just mentioned between UPM and RPM may be 
traceable to their different relationships with NGOs: RPM is closely connected with Masifunde 
in Grahamstown, which perhaps limits their options in terms of how to protest—NGOs do not 
promote the burning of tires, etc.  It is likely that the decision to be more engaged with formal 
institutions rather than confrontational is an aspect of relationships with NGOs, which operate 
within the sphere of those formal institutions rather than outside.  The significance of this to 
space will be engaged shortly. 
     Helliker writes that NGOs ‘occupy a contradictory and tension-riddled social space marked 
by pressures involving simultaneously upward and downward accountability, referring to 
global funders and local communities, respectively’, and that, because of this, ‘NGOs tend to 
suture their world and bring a simple coherence and logic to it, and normally in a manner which 
is consistent with the prevailing social order’ (2013, 318).  One (perhaps extreme) example 
occurred during the course of this research, when RPM members attended a national 
conference for rural movements organised by the Trust for Community Outreach and 
Education (TCOE) in Port Elizabeth in September 2014.  On the first day of the conference, 
movement members were asked to discuss their experience of encounters with the government, 
and one major problem that was cited was how movements were often expected, at 
government-convened meetings, to read through and endorse long documents that had not been 
2 This was the only interview undertaken with an NGO employee during the course of this research. 
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distributed in advance for careful consideration.  This was acknowledged by the NGO 
employees as a serious problem, but on the second day of the conference, a draft ‘constitution’ 
for a national rural mass movement was presented with the expectation that it could be 
discussed and decisions taken as a scheduled portion of the day’s programme in spite of the 
fact that only the handful of people who had drafted the document had seen it before and there 
were not enough printed copies for everyone in the room.3  The similarities to what was 
experienced by social movement activists as common government practises towards them are 
almost humourous, except that they demonstrate a marked lack of respect for the time and ideas 
of social movement activists.  The likening made by one woman in UPM, who was at the 
conference, that NGOs ‘are like municipalities’, comes to mind.  One RPM member who also 
attended this particular conference said, ‘I assume, maybe you have seen that the views of the 
other people were mainly ignored’ by the NGO staff.  ‘There is part of it’, he went on, ‘that is 
turning into sort of a meetings movement only—nothing practical.  You’d find that mostly, the 
NGOs, that’s what they do: there is a meeting, they write down a report, then that’s it. They 
will get the funds for whatever next time’. 
     The connection between NGOs and state politics (not only state-like practises), is very 
important here.  ‘NGOs themselves are normally state-centred in their practices’, writes 
Helliker, and continues,  
 
Additionally NGOs regularly reproduce their own kind of representative politics vis-à-
vis their interactions with movements, in that they claim to act on behalf of (and 
sometimes at the behest of) grassroots communities and movements.  For these reasons, 
movement can be ‘sucked into’ a representative-type of polices and demobilised as a 
result (2013, 319). 
 
In a similar vein, Nigel Gibson’s analysis of NGO-social movement relationships echoes some 
of the words of UPM and RPM members in that many of the relationships ‘have led to the 
demobilization and fracturing of many of the movements and forums’ (2006, 15). 
     Though I just characterised TCOE’s botched attempt at listening to social movement 
members as ‘extreme’, the reality is that NGO connections to state politics can be much deeper 
and pointed and, at times, much more destructive of social movement politics ‘from below’.  
While acknowledging that not all NGOs are bad, Gibson argues that ‘the boom of NGOs over 
the past twenty years is a product of both state and market forces with many NGOs stemming 
indirectly from government’ (2006, 21).  The state and market forces in the period to which 
3 Firsthand account 
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Gibson refers, the mid-1980s through early 2000s, were increasingly tied into a global, neo-
liberal political economy, a trajectory and mode of politics which Gillian Hart has included 
among the factors producing the contemporary ‘South African crisis’ (2013).  We will return 
to how the crisis extends beyond neo-liberalism momentarily. 
     In his exhaustive account of Haitian politics from the end of the Duvalier dictatorships in 
1986 until the ruinous earthquake in 2010, Damming the Flood ([2007] 2010), Peter Hallward 
details the crushing impact of NGOs on ‘bottom-up’ political movements.4  In Haiti, Hallward 
shows, the United States, Canada, and France had imperial interests in preserving low-wage 
manufacturing and textile export sectors that were directly threatened by the end of dictatorship 
and the democratic election of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, an important figure in the 
grassroots political movement Fanmi Lavalas, who enjoyed the support of the huge majority 
of Haitian people, who were (and are) extremely impoverished.  Although the United States 
eventually committed marines to Haiti in 2004 for the removal of Aristide and the conservation 
of the country for a tiny elite which shared American interests, NGOs played an enormous role 
in the containment of democratic politics and the neo-liberalisation of Haiti during the 1990s 
and early 2000s.  ‘NGOs’, writes Hallward, ‘provide rich countries a morally respectable way 
of subcontracting the sovereignty of the nations they exploit’ ([2007] 2010, 179).  Hallward 
cites the United States Agency for International Development on its own statistics, that in 2001 
USAID and partners had ‘almost 1,000 organizations with total membership exceeding 
200,000 people’ in Haiti—an example of NGO and governmental organisation links—which 
are at the forefront of the ‘American plan’ of neo-liberalisation of Haiti ([2010] 2007, 179).  
Not only do NGOs ‘tend to disrupt and then disempower the lives of the people they are 
supposed to support’, for instance, by taking people away from productive and necessary work 
in agriculture, to use Hallward’s example which invokes urban and rural dichotomies, but ‘the 
expansion of an inter-connected NGO sector serves to consolidate rather than challenge the 
hegemony of the cosmopolitan elite’ to the point that ‘NGOs now provide the main institutional 
and ideological mechanism for the reproduction of Haiti’s ruling class’ (Hallward [2007] 2010, 
179-181).  In Haiti, this included the discrediting and demobilising Haiti’s largest popular 
political movement in a cogent example of Rancière’s phrase used once here already: ‘politics 
as the art of suppressing politics’ ([1992] 1995, 10).  
     Haiti has experienced perhaps the most penetrative and vicious patterns of neo-liberal 
imperialism through impoverishment in the world, and certainly in the Western Hemisphere, 
4 The period covered is almost exactly the same in which Gibson observes the burgeoning of NGOs.   
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although the lessons regarding NGOs and their close association with neo-liberal state politics 
and markets are valuable in other locales as well, not least in South Africa (Pithouse 2006, 
256).  Harri Englund has argued, in his study of NGOs in Malawi (2006), that NGOs, which 
are often closely linked to state politics, carry on patterns of paternalism that obtained during 
Malawi’s colonial and post-independence periods. ‘NGOs’, Englund writes, ‘exercise a form 
of self-control [on politics from below].  Their discourse is elitist, even though many of the 
self-proclaimed experts of freedom, democracy, and human rights do not belong to the elite’ 
(2006, 20). However, the point is not only to make ‘[t]he key critique of NGOs’ as ‘elite 
organizations, funded by donors (local and international business, national and foreign 
governments)’ that ‘entrench existing paternalistic relations between the organization and the 
people’ (Gibson 2006, 21-22), but to expose the ways in which NGOs practicing such politics 
are significant in the production of political space.  As we saw in the interviews with UPM and 
RPM members, the idea of ‘jurisdictions’ as specifically associated with NGOs; and, through 
or because of NGOs, with social movements.   
     The tendencies of NGOs to replicate state thinking, to ‘dictate’ to social movements, and to 
work within ‘jurisdictions’ cannot be disassociated from each other and their combined results 
suggest two important insights.  The first is that, in some contexts, NGOs can be important in 
the process of categorising people and politics as urban or rural.  An RPM member used the 
word ‘conserved’ to explain the way in which movements’ politics can be delimited ‘from 
above’.  For instance, land is considered to be part of the rural programme by many NGOs 
despite the assertion made by both rural and urban activists that ‘we all need land’, and the 
explicit centrality of land to such urban movements as Abahlali baseMjondolo in Durban.  The 
particular cases of UPM and RPM bring out another possible way in which NGOs are 
implicated in the production of urban and rural space.  The thesis began with Mamdani’s 
location of ‘civil society’ in the urban—a theory complicated by Chatterjee’s work on urban 
spaces of the ‘governed’5—and the historical chapters demonstrated how, under colonialism, 
urban areas projected a politics onto rural areas while dividing the two politically.  The 
positioning of NGOs within ‘civil society’ suggests that NGOs are part of projecting urban, 
civil politics and power onto rural areas and people, to the extent that ‘civil society’ is not only 
to be found in urban areas but also demarcates urban areas.  Working through state logic, NGOs 
can operate under and re-inscribe such notions of the ‘civil’ urban and the governable rural. 
5 See Introduction. 
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     The different relationships that UPM and RPM have with NGOs are potentially illustrative 
of just such a situation.  UPM may be able to extricate themselves more easily from domination 
by NGOs because they live and work in an urban community that allows for the possibilities 
of a variety of different alliances to be formed.  For UPM, some of these possible alliances are 
with academics, students, lawyers, journalists, trade unions, sports clubs, churches and 
religious leaders, and other community members.  Because these are unregulated alliances 
based on personal interactions—and, in those ways, different from relationships with NGOs—
they are more equal.  Members of UPM can associate and work with people and on issues of 
their choosing, and disassociate with people as they see fit, which is fundamentally different 
from the relationships with NGOs described by movement members.  Students and academics 
can offer access to internet, printing, and library resources; they can also assist with preparing 
statements or work as writers for the media.  These relationships need only be preserved for as 
long as they work for the movement.  Because the university brings visiting academics, there 
is also the opportunity for making countrywide and international connections.  Sometimes these 
visitors are willing to offer support, and this has been the experience of UPM.  There is also 
the opportunity for connections to other movements and other types of movements, for instance 
between UPM and BSM, or UPM and the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, 
the Landless Workers Movement, (MST), in Brazil.  Both UPM and RPM have been able to 
send members to MST events in Brazil—the second such exchange is currently happening, as 
of November 2015—but some MST members who are visiting South Africa are based in 
Grahamstown, and can be in regular interaction with UPM members.  Links to Abahlali 
baseMjondolo in Durban, which has thousands of members, also strengthen UPM’s ability to 
negotiate a greater degree of autonomy from NGOs.  Most important are the opportunities for 
connections and interactions with other members of the community.  During the xenophobic 
crisis, for example, important relationships between some of the affected families and UPM 
were formed.  Masifunde was also involved, but as a partner, not as a directing force.  These 
relationships were possible because of the urban setting in which UPM works. 
     This is not dissimilar to Ealham’s argument in his spatial study of repression and resistance 
in Barcelona, in which ‘face-to-face contact’ was an important factor in creating political urban 
communities, especially among the poor, many of whom had migrated to Barcelona from rural 
areas (2005, 25;86).  Similar rural to urban migration has been a longstanding part of social 
experience in South Africa, often, though not in Grahamstown’s case, because of 
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industrialisation.6 One UPM member spoke about the recent proliferation of game farms in the 
nearby rural areas, which has forced people formerly living and working on commercial farms 
to move to towns, including Grahamstown,  because now ‘there are lions’ and ‘no one to talk 
to’.  Amidst this increasing isolation of rural areas in the Fish River Country, RPM, though 
they still inhabit conventional farmland, do not have the same means of creating political 
alliances that are available, within walking distance, to UPM.  We heard RPM members speak 
about how town-based movements have better access to and more attention from the media, 
and how modes of protest differ between urban and rural areas, with more confrontational 
protest possible in urban areas because it is not ‘safe’ in rural areas.7  One UPM member said 
that manipulation by NGOs ‘is worse for them’, referring to RPM.  The way in which UPM 
members were critical of RPM’s inability to escape the influences of party politics, supported 
by the experiences of organising related by RPM members, also speaks to a continuing urban- 
and civil-society-projected politics working in rural areas. 
     This introduces the second important idea arising from the discussion of NGOs.  Given 
NGOs’ emergence out of and continued immersion in the modes of state politics, not least in 
their top-down functioning and rationalities, the state also appears as a divisive force.  This is 
not a new idea.  Indeed, it is the fundamental argument in Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject, and 
we saw it enacted and enforced historically by the colonial state(s) in terms of an urban and 
rural division.  Considering the problem historically, neo-liberalism does not present itself as 
the primary energy behind this division.  Even if NGOs are an extrusion of neo-liberal policies, 
they are engaged in drawing new types of boundaries around old politics, or, perhaps, old 
boundaries through new politics.  Hart thinks about the ‘South African crisis’ and ‘the transition 
from apartheid in ways that go beyond narratives of “elite pacting” and neoliberalism’, that 
look to ‘the intertwining of race and nationalism in relation to histories of dispossession and 
accumulation’ (2013, 21). 
     Race has formed a central facet of the history and politics presented here, taking into account 
more of dispossession than of accumulation, but nationalism has not been part of the narrative, 
as yet.  While this is not the place to consider the history of African nationalism in the 
Grahamstown region, nationalism does influence the present in significant ways that were 
mentioned in the interviews with UPM and RPM members, particularly in terms of party 
politics and, most specifically, the ANC.  The ANC was influential, though certainly not alone, 
6 See Chapter 3. 
7 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
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among the political forces that combined to bring an end to apartheid, and it has been the ruling 
party since the transition to democracy.  In spite of its significance during the struggle for racial 
democracy, the ANC has increasingly demonstrated an anti-democratic mode of rule, 
beginning most explicitly with the evictions of mostly poor, black shack-dwellers at Bredell 
near Johannesburg in 2001 (Hart 2013; Brown 2015), persistent in the violent repression of 
poor, black activists in Durban for over a decade (Pithouse 2014), continuing through the 
massacre of poor, black miners at Marikana in 2012, and visible, most recently, in the riot 
weaponry employed against mainly working-class, black students in 2015.  As Richard 
Pithouse has written in regard to the political struggles of South Africa’s urban poor, ‘It was 
often assumed that the urban question would be automatically resolved by the success of the 
national struggle. With every day that people continue to make their lives amidst shit and fire, 
every eviction, every beating, every case of torture and every murder that assumption becomes 
ever more fantastical’ (Pithouse 2013, np).  Making a similar point in relation to rural areas, no 
less a figure than the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform linked political struggle, 
nationalism, and inequality when he remarked in 2013, ‘It is inconceivable that after a century 
of struggle, and after 18 years of democracy, social relations in the countryside can continue to 
mirror the patterns of apartheid’ (quoted in Helliker 2013, 317).  As the history presented in 
this thesis has demonstrated, and has also been argued by Neocosmos (2006b), it is not 
accidental that the current state in South Africa employs modes of violent control in similar 
ways to the colonial states of the past, nor that these have spatial determinants. 
     An important thinker who theorises nationalism in colonial, transitional, and post-colonial 
contexts, who has remained close by throughout this argument and appears now once again, is 
Fanon.  ‘History teaches us clearly that the battle against colonialism does not run straight away 
along the lines of nationalism,’ writes Fanon, and continues with his usual eloquence: 
 
National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallization of the 
innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious 
result of the mobilization of the people, will be in any case only an empty shell, a crude 
and fragile travesty of what it might have been.  The faults that we find in it are quite 
sufficient explanation of the facility with which, when dealing with young and 
independent nations, the nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to 
the state.  These are the cracks in the edifice which show the process of retrogression 
[…] ([1961] 1963, 148-149). 
             
Arguments around how race and ‘tribe’ or ethnicity are being politicised in contemporary South 
Africa can and have been made, but the significant point here is that what are definitely 
categories wrought on the colonial forge, like race and tribe, are not dispelled by the transition 
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through nationalism to independence.  As analysed in Chapter 1, in Souther/ern Africa and in 
the Grahamstown region of the Eastern Cape, what I have called the ‘Fish River Country’, the 
processes of defining these categories worked, in part but importantly, through spatial referents 
and politics.  The historically important but contestable divide between urban and rural politics 
was drawn in these processes, and, if we accept Fanon’s analysis, has the potential to be 
preserved or redrawn in nationalism. 
     In light of this, the frequent references by UPM and RPM members to political parties and 
specifically to the ANC as a dividing political force bear great weight.  The party of national 
liberation (as opposed to the National Party of apartheid) appears as a major factor in the 
‘distrust’ between urban and rural movements, much as Fanon argued it could in the course of 
the struggle for national liberation ([1961] 1963, 109; 117; 128).  However, bearing in mind 
the post-independence context of South Africa, Fanon’s arguments around the ‘pitfalls 
[mésaventures] of national consciousness’ in the post-colony are particularly useful.  In this 
period, according to Fanon, the nationalist movement which has formed the state detaches itself 
from the people in the service of foreign capital, the party ‘sinks into an extraordinary lethargy’, 
it ‘becomes an administration’, and the unity, actual or professed, of the struggle years is broken 
in deepening reaffirmations of exclusionary politics, among which, notably, Fanon counts 
xenophobia: the ‘foreigners are called on to leave, their shops are burned, their street stalls are 
wrecked’ ([1961] 1963, 156-171).  Such a crisis is readily apparent, and has been argued by 
many, to exist in South Africa today. 
     However, South Africa’s political crisis does not only arise from nationalism, as we have 
seen.  Michael Neocosmos (2006b) draws together the various issues at hand: the state, 
neoliberalism, nationalism, ‘civil society’, colonialism, and ‘subaltern’ or ‘popular’ politics.  
It is important in any discussion of South African politics to keep these elements in mind as 
interrelated, with multiple strata of contradiction and dependence.  Race and space have their 
place in this political admixture, as well, based on the historical arguments here.  In any case, 
to disregard the relationships among these strands of politics can quickly lead to an 
unconstructive reductionism.  
     Like Gramsci, Neocosmos stresses the links between the state and society, and particularly 
between the state and ‘civil society’.  He asks whether the violently oppressive nature of 
states in Africa and the ‘human rights’8 discourse that goes on in spite of it are not ‘two sides 
of the same liberal coin’ (2006b, 56).  ‘Both alternatives’, argues Neocosmos, ‘proposed by 
8 See Englund (2006) on NGOs and paternalism. 
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power for Africa, namely neo-liberalism and state nationalism, are founded on liberal 
precepts and are fundamentally authoritarian’ (2006b, 59).  These forms of power are, in 
Africa, excretions of the colonial period in which contemporary imperial projects from 
Europe and North America find nourishment, as do the corruption, violence, patriarchy, 
xenophobia, and other exclusionary forms of politics that have frequently followed 
colonialism in the African context (Neocosmos 2006b, 56).  Turning to the position of civil 
society in this political context, we saw that the rise of neo-liberalism coincided with the 
multiplication of NGOS.  Neocosmos argues and shows how ‘[c]ivil society regularly 
excludes democratic politics from its domain, and it has largely come to contribute to the 
constructing of a state consensus, rather than’ enabling democratic politics (2006b, 59).  The 
conclusion reached by Neocosmos is that politics must be considered and applied, if 
democratisation of society is the objective, which do not work in the same modes as state and 
civil society thinking and are not limited to the politics of the state and civil society.  
Mamdani’s argument, accepted throughout this thesis, is that this entails bridging the urban-
rural divide. 
     Fanon centres the failure of the ‘national bourgeoisie’.  In South Africa, it can be argued 
that there is a liberal as well as a national bourgeoisie, since political legitimacy is, in many 
cases, dependent upon the ANC, the party of national liberation and now the ruling party, 
which has aligned itself with global neo-liberalism. ‘A bourgeoisie’, Fanon writes, ‘that 
provides nationalism alone as food for the masses fails in its mission’ by not taking into 
account the consciousness, energies, and actions of the whole people ([1961] 1963, 204).  
This bears similarities to what one RPM member said about ‘the old politics’, the politics of 
contesting the state, that result in a ‘hierarchical social structure’ that in turn excludes people: 
 
If you want to mobilise people, to organise a big massive movement, you know, for a 
mass struggle, then you should not impose things on people.  Of course then, talking 
about consciousness—that people don’t have political consciousness—I don’t believe 
that.  I think everyone is aware of what side of the class he or she belongs to. […] So 
if we were to look to the other way to do things—not to impose, but to work with the 
people—[and]not ignore [but use] the knowledge of the people. 
      
In these words he was talking about several things: about the play of ‘the old politics’ within 
social movements, about the influence of party politics on movements, and about the way in 
which NGOs and the state both treat the ‘knowledge of the people […] who were not lucky 
enough to go to school’.  These different influences and problems cannot be divorced from 
each other, but are intertwined.  In an interesting story relayed to me, when UPM took a no-
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vote or ‘small party’ (meaning not the ANC or DA) stance in the national elections in May 
2014, the NGO Masifunde did not approve—a gesture that asserts the linkages between ‘civil 
society’ and the state.  Whether this specific stance by Masifunde has any bearing on RPM’s 
politics and the way in which RPM and UPM relate did not become clear, but certainly activists 
made plain that both NGOs and party politics were acting on the movements’ relationship, and 
the link between them is not to be dismissed. 
     Fundamentally, the link is occasioned by ideas about society’s organisation, which the one 
man from RPM portrayed just above as ‘hierarchical’.  The epigraph to this chapter, once again 
from Fanon, on the elite fetishising of organisation which precludes a ‘reasoned study of 
colonial society’ offers a way to meld the many strands of thought working here.  What 
preceded the interrogation of UPM and RPM’s politics had every intention of providing a 
‘reasoned study of colonial society’, and what came out of that was an understanding that 
politicised space was of great conceptual and experiential significance during the colonial 
period and the particular effects of this are still experienced by many.  The propensity for 
‘social movements from above’ to organise the political terrain over which ‘social movements 
from below’ mobilise, spatially and in other ways, did not end with the colonial period and 
apartheid, an argument suggested by the understandings of UPM and RPM members regarding 
political parties and civil society NGOs.  Indeed, the possibility of these movements ‘from 
above’ structuring society along the same fault lines that colonialism established is apparent.  
It should be noted that even UPM’s and RPM’s organisation as concretely defined movements 
begins to be affected by the problems of ‘fetishised’ organisation, especially in the case of 
RPM, which is patrolled more closely because of its NGO affiliation.  Like all movements, 
though, they change with their context, as in the case of the xenophobic attacks during which 
the function and shape of the movements was altered in response to the crisis.  They were able 
to organise differently—‘outside’ or ‘beyond’—the specific categories developed in and 
encouraged through entrenched colonial and national politics of race, space, and citizenship. 
     In terms of our driving question, what is clear is that space acts on UPM and RPM in several 
different ways, or that they occupy several types of political spaces produced through different 
modes of politics.  UPM has inherited a partitioned town in which space is divided in terms of 
race and class and politicised by those referents.  RPM struggle against the undemocratic 
tendencies of ‘rural democracy’.  In many ways, they exemplify Chatterjee’s ‘political society’, 
which is conceived of as governed politically rather than as participating in politics.  Yet, UPM, 
like political actors of Grahamstown’s past with whom they share similar situations, engage 
with the formal political structures and civil society.  There is not an unbridgeable gulf between 
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UPM and those structures.  The same is true of RPM, who inhabit, perhaps, a more complex 
political spatial geography.  Though rural in the historically produced and politicised sense of 
the term, they also have some access to the same structures of formal state politics; they are 
also affiliated with an NGO, and thus in close association to ‘urban’ ‘civil society’, which is 
therefore not precisely and exclusively urban as Mamdani has argued.  We have seen the same 
sort of ambiguity present in urban areas and urban politics, as well.9  At the same time, RPM 
as an organisation crosses spaces that are under municipal authority and traditional authority, 
and members live on land that was historically both commercially farmed and part of the Ciskei 
Bantustan.  As one member explained it: 
 
From the people who lived on farms under white people back then, the government put 
them closer to the chief, and then the chief does enforce its rule or impose its rules 
upon the people.  The main contradiction is that the chief is supposed to help to develop 
the people. 
 
On account of this, RPM’s politics considers and engages with both structures in the complex 
project of ‘rural democracy’.  Still, some RPM members can speak of themselves as ‘remote’ 
from towns and urban politics, where struggles are able to gain more attention, purchase, and 
momentum. 
     The first conclusion to be drawn from this sketch of UPM’s and RPM’s spatial politics is 
that Mamdani’s bifurcation is an incomplete interpretation of the South African political 
landscape, at least in the Grahamstown region of the Eastern Cape.  Even when one considers 
how these social movements engage with the state—whether the state refers to ‘civil society’ 
institutions or the ‘traditional’ authorities—they do not engage exclusively with one or the 
other, and particularly RPM, though UPM has supported them in issues of ‘rural democracy’, 
as well.  Therefore, even in a state-centred approach via social movements, the critique of 
Mamdani as state-centric can be upheld when one considers the political life of ostensibly 
‘urban’ and ‘rural’ South Africans involved in social movements.  This sort of political 
relationship seems to be explainable through Brown’s tracing of social movements in their 
interactions with civil society, or in Tarrow, who writes about how the ‘potential disruption’ 
by movements ‘led national states to […] open new forms of participation to their citizens’ 
(1994, 76).  However, this leads to the question of whether ‘bottom-up’ cannot also be an 
expression of ‘top-down’ in different guise. 
9 See Introduction. 
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     A second conclusion, which is of great significance to understanding the politics of the 
social movements in South Africa today, is the role of NGOs in producing different types of 
political space working through spatial divisions between urban and rural.  Given the frequent 
links between social movements and NGOs, the delimitation of politics and of political spaces 
by NGOs in ways that show continuity with oppressive politics of the past and the present 
should be taken seriously. 
     What can be certain is that the political landscape produced through ‘social movements from 
above’ is more complicated than bifurcation would suggest.  If nothing else, social movement 
politics have demonstrated that.  Still, the purpose was to examine social movements as outside 
of the state, and while it has arisen that indeed many social movements not only of the ‘from 
above’ variety but also ‘from below’ are not fundamentally challenging the state but are 
acceding to the form of its politics, and while the two movements in question sometimes fall 
among these, there are other times when UPM and RPM are acting outside of the formal 
political arena.  The xenophobic attacks in Grahamstown described above have demonstrated 
this.  Even while they petitioned the municipality for assistance, UPM10 were mobilising in the 
community on their own terms and around a different understanding of politics than that with 
which, based on their actions, the municipality and police was operating. 
 
So far, this analysis has largely accounted for the ‘practical scope’ of these social movements, 
and situated them within the region’s political history.  In turning back to the ‘interior 
horizons’, it is valuable to look to Aguilar once again.  She writes, ‘collective emancipatory 
action and its deep transformation of social, economic, and political relationships needs to be 
considered from a separate and distinct channel from the political struggle for government and 
state control’ because these two types of politics ‘move at different speeds and through different 
paths’ (2014, xxxvii; emphasis original).  Although they are ‘separate and independent of one 
another’, ‘each exists in relation to the other because together they define political realty at a 
given place and time’ (2014, xxxvii).  They are ‘entangled’, to relate to Holston’s argument, 
above.  Therefore, despite what appears to be the continuation of an epistemic and political 
division between urban and rural space, legitimated in different ‘social movements from above’ 
and often acceded to even by the ‘social movements from below’ that sometimes challenge 
them and sometimes work with them, we cannot discount what happens in those times when 
10 RPM were involved in seeking a political solution to the crisis on the first morning, but later transportation 
proved to be an obstacle to their participation. 
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rupture occurs.  Because of the massive student strikes, October 2015 was a time of rupture in 
South Africa, and possibly part of a longer and harder to define period of rupture.  The 
experience of active xenophobic politics during the same time denotes a rupture in the 
particular case of Grahamstown, as well, including for the social movements in question who 
defined for themselves a role based on a different politics, even if the day to day or month to 
month experience and practise of those social movements does not constitute a rupture.   
     But those moments of actual rupture when collective action produces politics require and 
substantiate the existence of interior political horizons.  Therein is found the dialectic of action 
and reflection already discussed.11  On the interior horizon of these movements the idea of 
discrete urban and rural political spaces might not exist, or, at least, might not define politics.  
Indeed, the words of some activists suggest that an effort must be made to move beyond those 
spaces, but that this movement is limited by various political forces that repartition urban 
politics and rural politics without including the politics of all the people this affects, once again 
operating through and enforcing exclusion of some from the ‘legitimate’ realm of politics.  
Fanon wrote of ‘cracks’ which widen to divide people politically, while we heard from one 
activist12 of ‘cracks’ which could be traced in order to unite people ‘across the whole world if 
we were able to use’ the spaces of the people.  What exactly those spaces of the people are or 
can be is uncertain, and no attempt to guess will be made, for they require the practise of politics 
by living people if they are to be worked out.  However, they would certainly appear differently 
on a map than the spaces which have been organised through many years by colonialism and 
capital, each in diverse forms, which have orchestrated the present divisions.   
     We saw in Landau (2010)13 the definite possibility of ordinary people defining political 
spaces for themselves.  We have also seen a long history of people challenging various 
movements from ‘above’, and there are people who continue to contest such politics.  Members 
of UPM and RPM are clear that they do not accept that the world of their experience is the only 
way in which the world can be organised or that the current dominant politics is the only 
politics.  The essence of this alternative politics is perhaps apprehended in an assertion that 
rings true in the recent experience of social movements during the xenophobic violence, ‘Every 
challenge you get into, it makes you different […].  Every challenge brings different 
organisation […].  The ideas change all the time.  Even the idea of today, even [tomorrow] it 
can change, even if it was a good idea’.  
11 See Second Excursus. 
12 See Chapter 4. 
13 See Chapter 1. 
 
                                                 
137 
 
     Perhaps the plot of this argument has progressed since we first saw the phrase ‘the burden 
of protest’—that is the hope, anyway—or maybe it has not; but it appears that, given the 
momentary nature of politics and experience and the way in which history works in and out of 
the politics of the moment, no conclusion can go further than agreement, lent legitimacy 
through the words of activists, that protest must span urban and rural space.  In the words of 
one man, the man who lives the eThembeni shack settlement in Grahamstown, who says that 
he and many are still suffering, who detects no freedom in his and others’ experiences despite 
the advent of democracy, who sees all the excluded involved in one struggle, the importance 
of social movements of the people is that ‘they try to show that there are still more things we’re 
supposed to fight.’  In fighting, it is possible that new configurations of political space could 
be conceptualised and organised, through modes of politics that are different than the modes 
that produced and produce divided spaces, different than those which emplace cordons of 
police between the spaces of rights and of control. 
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